Critical interpretation of practical and legal conclusions on the lack of free will and moral responsibility
Keywords:analytical philosophy, free will, moral responsibility, legal system, retributive function, justice
AbstractThe article analyzes the concepts of moral responsibility and free will in their close relationship and looks into their essential characteristics and influence on the legal system. Logical inconsistency of the conclusions on moral inadmissibility of the functioning of criminal law and legal proceedings in case of no free will and hence moral responsibility is proved. Some alternative non-moral approaches to substantiation of legal institutions in a world without moral responsibility are outlined. The former consider that philosophy makes it possible to address the question of why man should be responsible for his actions. Legal systems are mainly supported by the thesis that free will is the social basis for imposing responsibility on man for his behavior. Freedom is the main personal social implication for criminal responsibility. An attempt is made to substantiate the illegitimacy of the conclusions regarding the internal contradiction in the functioning of legal systems in a world without moral responsibility. It is shown that not all legal systems are based on moral principles, especially in a world where moral responsibility is not expected in principle. Therefore, in the world lacking moral responsibility no guilt and accusations of injustice are unlawful.
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Copyright (c) 2018 Halyna Diakovska, Vasyl Hontar
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