DOI: https://doi.org/10.21847/1728-9343.2018.5(157).148409

Critical interpretation of practical and legal conclusions on the lack of free will and moral responsibility

Halyna Diakovska, Vasyl Hontar

Abstract


The article analyzes the concepts of moral responsibility and free will in their close relationship and looks into their essential characteristics and influence on the legal system. Logical inconsistency of the conclusions on moral inadmissibility of the functioning of criminal law and legal proceedings in case of no free will and hence moral responsibility is proved. Some alternative non-moral approaches to substantiation of legal institutions in a world without moral responsibility are outlined. The former consider that philosophy makes it possible to address the question of why man should be responsible for his actions. Legal systems are mainly supported by the thesis that free will is the social basis for imposing responsibility on man for his behavior. Freedom is the main personal social implication for criminal responsibility. An attempt is made to substantiate the illegitimacy of the conclusions regarding the internal contradiction in the functioning of legal systems in a world without moral responsibility. It is shown that not all legal systems are based on moral principles, especially in a world where moral responsibility is not expected in principle. Therefore, in the world lacking moral responsibility no guilt and accusations of injustice are unlawful.

Keywords


analytical philosophy; free will; moral responsibility; legal system; retributive function; justice

Full Text:

PDF

References


Fisher, J. M. 1997. Responsibility, Control and Omissions. The Journal of Ethics. Vol. 1. No. 1: 45-64.

Fisher, J. M. 2002. Frankfurt-style compatibilism. In: Sarah Buss and Lee Overton (ed.). Contours of agency: essays on themes from Harry Frankfurt. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 381 p.

Kvаshа, О. О. 2012. Svоbоdа vоlі tа іnshі fіlоsоfskі kаtеhоrii v оbgruntuvanni zlоchynnoi pоvеdіnky tа vіdpоvіdаlnostі zа nеi. Vіsnyk Luhanskoho dеrzhаvnоgо unіvеrsytetu vnutrіshnіkh sprаv іmеnі Е.О. Dіdоrеnkа. 2: 3-12 (ukr).

Mоlоdchеnkо, V.V. 2010. Svоbоdа vоlі yak pіdgruntia mоrаlnоhо vybоru оsоbystostі. Fіlоsоfskі оbrii. Nаukоvо-tеоrеtychnyi zhurnal. Issue 23. Pp.264 (ukr).

Nelkin, D.K. 2004. Sense of freedom. In: Campbell J.K. (ed.). Freedom and determinism. Cambridge: 105-134.

Pereboom, D. 2001. Living Without Free Will, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 231 p.

Pereboom, D. 2016. Оptimisticheskii skеptitsizm оtnоsitelno svоbоdy vоli [translat. P.Khаnоvа]. Lоgоs. № 5: 59-102 (rus).

Rаtynska, І. V. 2015. Моrаlnа vіdpоvіdаlnіst і svоbоdа: lоgіkа vzayemоzviazku. Nаukоvі zаpysky. Psykholoho-pеdаhоhіchnі nаuky. № 3: 49-53 (ukr).

Strawson, G. 2013. The Impossibility of Ultimate Moral Responsibility. In: P.Russell, O.Deery (eds.). The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Reading from the Contemporary Debates. New York, Oxford University Press: 363-365.

Vаsiliev, V.V. 2016. V zаshchitu klаssichеskоgо kоmpаtibilizma. Vоprosy filоsоfii, 2: 64-76 (rus).


GOST Style Citations


Васильев В. В. В защиту классического компатибилизма. Вопросы философии. 2016. №2. С. 64-76.

 

Кваша О. О. Свобода волі та інші філософські категорії в обґрунтуванні злочинної поведінки та відповідальності за неї. Вісник Луганського державного університету внутрішніх справ імені Е. О. Дідоренка. 2012. № 2. С. 3-12.

 

Молодченко В. В. Свобода волі як підґрунтя морального вибору особистості. Філософські обрії. Науково-теоретичний журнал. 2010. Вип.23. 264 с.

 

Ратинська І. В. Моральна відповідальність і свобода: логіка взаємозв’язку. Наукові записки. Психолого-педагогічні науки. 2015. № 3. С. 49-53.

 

Перебум Дерк. Оптимистический скептицизм относительно свободы воли / Пер. с англ. П.Ханова. Логос. 2016. № 5. С. 59-102.

 

Fisher J. M. Frankfurt-style compatibilism. Contours of agency: essays on themes from Harry Frankfurt / ed. Sarah Buss and Lee Overton. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002. 381 p.

 

Fisher J. M. Responsibility, Control and Omissions. The Journal of Ethics. 1997. Vol. 1. No. 1. Рp. 45-64.

 

Nelkin D. K. Sense of freedom. In: Freedom and determinism / ed. Campbell J.K. Cambridge, 2004. P. 105-134.

 

Pereboom D. Living Without Free Will. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 231 p.

 

Strawson G. The Impossibility of Ultimate Moral Responsibility. The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Reading from the Contemporary Debates / eds. P.Russell, O.Deery. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. pp. 363-365.