

Transformation of Historical Memory and Identity: the Reception of Paul Ricoeur's Philosophy

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The article is devoted to the study of the interaction between memory and identity in the philosophy of P. Ricoeur. It clarifies the content of the concepts of "memory," "identity," "narrative," and "narrative identity," which are fundamental to the philosopher's original conceptual framework. Within the scope of investigating the outlined issues, the author analyzes the interpretation of memory and the mechanisms of memorization, and examines historical knowledge and its representation in consciousness as a tool for analyzing the interconnection between memory and history. The study also considers the concept of "narrative identity" introduced into scientific discourse and the role of narrative in P. Ricoeur's oeuvre. The author emphasizes that if memory is a representation of history, then narrative identity emerges as a foundational property of self-knowledge and the self-determination of the individual. From this follows the main characteristic of historical memory: it is the result of a complex dialectical interaction between individual and collective narratives, shared memory, and personal experiences. The contradictory nature of such interaction lies in the fact that this process creates both opportunities for self-awareness and a basis for distortions. Since memory is subjective, it can serve as both a source of continuity and a cause of the disruption of self-consciousness, where traumatic memories destroy the integrity of narrative and identity.

KEYWORDS

*identity,
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personality,
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Introduction

Paul Ricoeur joined the bright galaxy of philosophers of the phenomenological and hermeneutic directions. The specificity of his concept is that he invented something common between the above-mentioned scientific trends, offering a certain vision of history, of the historical process in close connection with the personality. It is known that being a professor at the Sorbonne and the University of Chicago, Paul Ricoeur was also an honorary professor at more than 30 universities around the world, including the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. The noted fact very well indicates the significance of the scientist's figure at the international level. This is largely explained by the fact that he managed to penetrate the transformational processes at the turn of the 21st century and provide them with an explanation and understanding in the vein of philosophical thought. In this case, one cannot fail to cite K. Sigov's apt statement that Ricoeur's philosophy plays a fundamental role, similar to that played for the culture of the 20th century by the thought of Bergson, Husserl, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Gadamer (Sihov, 2006). He returned to practical philosophy that high dignity that is almost forgotten in post-communist countries. The day after the philosopher's death, on Saturday, May 21, K. Sigov continues, the speeches of the President, Prime Minister, and Minister of Culture of France were published on the Internet. The world heard: "The entire European tradition is filled with grief for one of its most talented voices." (Sihov, 2006: 6).

The key issue in Paul Ricoeur's historiography is the problem of "just memory". On this occasion, O. Losyk reveals in the philosophy of the scientist the path of analysis of ambiguous relationships between historical narrative

(narrative) and temporal experience, which decisively influence individual or collective aspirations to know, understand, express the past and present in the categories of "truth", "truthfulness", "justice". His reflexive position found followers in the non-European, Anglo-American philosophical environment, and also provoked polemics of ambitious determinists (in particular, Marxists L. Althusser and P. Villard), polemized on dialogical principles with representatives of the analytical direction and opposed structuralists (Losyk, 2011).

P. Ricoeur directly connects the interpretation of the text and human experience. As V. Zaichko notes, in this context the analysis of symbols and language becomes especially important, since they are the means through which peoples transmit their unique experience, and therefore their national identity, from generation to generation (Zaichko, 2024: 197). Metaphor cannot be literally paraphrased without losing its semantic content. Reflection must become interpretation, since I cannot grasp the act of existence otherwise than through signs scattered in the world n (Zaichko, 2024: 198).

Another modern Ukrainian researcher L. Nagorna draws attention to the fact that the philosophical approach to memory problems proposed by the scientist, colored by psychoanalysis, turned out to be innovative in many respects. Ricoeur's normative paradigm is based on the emphasis on the "work of memory" and forms of memory manipulation, which he puts into the formulas of memory abuse and forgetting. Another dimension, which Ricoeur calls "purely ethical and political", concerns the duty of memory. In this case, a distinction is made between

"memory that is hindered", "memory that is manipulated" and "forced memory" (*Nahorna, 2012: 100*).

A. Khanum in his article points out that Ricoeur repeats that memory is the matrix of history. But what is history? "History is, from beginning to end, *écriture*" (*Hannoum, 2005*). Collective memory is an extremely difficult concept to define, says M. Vendra (*2019*). Collective experience and collective memory can only be understood through the development of an adequate theory of the symbol, which could explain the complex mediations between a person's personal experience and memory in the common sphere. The analogy that Ricoeur establishes between personal memory and collective memory is related to their symbolic and metapersonal sources. Following Ricoeur's line of reasoning, I believe that collective memory can be consistently imagined as a "web of memorable experience embodied in collectively transmitted symbols." In other words, collective memory is related to the act of establishing a symbolic function as a social space (*Vendra, 2019: 88*).

Thus, we see that the problem of collective memory in the philosophy of P. Ricoeur has deep ontological / phenomenological roots. The philosopher managed to form his own concept where the core is a person with his personal experiences, emotions, feelings, which in a heap reveals the epistemological process of interaction between the individual and the surrounding world. Therefore, the **purpose of our work** is to study the problem of the interaction of memory and identity revealed by the philosopher.

Tasks:

- to study the philosopher's understanding of memory, the process of memorization;
- to analyze historical knowledge and its representation in consciousness, which allows us to study the process of interaction of memory and history;
- to consider the concept of "narrative identity" given by the philosopher, the role of narrative in the philosophy of P. Ricoeur;
- to investigate the problem of the relationship of memory and identity in the philosophy of the scientist.

Research Methods

In the process of researching the formulated goals and objectives, the following methods were used: analysis and synthesis; dialectical (allowed us to consider memory and identity in the process of constant interconnection); phenomenological (aimed at revealing the essence of the process of representing the past in human consciousness, understanding the "I" as the basis of personal identification, the essence of "narrative identity")

Results and Discussion

Before proceeding to the direct analysis of memory and history, it is necessary to understand how Paul Ricoeur reveals the concept of memory in his concept. In his work, the scientist writes that the verb "to remember" replaces the noun "memory". The verb denotes the fact that memory is "exercised". The concept of "exercise", applied to memory, is no less ancient than the concept of eikon, representation. Following Socrates, Plato does not hesitate to transfer his reasoning about eikon to the arena of "imitative techniques" and distinguish between "fantastic" mimetics, doomed to be deceptive, and "iconic" mimetics, which are considered "direct" (orthos) and "true" (alethinos). Aristotle, in turn, in the section "Anamnesis" of his short treatise with a double title, describes recollection as a "search", while mnemonic was characterized as "affection" (pathos). Thus, both of our Greek teachers anticipated what Bergson

would call the effort of memory and Freud the work of recollection. It is noteworthy that these cognitive and practical approaches intersect in the operations of recollection; the recognition that crowns a successful search marks the cognitive side of recollection, while effort and work are inscribed in the practical sphere (*Ricoeur, 2004: 56*).

P. Ricoeur continues that this originality of the mnemonic phenomenon also defines the historiographical operation as a theoretical practice. The historian undertakes to "make history" in the same way that each of us tries to "remember". For the most part, the confrontation between memory and history will unfold at the level of these two, inseparably cognitive and practical, operations. In remembering, the emphasis is on returning to the awakened consciousness of an event, recognized as having occurred up to the moment when consciousness declares that it has experienced, perceived, assimilated it. The temporal marking of the previous, therefore, constitutes a distinctive feature of memory, in the double form of simple evocation and recognition, which completes the process of reproduction. Memorization, on the other hand, consists in the modes of learning concerning forms of knowledge, know-how, abilities, marked from a phenomenological point of view by a feeling of ease, lightness, spontaneity, in such a way that they are fixed and remain available for activation. This feature constitutes the pragmatic counterpoint to recognition, in which reproduction is completed on an epistemological level. In a negative sense, it is an economy of effort, since the subject is freed from relearning in order to carry out a task appropriate to the specific circumstances. The feeling of ease thus represents the positive side of this successful actualization of memory, which Bergson would call "active" and not "representative". In this respect, memorization can be considered a form of habit-memory. But the process of memorization is determined by the methodical nature of the modes of learning aimed at easy actualization, a privileged form of happy memory (*Ricoeur, 2004: 58*).

To explore the relationship between history and memory, Ricoeur distinguishes three phases in the historiographical operation. The first is what he calls the "documentary phase" – the eyewitness phase, indispensable for the creation of archives whose purpose is to substantiate evidence. This means that historiography is archival memory. The second phase is the explanatory/comprehensive phase, where answers to specific research questions are sought. The third phase is called the representational phase, that is, the phase where form is given in writing, where the historian declares the intention to present the past as it happened. History itself begins with testimony, therefore with memory. With testimony, an epistemological process opens. It departs from declared memory, passes through archives and documents, and ends with documentary evidence. In other words, prior to archiving, there is testimony, which is complex and has various uses, but whose fundamental characteristic, as noted by D. Leichter, is narrativity (*Leichter, 2012: 127*).

According to Ricoeur, historical knowledge "signifies the past, it represents the past not in the sense that the past itself appears in consciousness (*Vorstellung*), but in the sense that the trace occurs (*Vertretung*)". In contrast to the direct mental representation of objects, history is mediated by traces of the past. These traces represent the past through mimesis, that is, they replace the past (*Ricoeur, 2004: 89*). Thus, while maintaining the desire for truthfulness, history fixes the past, transferring historical reality into an analogous narrative. Since historical narrative dis-

course signifies past reality in terms of "such as", the ontological status of historical representation, in my opinion, can be defined as a metaphorical status. Thus, history can reproduce the past and reproduce it with the help of productive imagination in the chronology of history.

Collective memory refers to the sum of all possible historical narratives that testify to the past. Historical narratives aim to narrate the lived time of past events in comparison with cosmic time and have a certain duty to the memory of the dead, a duty that makes history accountable to the documentary archive. Therefore, through historical narratives, a person expresses the experience of a sense of obligation to remember what happened in the past. For example, this experience finds expression in the process of mourning. Obligatory memory is inserted into the single flow of human life experience. More precisely, through historical discourse, people feel their duty to remember others of the past and to pay tribute to these others. In this speculative context, the historical narrative is conceived as a "servant of the memory of past people" (Ricoeur, 2004: 124).

For P. Ricoeur, imagination and memory are similar in one important respect: they both contain the presence of something absent. But if "memory is time," according to Aristotle, then even "being is expressed in many ways." Nevertheless, memory refers to the past, and it is in this reference, or rather, its claim to the truth of the past, that the epistemic dimension of the question of memory is constituted. After all, if memory is not a thing, it is not an object, it is an act and a doing, its epistemic dimension is mixed with its pragmatic dimension, which makes it an exercise. For memory strains itself. Indeed, memory, Ricoeur argues, has an objective quality, one does not simply remember, but rather remembers something (Ricoeur, 2004: 125).

For, ultimately, history is a narrative, and as such is subject to the techniques of writing that Ricoeur calls explanation, understanding, and representation. For Ricoeur, this decoupage is regulated by two principles. The first is that the models of explanation in the practice of history have a common feature: they all refer to human reality as a social fact. Hence the status of history as a social science. The second principle is decoupage within social science (Hannoum, 2005: 128).

Ricoeur introduces the concept of "narrative identity," by which he understands a form of identity that the subject is able to arrive at through narrative activity. Narrative in Ricoeur's philosophy appears as that which connects the individual with himself, inscribes him in memory, and projects. The integrity, autonomy, and creative essence of a person are considered by him as narrative identity, without which, according to Ricoeur, the problem of personal identity is doomed to antinomy: either we consider the subject to be constantly identical to himself, or we consider the self-identical subject to be an illusion. In his opinion, the human self can avoid this dilemma. The point is that the "self" does not know itself without an intermediary, but exclusively through him, through the signs of culture that others endow the world with. And it is the reader's identification with a fictional character that is the main guide to this interpretation. Due to the different character of the character, the "self", interpreted in terms of the "narrative", is transformed into a certain equally different I, into the I that portrays itself as this or that person (the narrative acts as a temporally organized story; reality itself has a narrative character). That is, according to the concept of narrative, what is perceived can be assimilated by consciousness

only through narrative fiction, through the subject's account of what he experienced (Tkachenko, 2019: 185).

While P. Ricoeur emphasizes the narrative nature of the 'Self', contemporary researchers A. Vitov and H. Tymofieieva complement this approach, pointing out that in the Ukrainian context, identity formation correlates with Foucault's 'technologies of the self', where the construction of one's own narrative becomes an ethical and cultural practice (Vitov, Tymofieieva, 2025).

This thesis is very well demonstrated by the example of the formation of narratives in modern Ukrainian society. To study this issue, N. Evdokimova uses the concept of "military everyday life", which refers to the entire complex of everyday realities of people, in which the "military factor" plays a leading role. According to the researcher, military everyday life should include frontline everyday life – wars themselves and armed local conflicts, as well as rear everyday life – the realities that accompany them – rotations, ensuring the daily needs of military groups, volunteering, etc. In military everyday life, actions acquire special significance (Evdokymova, 2024: 30). Narratives are not just a means of expressing information about our past, they help us build identities, communicate with others and give meaning to experience (Zlyvkov et al., 2024: 114). Storytelling can serve as a means of understanding and communicating with others, while simultaneously establishing an identity within a particular cultural and social context. The way we tell stories and evaluate them is greatly influenced by the culture in which we live. Narratives are also a means of constructing identities and finding meaning in our lives. By telling stories about what happened to us long ago, we understand who we are today. The self is created, maintained, and adapted through interaction and communication with others, and the stories we tell about our lives contribute to understanding the world, others, and ourselves (Zlyvkov et al., 2024: 119).

Narratives include three minimal elements. First, the story must focus on a specific experience selected from the past to describe. Second, the events included in the experience must be organized in the form of a story—with a clear beginning, middle, and end, and an established setting, plot, and characters. Third, the events must be somehow related to one another and arranged in chronological order so that questions about how and why events occurred can be asked, and narrative elements can take on pace, duration, and tempo. Of these three elements of narrative, the second, or "engagement," element is the most important, because it is here that meaning is created (Zlyvkov et al., 2024: 118). For example, a war veteran recalls his own war experience – his autobiographical memories – against the diverse collective memories that make up the field of memory. Collective memory is created in different mnemonic communities (family, local community, friends) and is based on different social resources, such as generational experience or organizational memories of the army. When the event is collective and formative, such as war, personal memory is more directly influenced by the national memory of the event. National memories compose the meanings of different wars, the formative events in each war, and the connotation of war as a common theme in the national metanarrative that Ukraine has yet to create (Evdokymova, 2024: 32).

The above indicates the functioning of the Hero narrative as one of those modern narratives that are most pronounced. In this case, the "Hero" is generally the central character of the history of war in Ukrainian culture, which

is based on the archetype of a warrior-defender. This image has transformed from historical military identities to a modern symbol of resilience and courage, where a hero becomes everyone who fights for freedom. As R. Voloshyn notes, a Hero is a figure through which a community can identify and describe itself, rally, and affirm its values. The heroic past, great people, and glory are the main capital on which the national idea is based. A hero can win victory on the battlefield or tragically die, devote his life to service, or become a martyr in the name of his people. A hero can be a distant, mythical figure whose life and actions are shrouded in mystery, or a very real figure who left behind a wealth of documented information and memories. Most importantly, the hero becomes a symbol that a nation uses for its formation and self-affirmation (*Voloshyn, 2025: 46*).

Thus, history is not an unintentional set of events, but rather expresses the meaning that a person gives to his life. When a person tells the story of his life, he organizes and arranges his autobiographical memories; however, history always includes cultural models: language, myths, meta-narratives and collective memories. These models shape the means by which personal experiences are encoded, the ways in which they are interpreted and the ways in which they are presented. Therefore, the narrative of war veterans should be read as a cultural text that intertwines private experiences with collective representations that constitute the field of war memory (*Evdokymova, 2024: 33*).

D. Leichter, studying the issue of identity in P. Ricoeur's philosophy of memory, notes that at the level of idem-identity, a community is defined by a kind of national character. Character refers to "the set of enduring dispositions by which a person is recognized," and marks the point where ipse-identity becomes almost inseparable from idem-identity. These enduring dispositions include habits, which are the behaviors or traits "by which a person is recognized, reidentified as the same," and "the set of acquired identifications by which the other is included in the same," which include "values, norms, ideals, models, and heroes in which a person or community identifies itself." Idem refers to the habits, ethos, or ideology that define a person or group. In contrast, ipse-identity refers to the ability to keep one's word over time. This capacity "marks the extreme gap between the constancy of the self and the constancy of the same, and thus fully demonstrates the irreducibility of the two problematics to each other." Being responsible implies "a way of behaving in such a way that others can count on this person. Since someone counts on me, I am responsible for my actions to another" (*Leichter, 2012: 120*). Although Ricoeur mainly speaks of this dialectic from the perspective of the individually existing self, his consideration of the relations involved in the constitution of the community extends these forms of identity to collective existence.

P. Ricoeur, speaking about the relationship between identity and memory, raises the following problem: "Here there is another difficulty that needs to be resolved: one can ask to what extent the pathology of memory, and therefore the interpretation of memory as pathos, fits into the study of the use of memory, the memorial technique. The difficulty is new: we are talking about individual and collective changes caused by the use, the practice of memory" (*Ricoeur, 2004: 69*). The starting point is to identify the main obstacle that interpretive work encounters on the way to reproducing traumatic memories. This obstacle, which is explained by the "resistance caused by repression", is des-

ignated by the term "compulsion to repeat"; it is characterized, among other things, by the tendency to act in place of the memory. The patient reproduces it not as a memory, but as an action; he repeats it, of course, without realizing that he is repeating it. We are not far from the phenomenon of obsession mentioned above.

The emphasis is then on the reenactment and on the place it occupies without the patient's knowledge. What is important for us is the connection between the compulsion to repeat and the resistance, and the substitution by this double phenomenon of the memory itself. This creates an obstacle to the continuation of the analysis. In addition to this clinical aspect, two therapeutic suggestions are offered which will be of the greatest importance to us when we transfer the clinical analysis to the level of collective memory, which we feel we are authorized to do at this stage of the discussion. The first suggestion concerns the analyst, the second concerns the analysis of the *anda*. The analyst is advised to be very patient with the repetitions that occur under the cover of the transference. The transference creates something of an intermediate sphere between the illness and real life; it can be spoken of as a "playground" on which the compulsion is allowed to manifest itself in almost complete freedom, offering the subject's pathogenic background the opportunity to manifest itself openly. But something is also required of the patient: having stopped complaining or hiding his true condition from himself, "he must find the courage to turn his attention to the phenomenon of his illness" (*Ricoeur, 2004: 70*).

Sick collective memory has similar signs of unwillingness not only to admit that the tragic past actually happened, but also to carry out its updated interpretation without forcibly repressing or silencing "inconvenient" memories. Symbolic wounds accumulate in the archives of collective memory that require healing, and this is expressed, in particular, in the solemn rituals of funeral ceremonies, commemoration of anniversaries and other supra-individual "losses" that "unite entire nations". Similar to the work of a therapist with a patient who must overcome mental addiction to something/someone important and valuable, but finally lost, collective "wounds" are subject to similar, but much larger, pathological situations. Their presence, the thinker emphasizes, "does not concern only emergency situations", but is part of the "fundamental structure of our collective existence", which is also reflected in the functioning of individual identity. Mourning is a "normal, albeit painful, phenomenon" that positively stabilizes identity. The "work of remembering" inherent in it (not only in psychotherapy rooms) involves openness to working through the experience, gradual courage in overcoming resistance to the fact of inevitable loss, critical "appropriation" of it in the light of self-respect, and ultimately forgiveness, which "accentuates the value of the past, which strengthens the future" (*Losyk, 2011: 60*).

The scientist considers the noted processes in the context of the close interplay of memory and identity. In his understanding, these two components of our existence as human beings are "fragile" for three reasons: time, otherness, and heredity. In the temporal perspective, both memory and identity inevitably change, which multiplies the ambiguity of the status of "remaining oneself." At the same time, the form of identification (ipse, self, *Selbst*), which is responsible for the original self, is capable of being subject to the influence of the other (idem, same, *gleich*), which emphasizes collective identification. In turn, otherness and heredity indicate the importance of the community's symbolic memory of its past, especially if threats to

its existence constantly functioned in it. Therefore, a way of "being oneself" that is different from the stereotypical one irritates individual or collective identity, subjugates it by the very fact of otherness, and this often "directs relations with others from hospitality to repulsion and alienation" (Losyk, 2011: 61).

This is often manifested in the very process of transformation of narratives, views on the activities of a particular figure. Heroes whose names began to appear in public discourse often had a dual character, especially over time, when modern ideas about the world and values differ from the context of that time. For example, the old narrative regarding Christopher Columbus was that he was viewed only from a positive perspective - he brought the cultural heritage of that time to local peoples. However, the new narrative mainly focused on the very process of colonization of new lands and its consequences, emphasizing the destruction and assimilation of these cultures. That is, the old narrative about progress gave way to a new narrative about the need to restore truth, historical justice.

From this it becomes clear why the philosopher in his studies of memory enters the plane of utopia. According to Ricoeur, it is similar to Husserl's imaginative variations on essence, which are introduced into the consideration of the plots of society, power, government, family, religion; certain mechanisms of neutralization are based on the assertion of "imagination as fiction". Utopia is the name of that space where any place turns out to be impossible. From this 'placelessness' one can look, as if from the outside, at our own reality, which suddenly begins to seem strange, one where nothing can be certain. The field of possibilities goes beyond reality, it turns out to be a field of alternative ways of life (Parashchych, 2011).

In modern society, digital technologies have contributed to a certain transformation of the process of perception of narratives. Photo and video fix the modern hero in the memory of many as an ordinary, living person. Digital technologies make it possible to significantly expand the number and differentiation of types of carriers of public memory. Instantaneous dissemination of information, the ability to unite in a few clicks, the creation of various initiatives can provide recognition and public recognition to a person who, under other circumstances, could forever remain without public attention. At the same time, media coverage and a large number of contacts are not imprinted in memory for generations. One filmed act, even if it causes an extraordinary public resonance, does not turn the person who committed it into a historical figure. Millions of views can turn a news hero into a "hero of the moment". A national hero, who is a historical figure and a symbol of the nation, a semi-mythical figure even in the digital age, needs solid institutional support. The state, academic and artistic circles, and the media fill the digital image of the hero with meanings (Voloshyn, 2025: 52).

Conclusion

P. Ricoeur in the process of his analysis comes to the conclusion that memory is essentially a reflection of history, or rather, of past events in the present. Thanks to the factual material, the reflection of memory allows us to raise memories in consciousness, while revealing at the same time the person's attitude to these events. A person, relying on reflections on the past, can preserve and reproduce his past experience of seeing the world. In this process, the identity of the individual, the awareness of his place in the world, the knowledge of reality taking into account the experience are revealed.

The last statement makes it possible to speak of "narrative identity" as a distinctive property of self-knowledge and self-determination of a person. Due to the fact that it is not static, in the course of the historical process there is a constant interpretation by a person of cultural and social events in the direction of epistemological analysis. At the level of self-consciousness, parallels are drawn between time regimes, events are linked into a single historical process. This is what identity is built on, which P. Ricoeur considers as a process based on narrative. Self-preservation and personality formation are key in identity, where, as we see, memory plays a key role, since it allows a person to maintain a sense of continuity in time and, most importantly, a constant transformation of himself. This narrative, as it were, creates a collage of different events, linking them into a single story, thereby indicating the continuity of our "I" in time.

The above indicates the main feature of historical memory - it is the result of a complex dialectical process of interaction between individual and collective narrative, collective memory and one's own memories and experiences. The problems here arise in the fact that this mutual influence creates both an opportunity for self-consciousness and a basis for distortions, since memory is prone to subjectivity and can be both a source of continuity and a cause of a break in self-consciousness. That is, the point is that, given the subjectivity of memory, it can distort the past, thereby creating a conflict between what we remember and who we would like to be. Traumatic memories violate not only the integrity of the narrative, but also identity. On the other hand, this is where another phenomenon lies - utopia, which replaces the real reality with a desired one.

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Трансформація історичної пам'яті та ідентичності: рецепція філософії Поля Рікера

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Стаття присвячена дослідженню взаємодії пам'яті та ідентичності у філософії П. Рікера. Розкрито зміст понять «пам'ять», «ідентичність», «нарратив» та «нарративна ідентичність», які є фундаментальними для авторської концепції мислителя. У межах вивчення окресленої проблематики проаналізовано трактування пам'яті та механізмів запам'ятовування; досліджено історичне знання та його репрезентацію у свідомості як інструмент аналізу взаємозв'язку пам'яті та історії. Розглянуто уведене в науковий обіг поняття «нарративної ідентичності» та роль нарративу в доробку П. Рікера. Авторка наголошує: якщо пам'ять є репрезентацією історії, то нарративна ідентичність постає засадничою властивістю самопізнання та самовизначення особистості. З цього випливає головна особливість історичної пам'яті — вона є результатом складного діалектичного взаємовпливу індивідуального та колективного нарративів, спільної пам'яті та особистих переживань. Суперечливість такої взаємодії полягає в тому, що цей процес створює як можливості для самоусвідомлення, так і підґрунтя для викривлень. Оскільки пам'ять суб'єктивна, вона може слугувати як джерелом неперервності, так і причиною розриву самосвідомості, де травматичні спогади руйнують цілісність нарративу та ідентичності.

Ключові слова: ідентичність, історія, нарратив, пам'ять, колективна пам'ять, особистість, свідомість, репрезентація, феноменологія

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