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The Modern Self Prognosis: Freedom, Power, and Globality

Binyam Mekonnen (ORCID 0000-0002-9193-8904)
Addis Ababa University (Ethiopia)

This paper critiques the modern self as a hegemonic construct constituted through the rational, mythical, and colonial matrices of Western modernity. It challenges the presumed universality of this self, showing that its authority depends on the systematic suppression of alternative identities and their rational voices. Positioned within the broader colonial matrix of power, the modern self appears both as the subject and instrument of a universalizing project that privileges Eurocentric rationality while marginalizing subaltern epistemologies. Tracing the historical and conceptual trajectory of this formation, from its original sources in classical and early modern philosophy to its Enlightenment consolidation, the paper argues that the "modern self" constitutes as a normative ideal of humanity, predicated upon the continual invention of the "Other" as inferior. Consequently, claims to universal reason are shown to be inseparable from exclusionary and hierarchical practices. Drawing on de-colonial and liberation philosophy, this paper seeks to deconstruct the coercive imposition of the modern self and to reconstruct subjectivity through an affirmation of the pluriverse of philosophical traditions and lived experiences.

KEYWORDS
Modern self, Otherness, Transmodern globality, Emancipation

Introduction

The modern self, both as a philosophical and sociohistorical reality, arises from overlapping critical, cultural, and theological traditions. Embedded in classical philosophy and early modern metaphysics, these currents have underwritten the intellectual authority of modernity. Although often presented as emancipatory, they conceal structures of control, revealing how the rational pursuit of freedom is entangled with systemic power. The coming together of classical metaphysical thought, 15th-century European imperial expansion, and Enlightenment universalism gave rise to a project in which reason acts both as a vehicle for liberation and an instrument of domination.

The modern self presents itself as a rational subject whose claim to self-legislation also enforces and justifies colonial power, which reflects the enduring logic that might defines right (*Dussel, 1996; Strömbäck, 2024*). Ancient and early modern Western intellectual and religious traditions shaped the self through ideals of individualism, reason, and autonomy. Yet these ideals are historically specific rather than universal truths, posited as virtues that justified domination over others and reinforced the myth of the European, an ideological core of Eurocentrism (*Kebede, 2004; Mudimbe, 1988; Dussel, 1996*).

Eurocentrism has been central to modernity's construction of the self. Colonization and globalization exported Eurocentric models of personhood, reason, and progress worldwide, so that marginalizing non-Western perspectives and legitimizing the global dominance of Western knowledge systems. Critics argue that this universalizing project entails profound epistemic violence by suppressing alternative philosophical traditions and reinforcing global hierarchies of power. Postcolonial and decolonial scholars endorse the affirmation of plural epistemologies and the legitimacy of diverse rational and spiritual traditions. This paper, therefore, interrogates how the modern self is hegemonized through ethnocentrism, foreclosing the pluriverse of epistemic, cultural, and philosophical sources that constitute modernity's project.

Research methods

This study employs a critical-philosophical approach combining genealogical, conceptual, and comparative analyses. It traces the evolution of Western epistemic frameworks from Descartes to Hegel, revealing their entanglement with Eurocentrism, colonialism, and manipulative hierarchies. Conceptual scrutiny interrogates categories like cogito, autonomy, and universality, while comparative engagement incorporates decolonial and transmodern perspectives from Fanon, Dussel, Mbembe, and Mignolo.

Results and Discussion

1. The Modern Self as a Political Invention

In critically examining the dominant Eurocentric philosophical tradition, particularly its grounding in the philosophy of consciousness, it becomes evident that the identity of the modern self is not a transhistorical or universal given but the product of a specific constellation of epistemic and socio-political conditions internal to modernity's self-understanding. Core to this formation is the Cartesian conceptualization of the cogito, through which the subject attains self-certainty by positing itself as an autonomous and self-transparent center of rational reflection (*Descartes, 2008*). But, as later exegetical readings have shown, the Cartesian gesture cannot be reduced to a purely intellectual operation; rather, the cogito discloses the subject's existence through an act that is inseparable from the exercise of freedom itself (*Boehm,*

binyam.mekonnen@aau.edu.et

2014: 705). This emphasis on the will introduces a practical dimension into the very structure of self-certainty, which suggests that the knowing subject, in affirming its own existence, simultaneously enacts the autonomy that modernity later institutionalizes in its moral, juridical, and political orders. In this sense, the Cartesian self becomes both the epistemic origin and the normative model for modern reason: a self-legislating consciousness whose claim to universality conceals the historical and intersubjective mediations that make such autonomy intelligible in the first place. Thus, the valorisation of the cogito as the foundation of knowledge and certainty marks not exclusively a philosophical event but a decisive moment in the rationalization of the Western lifeworld, through which power, knowledge, and truth become entwined in the project of enlightenment.

German Idealism intensifies the Cartesian project by endowing the self with an ontological privilege that renders consciousness both the ground and guarantor of reality Within this conceptual horizon, the modern subject is no longer conceived as a passive knower but as the productive source of meaning, a self-consciousness that secures its own legitimacy by elevating itself to the level of metaphysical necessity (*Beiser, 2000: 18*). Notwithstanding, this elevation exists within a deeper economy of power: the 'I' is constituted through exclusions, hierarchies, and regimes of truth that sustain its appearance of universality. Thus, any genealogy of the modern self must begin not with its presumed autonomy but with the historical conditions of its production charting how it is organized, whom it marginalizes, and through which mechanisms it legitimates its authority.

The rationalist ontology underlying modern identity reveals an intrinsic tension within its own logic. The pursuit of a universally valid and self-identical "I" presupposes an act of distinction through which the subject affirms its coherence against what it excludes. In this process, the self attains identity not in isolation but through a mediated relation to its otherness. Yet when this differentiation hardens into a hierarchical opposition, the possibility of reciprocal recognition is foreclosed. Rooted in the Aristotelian principles of identity and non-contradiction, this structure stabilizes the self by denying the communicative interdependence that makes understanding and mutual recognition possible.

As Hannah Arendt (*1958*) insightfully points out in The Human Condition, Western philosophy has seldom confronted the problem of identity in its full existential and political scope. For Arendt, identity refers to the who of human existence, the capacity of persons to disclose themselves through speech and action within the public sphere, rather than the what, the abstract essence of human nature. Nevertheless, the philosophical tradition has consistently prioritized this whatness, defining the self in terms of universal substance rather than communicative relation (*Hiltmann, 2007: 46-47*). In doing so, it overlooks the intersubjective and political conditions under which individuals recognize one another as distinct yet co-present participants in a shared world, which obscures the plurality that constitutes human life itself.

To revisit the question of the modern self, one must ask anew: Who speaks as the "I," and who is excluded as the "Other"? Such a reframing calls for a turn from abstract metaphysical postulates to a historically conditioned and communicatively situated understanding of subjectivity. In Dussel's Philosophy of Liberation (*1996*), the modern self is shown to be constituted not in the purity of reason but through historically mediated structures of domination, including colonization, dispossession, and epistemic marginalization. The self attains coherence and autonomy precisely by negating the "Other," who is constructed as ontologically subordinate. In this sense, the modern "I" is inseparable from the network of power that shapes, constrains, and legitimates its existence.

Within this Eurocentric construction, the boundary between the "I" and the "Other" is maintained through epistemic and ontological hierarchies. The "I" is cast as the sovereign knower, bearer of universal reason, while the "Other" is confined to emotion, culture, and particularity. The "Other" is not recognized as a knowing subject in its own right but is interpreted, categorized, and represented according to the dominant subject's paradigms. This hierarchy is not incidental; it emerges from a canon that attributes truth exclusively to Western reason, systematically marginalizing alternative epistemologies. However, Léopold Sédar Senghor challenges this rigid dichotomy, arguing that African cultures embody a complementary form of knowledge that is not inferior but differently rational, integrating emotion, rhythm, and communal experience into cognition (*Senghor, 2025: 105-106*). From Senghor's perspective, the binary opposition between reason and particularity collapses, revealing that the so-called "Other" possesses epistemic authority of its own and that universality itself can be rethought through pluralistic, culturally mediated lenses.

Tracing the genealogical rise of the modern self requires attention not only to intellectual abstraction but also to the social and political operations that sustain it. The Cartesian cogito asserts autonomy while consolidating authority over meaning and order. German Idealism develops this claim, presenting the self-legislating subject as the bearer of freedom, capable of self-definition independent of external command. But this idealization obscures the fact that the subject is historically and geopolitically situated. The modern self is produced through technological, scientific, imperial, and legal regimes, which presuppose a universalized subject whose authority is enforced through exclusion.

From this point of view, the epistemic privilege of the modern self entails the production of an "Other" whose marginalization is constitutive. The "Other" is defined as irrational, dependent, or non-autonomous, ensuring that the self's autonomy appears natural and self-evident. This logic reproduces hierarchical binaries; self/other, reason/emotion, modern/traditional that structure both philosophy and social institutions. Feminist, postcolonial, and decolonial theorists demonstrate that this subject is historically masculine, European, and colonial. Enrique Dussel (*1996*), for instance, situates the self within a colonial matrix of violence, showing how identity is secured through the subordination and erasure of non-European humanity.

As far as Boaventura de Sousa Santos is referred, the epistemologies of the North are premised upon an abyssal line separating metropolitan societies and forms of sociability from colonial societies and forms of sociability. On this basis, what counts as valid, moral, or rational within the metropolitan sphere is deemed irrelevant or inapplicable to the colonial one. This abyssal division, both foundational and invisible, enables false universalisms established in the social experience of the metropolis while justifying the normative dualism between metropolis and colony. To exist on the colonial side of the abyssal line is to be "prevented by dominant knowledge from representing

the world as one's own and in one's own terms." Hence, the epistemologies of the North contribute to reproducing capitalism, colonialism, and patriarchy by conceiving the Eurocentric epistemological North as the sole source of valid knowledge, rendering the South the realm of ignorance and deficiency. Within this context, the South is considered as the site of problems to be solved, while the North positions itself as the bearer of solutions and the ultimate arbiter of what constitutes legitimate understanding of the world (*Santos, 2018: 22–24*).

From this perspective, the modern self operates as both subject and instrument of this universalizing project, enacting autonomy, reason, and freedom while imposing these standards on others. Historically, this entailed conquest, colonization, and missionizing; today, it persists through globalization, neoliberalism, and international human-rights frameworks. As Santos remarks, the Western subject occupies the "center" of the abyssal line, separating zones of recognized knowledge and humanity from those of epistemic non-being (*Santos, 2018: 19-24*).

Critically, understanding the modern self also requires recognizing the entanglement of freedom and power. The self-legislating subject claims autonomy by detaching from external authority, though in practice it participates in the hegemonic structures it purports to transcend. Freedom, in this sense, is inseparable from the capacity to dominate, define knowledge, and govern others. Decolonial critique demands that subjectivity be reconceived as relational, situated, and accountable to alterity, disrupting the binary opposition that underwrites both the hegemonic self and the "Other" it constructs.

Senghor's insights further enrich this critique by demonstrating that universality need not rely on exclusion: reason and affect, autonomy and community, can coexist in a pluralistic epistemology that affirms the "Other" as a knowing, creative, and legitimate participant in the shared construction of meaning.

As Achille Mbembe (*2015*) states, this epistemological regime constructs a knowing subject radically detached from the world, an intellect gazing upon inert objects presumed knowable without historical or relational embeddedness. Knowledge becomes a function of distance, detachment, and control. Within this discourse, colonialism is not conceived as rupture or catastrophe, but normalized as a necessary stage of human development, an ostensibly civilizing project that conceals systems of exploitation, dispossession, and epistemic erasure. Thus, not only bodies but also knowledges are colonized: the "I" monopolizes cognition, while the "Other" remains perpetually known but never knowing.

2. *Cogito's* Empire and Eurocentrism

The Cartesian *cogito* becomes the anchor of judgment, verification, and epistemic authority. It is empowered to dismantle fallible rationalities and to extricate the self from illusion and error. Descartes' method of radical doubt mandates that all claims must be validated by the cognition of the ego, which withdraws from sense perception, imagination, and even reason itself, insofar as these faculties are prone to deception.

This marks a moment of hyper rationalization: reason is no longer an independent faculty but must be constituted in the act of self-thinking. Descartes' classic arguments – *the wax*, *the dream*, and *the demon* – demonstrate that sensory knowledge, imagination, and even pure reasoning are unreliable unless anchored in the self's reflexive consciousness (*Meditation II, Descartes, 2008*). From this Descartes concludes that true knowledge arises only from the intellect of the self, which alone secures both epistemic certainty and ontological self-presence:

> From the fact that I think, or have a phantasm, whether I am asleep or awake, it can be inferred that I am thinking; for 'I think' and 'I am thinking' mean the same. From the fact that I am thinking, it follows that I exist, since what thinks is not nothing (*Descartes, 2008: 107–108*)

Thus, for Descartes, the modern self comes to know the world first, and only through this epistemic act does it achieve its ontological status. The "I" exists only insofar as it thinks. Despite the radical doubt he employs, Descartes reaffirms the classical view of humans as rational animals: the self is rational precisely because it thinks.

This "I" defines itself dialectically against the "Other," encompassing all extended things, including, paradoxically, its own body. Everything external to the "I" is *res extensa*, whose knowledge must be mediated through intellect. As Descartes insists, "Bodies themselves are perceived not, strictly speaking, by the senses or by the imaginative faculty, but by the intellect alone." (*Descartes, 2008: 24*)

The outcome is an epistemological configuration in which the intellect defines humanity, and all else – *nature*, *body, and non-European others* – is rendered external and subordinate. The *res cogitans* becomes the paradigm of the human, while the *res extensa* is reduced to objecthood. The "I" thus secures its identity through modes of exclusion that are at once epistemic, ontological, and political.

This Cartesian model, later reinforced by Baconian rationalism and German Idealism, naturalizes a hierarchy between the knowing self and the subjugated Other. Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze (*2008*) exposes how this logic entangles the modern self with the ethos of scientific-technological domination, at the expense of relational and affective modes of knowing. In *The New Organon*, Francis Bacon exalts experimental science while subordinating the arts, essentially constituted by emotion and culture, to the realm of irrationality. As Eze puts it:

> Arts are manifestations of irrationality and must be not only culturally degraded but also, when possible, banned… Academic study of art is unnecessary because whatever legitimate objectives such courses of study might have could be better accomplished and realized in the methods of the New Organon. (*Eze, 2008: 30*)

This philosophy does not remain abstract. During colonial modernity, indigenous peoples were portrayed as irrational, emotional, and incapable of rational progress. Their epistemic systems were not simply devalued but rendered illegible. Colonial ideology justified domination by constructing the colonized as devoid of reason and therefore unfit for autonomy.

Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno (*1982*) extend this critique by showing how Bacon's experimental philosophy evolves into a doctrine of governmentalization, an epistemic order that equates knowledge with control. They write:

> The concordance between the mind of man and the nature of things that he had in mind is patriarchal: that human mind, which overcomes superstition, is to hold sway over nature. Knowledge, which is power, knows no obstacles: neither in the enslavement of men nor in compliance with the world's rulers. (*Horkheimer and Adorno, 1982: 4*)

The modern mind is thus both anthropocentric and phallocratic. The position of the "I" is confined to the masculine philosophical subject, which is *sovereign, knowing, and dominating*, while the "Other" includes the body, women, nature, and colonized peoples.

German Idealism inherits and refines this hierarchical schema. Whereas Immanuel Kant rejects Descartes' conflation of thinking with knowing, he preserves the centrality of reason and autonomy as the grounds of human dignity. Knowledge, in Kant's view, is limited to phenomena, appearances structured by the a *priori forms* of space and time,[1] still the unity of the "I" remains the foundation of both cognition and morality. Reason distinguishes humans from animals, granting them autonomy and moral worth.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte radicalizes this notion, grounding freedom in the self-positing activity of the "I." Freedom is possible only through the overcoming of obstacles, transforming absolute autonomy into finite, situated self-realization. Daniel Breazeale (*2003: 150*) maintains that to be an "I" is to be engaged in an endless process of self-overcoming, an activity that unfolds only in relation to others and within the material world.

Friedrich Hegel further develops this dialectic through his conception of "concrete freedom," realized only in reciprocal recognition. Prior to such encounters, the self remains abstract, an empty formalism of self-relatedness (*Rauch, 2003: 272*). Freedom becomes concrete only through the ethical life of the state, where universality and particularity are reconciled: "The state is the explicit unity or harmony of the universal and the particular, of duty and right, of necessity and freedom" (*Kaniz, 1974: 44*).

However, Hegel's notion of reason remains bound to a Eurocentric teleology. As he writes, the history of the world moves from East to West, culminating in Europe as the heart of civilization. Thus, the narrative of human freedom becomes inseparable from the geography of empire.

Frantz Fanon exposes this entanglement by reinterpreting Hegel's *master–slave dialectic* in the context of colonial domination. In colonial modernity, the slave, unlike in Hegel's schema, does not achieve freedom through recognition. Rather, colonized peoples remain entrapped in a system of neo-colonial domination masked as democracy and progress. "It is in the name of the spirit of Europe," Fanon writes, "that Europe has justified her crimes and legitimized the slavery in which she holds four-fifths of humanity" (*Fanon, 1967: 252*).

In parallel, Dussel underscores that capitalism serves as the principal mechanism for the domination of the world's majority, those consigned to the "underside" of modernity. Within the projects of the Kantian Enlightenment and Hegelian historicism, Dussel (1996) identifies ethnocentric logics that inscribe Europe as the privileged site of reason and culture. This Eurocentric episteme continues to shape contemporary regimes of communicative rationality (Habermas), discourse ethics (Apel), and pragmatic liberalism (Rorty), where Western epistemic standards delimit what can appear as rationality.

Thus, despite its claims to universality, the Enlightenment's conception of the self remains exclusionary. The "modern self" is ultimately ethnocentric; *white, male, and rational* while the rest of the world is cast as its *irrational and subordinate "Other"*.

3. Seeking a Pluriversal Order of Reason

The critique of the Eurocentric modern self and its epistemic hegemony compel a philosophical intervention: the decolonization of knowledge and the reconstruction of a *pluriversal order of reason*. Cartesian and Kantian traditions elevated abstract rational autonomy while marginalizing relational, embodied, and affective dimensions, universalizing a disembedded "I" that negates its constitutive "Other." Contemporary philosophy must therefore reconstitute the foundations of reason, subjectivity, and universality.

Mbembe (*2015*) notes that the modern archive and its philosophical infrastructure are not neutral repositories of truth but sites of exclusion and power asymmetry. Eurocentric reason, he argues, "is not only a form of reason that postulates its own universality, but one that devalues and disqualifies other forms of knowing and being." The knowing subject is imagined as disengaged, producing "objective" knowledge, but this masks profound violence: the denial of co-presence, entanglement, and shared being.

This critique demands a philosophical turn that decisively exceeds Eurocentric epistemology. In *Philosophy of Liberation*, Dussel applies a transmodern project that both traverses modernity and pushes beyond its conceptual limitations. Liberation, he argues, requires a substantive conceptualization that moves away from the abstract *ego cogito* and toward the suffering subject whose selfhood is constituted through concrete historical positionality. Consequently, knowledge must emerge from exteriority from voices rendered invisible or subordinate by Eurocentric reason so that subjectivity is produced dialogically rather than through practices of extractive domination. In this sense, the shift marks a movement from ethnocentric rationality toward pluriversality in both identity and the production of rationalization itself. Here, the very notion of pluriversality must be emphasized as a transmodern critique aimed at dismantling eurocentrism's hegemonic order.

Pluriversality is not a call for relativism or wholesale rejection of European thought, but a transformative project affirming the coexistence of multiple epistemic traditions. It rethinks the conditions of philosophical dialogue, challenging the hegemonic claim that reason has a single geography or history, emphasizing relational engagement rather than absolute universal truth (*Dussel, 1993; Mignolo, 2018*).

Freedom, too, must be reconceived: no longer the self-mastering autonomy of a singular "I," but a collective, relational project grounded in historical situatedness. From the vantage of the oppressed subject, freedom is the concrete condition of living with dignity, voice, and connectedness. As Dussel emphasizes, the "I think" must give way to the "I conquer," whose self-understanding emerges in relation to those rendered silenced, making knowledge an act of co-construction rather than domination (*Dussel, 1996: 20*).

Crucially, epistemic plurality becomes the ground of universality, rather than its opposite. Pluriversal philosophy challenges the modern binary between universalism and relativism: it does not abandon shared human concerns but reconceives universality as the inclusive interaction of multiple rational traditions. As Mignolo (*2018: x*) observes, "pluriversality as a universal project means that the universal cannot have one single owner: the universal can only

[1] See Jill Vance Buroker, *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: An Introduction* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), See pp.201-204 – the two terms, *phenomena* and *noumena* first coined in philosophy by Goltfried Wilhelm Leibniz's *Discourse on Metaphysics*, to signify objects of *"Sensory representations"* and *"things-in-themselves"*, respectively. For Leibniz we can know thing-in-itself through intellectual intuition that takes the light from the *"intelligible substances"* or *"monads"*.

be pluriversal"[2]. This invites an ethics of encounter, recognizing that reason has many territories and histories, and opens philosophical space for excluded Western, Indigenous, African, Latin American, and other non-Western knowledges as full interlocutors.

The decolonisation of knowledge also demands structural transformation of the institutions, archives, and canons that sustain the epistemic dominance of the modern self. The archive is not merely a repository of facts but a power-machine that authorizes some voices and silences others. Mbembe's insight reminds us that changing the subject entails changing the archive, memory, and forms of recognition. A pluriversal order thus requires institutional reforms: curricula, publishing practices, languages of philosophy, funding structures, and the very categories of "rationality" and "subjectivity" must be opened to contestation and pluralization.

To realize a philosophy of liberation on the pluriversal platform is to commit to praxis: theory must be tied to action, to world-making beyond critique. Philosophy must support the self-determined affirmation of communities previously cast as non-human or peripheral (*Dussel, 1996: 6*; *Mekonnen, 2012:12–14*). Liberation is thus not simply emancipation from constraints, but the affirmation of fullness: of being, knowing, and relating on one's own terms. The modern self is transcended, not abolished, but re-imagined as one relational node among many, set in interdependence rather than mastery. Dismantling epistemic hierarchies cultivates new modes of thinking, knowing, and being – *together*.

Such conviviality is underpinned by epistemic justice, recognizing that diverse knowledge communities are entitled to legitimacy. Engaging African, Latin American, Indigenous, Asian, and excluded Western traditions as full interlocutors, rather than ethnographic curiosities, is essential to constructing a genuinely global reason. Philosophy must move from the monologue of universalism to a dialogical terrain of plural rationalities, that is, *polylogue*[3]. This is not only an epistemological adjustment but a profound ontological shift: from being as domination to being as coexistence.

Fanon's appeal for a "new humanism,"[4] asserts hat decolonizing knowledge cannot be separated from decolonizing the human, privileging the experiences and struggles of the oppressed over the utopian ideals of European Enlightenment ideals. Contemporary globality, by contrast, enforces a monocultural universality, silencing plural voices and subordinating difference to technocratic and rationalist accounts. Nevertheless, scholars in liberation and decolonial critical theories argue that human liberation requires repositioning globality from hierarchical dependency toward intercultural interdependence, and from epistemic domination toward collective, pluralistic co-creation. A pluriversal order affirms epistemic diversity as foundational, which seeks dialogue among multiple rational traditions and cultivating a truly global reason. Philosophy, opened beyond Eurocentric paradigms, can thus enact a trans-modern project of coexistence and shared world-making.

Conclusion

The genealogy of the modern self demonstrates that its claim to universality arises not from neutral reason but from a historically specific hegemonic order established in the classical and early modern mythos of the cogito and consolidated through Enlightenment rationalism and colonial expansion. This subject establishes itself through exclusion as it becomes rational, autonomous, and universal only by relegating non-European, non-masculine, embodied, and relational forms of life to the status of the "Other." The modern self thus functions as an imperial abstraction, legitimizing global hierarchies while presenting its provinciality as the measure of the human.

Proponents of liberation and decolonial philosophy show that this subject is inseparable from structures of domination. Mbembe reveals how the modern archive authorizes truth by silencing alternative voices; Santos exposes the abyssal line that divides metropolitan reason from colonized worlds; Dussel identifies the ego conquiro that underwrites the ego cogito; and Fanon demonstrates how Europe universalizes its violence as "civilization." These critiques make clear that the modern self cannot simply be expanded to include the subaltern, for its very coherence depends on their exclusion.

A genuinely emancipatory alternative requires the reconstruction of subjectivity itself. Pluriversality has this essence: not the rejection of rationality but the recognition that reason has multiple histories, geographies, and modalities. It redefines universality as a dialogical, co-constructed field in which diverse epistemic traditions engage as equals rather than as objects of integration into a dominant paradigm. This shift demands structural transformation of archives, canons, curricula, and philosophical categories so that knowledge is produced through encounter rather than hierarchy.

The task, then, is to move beyond the monological modern "I" toward a relational and situated conception of the human. This transmodern humanism affirms that subjectivity is co-constituted through plurality, interdependence, and mutual recognition. It seeks not to negate the insights of European thought but to situate them within a broader ecology of knowledges. Only by abandoning the self's imperial posture can philosophy enact a universalism that is genuinely shared rather than imposed. Pluriversality thus marks the horizon of a new conception of the human, one in which freedom is understood not as mastery but as the capacity to live, know, and create with others in dignity. In this horizon, the modern self's hegemony is overcome, and a more inclusive and truthful account of humanity becomes possible.

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[2] Mignolo (*2018*) asserts that pluriversality, as a universal project, is not about reshaping the world itself (*ontology*) but transforming our understanding of it (*gnoseology*). By relinquishing the assumption that the world must be conceived as a unified totality, we are freed to inhabit the pluriverse and think decolonially about multiple, coexisting rational orders.

[3] Franz M. Wimmer introduces the concept of *polylogue* to denote a multidirectional, intercultural dialogue among representatives of diverse philosophical traditions, aimed at fostering mutual understanding without privileging any single epistemic framework. (See: *Franz M. Wimmer, Essays on Intercultural Philosophy Chennai: Satya Nilayam Publications, 2002, 79*).

[4] Fanon views a *new humanism* as a radical rupture with the colonial subject-object dynamic and the epistemological legacy of European Enlightenment thought. This humanism, he insists, must arise not from abstract universalism but from the historical wounds, insurgent knowledges, and lived experiences of the colonized." (See: *Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Constance Farrington New York: Grove Press, 1963, 316*).

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Прогноз щодо «модерного Я»: свобода, влада та глобальність

Біньям Меконнен (ORCID 0000-0002-9193-8904)
Університет Аддіс-Абеби (Ефіопія)

Ця праця критикує «модерне Я» як гегемонний конструкт, сформований через раціональну, міфічну та колоніальну матриці західної модерності. Вона ставить під сумнів імовірну універсальність цього «Я», показуючи, що його авторитет залежить від систематичного придушення альтернативних ідентичностей та їхніх раціональних голосів.

Розташоване в рамках ширшої колоніальної матриці влади, «модерне Я» постає одночасно як суб'єкт та інструмент універсалізаційного проєкту, який надає перевагу євроцентричній раціональності, маргіналізуючи при цьому субальтерні епістемології. Простежуючи історичну та концептуальну траєкторію цього формування, від його першоджерел у класичній та ранньомодерній філософії до його консолідації в епоху Просвітництва, автор дово-

дить, що «модерне Я» конституюється як нормативний ідеал людства, заснований на постійному створенні «Іншого» як меншовартісного. Відповідно, показано, що претензії на універсальний розум є нерозривними з практиками виключення та ієрархії. Спираючись на деколоніальну філософію та філософію визволення, ця праця прагне деконструювати примусове нав'язування «модерного Я» та реконструювати суб'єктивність через ствердження плюриверсу філософських традицій та життєвого досвіду.

Ключові слова: Модерне Я; Інакшість (Іншість); трансмодерна глобальність; емансипація

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