

# The phenomenon of Sobornist in the context of civilizational discourses of Ukrainian orthodoxy

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The article examines the authentic (Orthodox) dimension of the phenomenon of Sobornist. It argues that the conciliar (soborny) paradigm offers a complex ideological construction of unity in diversity. Theoretically, this is the ideal of harmony within the Orthodox Church and Orthodox community. Practically, due to a series of ideological distortions, it cannot be realized either in ecclesial or social existence. It is substantiated that in historical retrospect, in Orthodox countries, the source of these distortions was the cultural-civilizational complex of Byzantism (Byzantinism). A number of “social sins” of Byzantism, namely the Caesaropapal subordination of the Church to the state, the statist exaggeration of the historical role of certain countries and peoples, and the devaluation of human personality, absolutized the principle of unity through pressure on diversity. The importance of considering the role of socio-cultural and political factors of different nations and countries in the self-expression of Byzantism on national soil is proven. In the case of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, it is about the tradition of “Kyivan Christianity,” which had several specific traits that laid the foundation for the legitimization of both unity and diversity, somewhat minimizing the distortion of the conciliar (soborny) ideal in the life of the Church and the community. On the contrary, Russian Orthodoxy and Russian religious philosophy, through the cultivation of the statist component of Byzantism, legitimized Russian imperialism. Its current form—the ideology of the “Russian world,” with an emphasis on the violent “gathering of lands”—embodies an anti-soborny social paradigm.

## KEYWORDS

*Sobornist, conciliarity, unity in diversity, civilizational values, Byzantism, Byzantinism, Kyivan Christianity, etatism.*

## Introduction

There are times that reveal the existential meaning of complex phenomena. Until January 22, 2014, Sobornist for us was associated with a holiday – the Day of Unity of Ukrainian Lands, which was earned and fought for by the previous generations of Ukrainians. In 2014, we experienced the Bloody Day of Sobornist, when the first heroes of the Revolution of Dignity died on Hrushevskyi Street, and we understood its true price. With the start of Russia's barbaric invasion of Ukraine, and especially its large-scale phase in 2022, we comprehended not only the value, but also the existential meaning of Sobornist for the country and each of us.

The complexity of the phenomenon of Sobornist (Conciliarity) lies in its multidimensionality. Another dimension of this phenomenon points to its authentic “roots,” related to religion. More precisely, the concept and phenomenon of Sobornist are rooted in Orthodox ecclesiology, which defined the organizational structure of the Orthodox Church as Soborny (Conciliar). The importance of understanding the religious discourse of Sobornist clarifies the essence of the self-expression of this phenomenon not only in the religious, but also in the secular spheres, which explains the relevance of our article.

## Literature review and Research methods

A review of the research literature on the phenomenon of Sobornist shows that it is the subject of interdisciplinary studies at the intersection of philosophy, religious studies, history, political science, literary studies, etc. Any attempt to systematize its meaning is inseparable from the analysis of its religious component from both its positive and negative effects on society.

The apologia of Sobornist as a model for building an Orthodox community is found in the works of Ukrainian theologian and philosopher I. Vyshensky. It is also discussed in the works of Russian religious philosophers and figures of the Russian diaspora such as O. Khomyakov, N. Berdyaev, S. Bulgakov, I. Ilyin, I. Kireyevsky, V. Lossky, V. Solovyov, S. Trubetskoy, and S. Frank. The ideas of many of these thinkers were used by the ideologists of Russian statism to justify militaristic political strategies.

Among more recent works, D. Biriukov (2024) investigates the connection between the teaching of conclusively and love and power in the Orthodox tradition. L. Litvak (1990) systematizes the influence of the ideal of Sobornist on Anglican-Orthodox relations in the context of the life stance of J. M. Neil. Also important is the Ukrainian dimension of the studied issue. The influence of russification policies on the religious and communal life of Ukrainians, as well as the use of the idea of Sobornist by the Soviet authorities to legitimize their actions, have been studied by I.

Dziuba (1998) and S. Kulchytskyi (*Hlukhovskiyi*, 2018). The analytical exploration of the impact of Sobornist on national identity and the unity of the country belongs to S. Zhadan (2020), who reflects on the impact of the idea of Sobornist on national identity and unity; S. Piatachenko (2004), who examines the reflection of the idea of Sobornist in Ukrainian literature; and O. Bezv (2018), who tries to clarify the challenges and threats to Ukrainian Sobornist. T. Butler (2023), analyzes the Russian Orthodox idea of Sobornist and its critique in support of the Moscow Patriarchate's backing of Putin's policies, and others.

The scientific study was conducted using systemic and cultural-historical approaches. Hermeneutic procedures, including the hermeneutic circle, as well as Anna Wierzbicka's method of key words, were applied. The study of Byzantine transformations of the Sobornist paradigm is carried out using the method of deconstruction.

### Results and Discussion

The primary aspect of the phenomenon of Sobornist lies in its ecclesiological discourse. The term "Sobornist" was first used in the 9th century by Cyril and Methodius during their translation of the 9th article of the Nicene Creed, which stated: "I believe in One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church." They employed the word "Sobornist" as an equivalent for the Greek term "catholicity" (καθολικότης). The Greek term καθολικότης (derived from καθ, meaning "according to," and ὅλη, meaning "whole") is literally translated as "according to the whole," signifying the Local Church in harmony with the Church as the Body of Christ, where all members form a single organism, i.e., the fullness of the Christian Church.

Over time, however, "catholicity," particularly in Slavic languages, started to be associated with universality or ubiquity, which was unwarranted since, in Greek, the phenomenon of universality is conveyed by the term "Oikoumene" (οἰκουμένη – "the whole inhabited world," derived from οἰκέω – "to inhabit, to dwell") (Paprotskiyi, 2019:43). The similarity in the phonetics of "catholicity" (καθολικότης) and "Catholicism" likely influenced public perception, especially with the emergence of two Christian denominations. Considering the complex relations between Orthodoxy and Catholicism at that time, Slavic church literature and sermons gradually began favoring the term "Sobornist."

Sobornist (conciliarity) is an integral part of the Orthodox teaching on society, embodying the most optimal model of collective life. Most researchers trace the concept of "Conciliarity" to two equally significant meanings: assembly and temple. Primarily, the term "Sobornist" (catholicity) pertains to the Orthodox Church itself, symbolizing the unity of the Church's mystical body and its subordination to a single purpose. This is evidenced by the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed, in which the Church is proclaimed to be "One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic." The catholicity of the Church signifies that it: geographically encompasses the entire universe; proclaims the complete truth; embraces the entirety of humanity, regardless of national, professional, or other affiliations; engages with the full scope of human morality, both in its positive and negative manifestations.

From this follows the conclusion that although the church is "not of this world," but, taking the figure of the Savior as an example, it strives to save and renew the world through the realization of the redemptive mission of kenosis. Namely, the mission of the church on earth is not only to save people, but also to save and renew the entire

world of all living things. That is why the church in the world acts as a council, it strives to save many "and to give His soul for the redemption of many" (Mk. 10.45). At the same time, the interpretation of the term "Sobornist" as a gathering does not contradict its interpretation as a temple, because the Greek word "church" (ekklesia) means a gathering of those who are invited. This allows us to talk about the complementarity of these two concepts, which reveal the ecclesiological discourse of conciliarity.

Despite this, the concept of conciliarity has social and even civilizational dimensions. Attention to the social discourse of this phenomenon is also actualized due to the interpretation of conciliarity as a certain mystical paradigm of the collective life of people, when concurrence is understood as agreement, unanimous participation of believers in the life of the church and the world, collective creativity of life and collective salvation. More precisely, it is the unity of all baptized people and the desired ideal of communication and coexistence of people.

It is natural that the sobornal perception of the world, inherent in the Eastern Christian mentality, was not limited to the framework of human earthly life, but was aimed at metaphysical existence. Congregationalism was a necessary condition for the human salvation, when the healing of an individual is possible only through the healing of the mankind. However, the Orthodox understanding of salvation included not only the idea of the salvation of the human race, but also of the entire world of all living things. The condition of universal salvation was declared to be the solidarity of the whole collected world, when salvation was understood not individually, but collectively, together with the whole world. This cosmic level of sobornist was traced even in the idea of apokatastasis of the Eastern teachers of the church: Clement of Alexandria, Maximus the Confessor, etc. Already in those times, Eastern Christianity emphasized the fundamental importance of the rite as an external expression of a deep internal agreement with the association of believers.

The formation of the conciliar doctrine in Ukrainian Orthodoxy was influenced by the tradition of "Kyivan Christianity," which, by the 10th–13th centuries, had developed several distinctive features, setting it apart from Byzantine or Russian Christianity. In particular, the foundation of "Kyivan Christianity" included the pre-Christian sophian tradition of Socrates, Parmenides, and Plato, the social teachings of Pauline theology, as well as the philosophical and theological legacy of prominent Christian theorists such as Ambrose the Great, Gregory of Nyssa, Maximus the Confessor, and Gregory the Theologian. Thus, the nature of religiosity in Kyivan Rus' "had its own specificity and was far removed from the aspirations of Eastern and Western models, on the one hand, purely external practicalism of faith, and on the other, abstract, purely intellectual religiosity". (Kharkovshchenko, 2004: 220).

Therefore, the Kyivan Church for a long time did not prioritize either Eastern or Western forms of church organization, and Christianity in Rus' could not be described as either Byzantine or Roman but rather as uniquely Rus'. It should also be noted that Ukrainian Orthodoxy was influenced by Western Christian traditions. This influence was manifested not only in the phenomenon of Greek Catholicism but also in the dissemination of Western church influences on Eastern Orthodox Christianity through the activities of representatives of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Feofan Prokopovych, and others.

The pragmatic foundation of the establishment of the paradigm of sobornist in the Ukrainian lands was, first of

all, joint collective work, which made it possible to realize the need for the unity of people for survival. The spread of the idea of that paradigm was facilitated by the naturocentric and communal perception of the world, which manifested itself in the absence of opposition of an individual to both nature and the collective. In the natural dimension, Ukrainians tried to live in harmony with nature. In the social dimension, they identified themselves through belonging to certain social groups, which was formed according to various criteria, primarily by place of residence, religion, type of activity; in the case of wars - with belonging to the people resisting foreigners.

In Ukrainian Orthodoxy, thanks to the personal representation of the secular element at the councils and the spread of the competence of the brotherhoods, there was a wide participation of the public in the church administration. Therefore, the Ukrainian clergy, elected by the people, did not become a closed stratum of Ukrainian society, and no significant decision was taken by the church "without the rites of the spiritual council," but taking into account "the will of the secular states, as capable ancient states ... and ordinary people of the Orthodox faith" (*Richynskyi, 2002:152*). The council form of solving important cases was accompanied by the development of the concept of council law, which supported the idea of the church as people. This, in turn, had an impact on the further development of the Ukrainian church ideology, which "was formed for many centuries, and was made together with the entire Clergy and the People" (*Ilarion, 1944: 4*), therefore - acquired a more democratic character than the refined version of the ideology of Byzantium, inherent in Russian Orthodoxy.

In addition, the cathedral organization of the church was combined with the approval of certain models of the organization of social life. As noted in his scientific investigations, M. Kostomarov, the dichotomy "personality-society" was resolved in different ways in the Russian (quasi-Byzantine. - *N.I.*) and Ukrainian spiritual traditions. In the Russian tradition, the dominance of generality - "communism" (of God and the king) over the individual was observed, therefore, in social life, Russians gravitated towards monarchism. Instead, the Ukrainian tradition was characterized by respect for the individual and recognition of their positive significance. In the imagination of Ukrainians, the community was a free association of people, so their ideal was a free federal union (*Fediv & Mozghova, 2001: 249-252*). Despite historical cataclysms, this state of affairs was maintained for centuries. And the most large-scale attempt to destroy it was inspired by the atheistic Soviet regime, which for almost seven decades tried with varying intensity to plant its ideological ersatz - collectivism on our lands.

Also, Ukrainians have been characterized by tolerance towards non-believers, due to the absence of strict confessional identification here, which seriously undermines the possibility of establishing a religious monopoly. And the Ukrainian national myth was much less connected with religion (*Yelenskyi, 2002: 16*), which made it impossible to absolutize its religious component.

Kyiv Christianity was also devoted to the social ideals of Paulinism. Thus, the main idea of Paulinism was to proclaim the equality of all people before God, which excluded any discrimination of a person based on social or national characteristics. The idea of the equality of all people and the denial of the messianic destiny of individual nations gained further development in the writings of Metropolitan Hilarion, K. Smolyatich, etc. In addition, as rightly noted by A. Rychynsky, the basis of Ukrainian religious tolerance

became the syncretic nature of the Ukrainian religious outlook, the formation of which was influenced by Iranian, Semitic, Indian, Persian, Greek, and Varangian influences (*Richynskyi, 2002:410*). Therefore, the above-mentioned circumstances made any significant manifestations of etatism in Ukraine impossible.

In Ukrainian lands, despite the Ukrainian Church falling under the influence of the caesaropapist tradition during Peter I's reign, Ukrainian Orthodoxy retained anti-caesaropapist tendencies (*Istoriia rehlii na Ukraini, 1997: 243*). Evidence of this anti-caesaropapist orientation in Ukrainian Christianity includes "pre-Mongol Christianity, the Uniate and Mohylian periods, and the service of Metropolitan Sheptytsky" (*Havano, 2002: 19*). One historical implementation of the symphony of powers in Ukraine was the "Kyivan-Rus'" model of church-state interaction (*Rybachuk, & Bilous, 2004: 55*), which minimized negative political distortions of the conciliar ideal.

The idea of conciliarity is undoubtedly closely connected to the Orthodox understanding of freedom. In the Orthodox tradition, freedom could not manifest itself in an autonomous, self-asserting individual, but in a person who develops themselves in unity with others, within the Church. It is believed that within a conciliar community, antagonisms are impossible because the religious individual exists within the religious collective, and the religious collective resides within the religious individual. The conciliar paradigm excludes the complete absorption of the individual by the collective and the dissolution of the individual "I" into the collective "we." An individual consciously abandons isolation and alienation, embraces the fullness of other individualities, and gains the ability to perceive and express the consciousness of the community to which they belong. In other words, the conciliar synergy of individuals should not depersonalize them.

Under such circumstances, the aspiration for freedom did not imply an aggressive pursuit of expanding individual choice, but rather freedom in serving the community, society, and state on principles of selfless love. This process was supposed to be symmetrical - where all members of the community, including those in power, serve everyone. However, this "ideal type" proved utopian in the context of real society. Such an understanding of conciliarity (sobornist) in Kyivan-Rus' Christianity aligns with its description by the Ukrainian theologian of the 16th-17th centuries, I. Vyshenskyi, who believed that all people should live "in a conciliar manner, correcting one another, rather than one person ruling over all." Under such conditions, any form of domination of one person over another becomes impossible, as equality, freedom, justice, fraternity, and benevolence form the foundation of communal life) (*Vyshenskyi, 1986: 132*).

More specifically, under the instrumental use of the paradigm of conciliarity, it became a basis for minimizing individual rights and freedoms. This occurred when the idea, superficially and selectively, was adapted by authorities or specific socio-political forces to serve their own needs. In such cases, situations arose where "not communities of people - ethnic, political, confessional, or otherwise - formed from intrinsically valuable human individualities, but, conversely, one class of such communities became, in relation to the individual, a higher metaphysical reality" (*Pavlenko, 2001: 45*) For example, in the context of the ethnocentric transformation of the conciliar idea, the people were represented as a supra-individual, timeless, organic unity of "conciliar personalities." Their unity was

understood not only as the unity of the community's destiny, but as unity in faith and truth.

Despite these advantages, the paradigm of conciliarity, as one of the ideologemes of classical (primary) Byzantism (Byzantinism), was not only a product of the patriarchal value system, but also a means of preserving values aimed at societal integration. "Byzantism" refers to the set of political, ethnographic, and ecclesiastical characteristics of the Eastern Greco-Roman Empire in the 11th–12th centuries, which later influenced the socio-political and cultural development of Orthodox countries. This encompasses the formation of certain patterns of religious-social, state-political, and philosophical-moral ideas, along with corresponding forms of social practice, whose origins can be traced back to the Byzantine civilization. In its broadest sense, it refers to autocracy in the state, Christianity with specific traits distinguishing it from Western churches, the rejection of overly exaggerated notions of earthly individuality, disillusionment with the material and earthly, and the orientation of individuals toward moral self-improvement (*Ishchuk, 2009: 50*).

This approach to individuality, reinforced by the idea of joint paternalistic care by secular and ecclesiastical authorities for the Orthodox people's fate, was expected to enhance the collective spiritual unity of the nation and societal harmony. Instead, it gave rise to several threats, which became fully evident in the case of secondary (Russian Byzantism).

In contrast to Kyivan-Rus' Christianity, the spread of Byzantinism in Russia had detrimental consequences for the ideals of sobornist. The entrenchment of ideas associated with secondary (Russian) Byzantism began after the fall of Constantinople in 1453, when Moscow started positioning itself as the successor to the Byzantine Empire. This process became irreversible during the reigns of Ivan III (1462–1505) and Ivan IV the Terrible (1533–1584), as Byzantine titles, rituals, and symbolism were adopted. During this period, Byzantism infiltrated all spheres of Russian societal life and acquired a "civilizational" vector, positioning the country as a unifying force for the Slavic world. Under conditions of caesaropapist subjugation of ecclesiastical authority to secular power and the dominance of the monarch in religious affairs – characteristic of Byzantium and inherited by Russian traditions – political power effectively gained unlimited legitimacy for its actions.

Russian Byzantism hyperbolized the statist component of this ideology. Etatism is a political doctrine aimed at establishing (or restoring) an "Orthodox state" and an "Orthodox monarchy" as the sole viable model for the co-existence of the faithful, premised on recognizing the Empire "not merely as a secular apparatus, but as a mystical soteriological organism that prevents the coming of the Antichrist" (*Sahan, 2004: 64*). This ideology is rooted in the belief in the infallibility of the theological knowledge of a particular church, where attempts to universalize it are perceived as paving the way for the political unification of "Orthodox peoples" under the leadership of an "Orthodox tsar." Both etatism and ethnophyletism are historical distortions of the idea of the national church, because they offer a false hierarchy of principles, reinforcing the political: state, ethnic, and then national (that is, local) at the expense of the universal – the Christian ideas of equality of all people before God. Likewise, etatism and ethnophyletism are inadmissible from the standpoint of the basic ethical principles of the modern civilization: tolerance, respect and recognition of equal dignity of all people, regardless of their ethnic or racial origin (*Ishchuk, & Sagan, 2020*).

Etatism is a social sin of Russian authority and the church, encompassing the violent creation of a centralized Russian state, its aggressive assimilation of other peoples and territories under the doctrine of "Moscow as the Third Rome," later evolving into "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality," and culminating in the post-Soviet period with the rise of "rashism" and its "Russian world" doctrine. Even the atheist Soviet period was no exception. The Russian Orthodox Church, reanimated by Stalin in 1943 as a "pocket" institution fully subordinated to the regime, faithfully served the cause of "land gathering" within a secular empire.

Post-Soviet Russia, beginning in the 1990s, witnessed the emergence of narratives among public theologians emphasizing the antagonism between Orthodox values and those of Western civilization and globalization. Such rhetoric often had a geopolitical component, advocating for the creation of an anti-Western alliance of nations. By 2000, with the rise of Putin and his continued rule, the militaristic aspect of these ideas became increasingly pronounced. A series of bloody wars waged by Russia under the pretext of "gathering Russian lands" has been and continues to be fully supported by the Russian Orthodox Church and Orthodox intellectual circles. The culmination of this cynicism is the barbaric and bloody war against Ukraine, which unfolds with the consent of the Russian Orthodox "elite."

Russian philosophy has played a significant role in both the development and distortion of the idea of Sobornist. Russian religious philosophers and theologians of the 19th and 20th centuries wrote about "sobornost" as a desirable social ideal. This includes the Slavophiles and their intellectual counterparts in religious philosophy, such as A. Khomyakov, I. Kireevsky, Y. Samarin, S. Bulgakov, P. Florensky, S. Trubetskoy, V. Solovyov, S. Frank and others.

At the rhetorical level, the term "Sobornist" was interpreted harmoniously by these thinkers, as a prerequisite for social coexistence. For example, V. Solovyov believed that the collective life of a Christian community is impossible without the "multitude of individual persons" as a necessary component of the Church; the "single creative form" that unites people into one whole; and the "unifying action of the Spirit of God, by which this whole lives and moves through the interaction of all individual gifts and ministries" (Solovyov, V. *Spiritual Fundamentals of Life*). Therefore, the essence of sobornist lies in "permeating" social existence and serving as a correlate of people's social behavior. This idea was also echoed by Y. Trubetskoy, who argued that "sobornist is the manifestation of Christ Himself in the collective life of the Church" (Trubetskoy, Y. N. *The Meaning of Life*).

Russian philosophers identified several prerequisites for building a conciliar society: the integrity of society based on the voluntary submission of individuals to absolute values grounded in love for wholeness, the Church, the people, God, and the state (I. Kireevsky); the free unity of the foundations of the Church in their shared understanding of truth and their collective search for paths to salvation (A. Khomyakov); the harmony of freedom and unity among many people, based on their shared love for the same absolute values (Y. Samarin); the free union of all in perfect goodness (V. Solovyov); and the internal universality, primordial harmony, and coherence of human life (S. Frank) (*Ishchuk, 2007: 97-99*).

Against the backdrop of these lofty ideals, Russian imperialism flourished over the centuries. Representatives of religious philosophy emphasized the greatness of the Russian Church and the high spiritual qualities of the Russian

people, while the Slavophiles extolled the unique civilizational path of Russia. Their ideas were ostensibly meant to guide Russian society along a spiritual path. Instead, they became a façade – and at times a tool – for the horrific crimes committed by the Russian authorities.

Consequently, the people (at least in the Russian tradition) became carriers of the national-state idea, which was central to their self-awareness. Defending this “supra-individual” idea led to the cultivation of anti-personalist and ethnocentric (etatist) sentiments in society, where, for the sake of a “higher” goal, it was permissible to “sacrifice” individual persons. This socio-centrism created a foundation for the ideological justification of totalitarian regimes. In such circumstances, the ideal of a conciliar society became not only a tool for political manipulation, but also a justification for armed aggression. It was used to legitimize the establishment and strengthening of centralized power, the suppression of regional identities, and the subjugation of other peoples.

### Conclusion

The study of the authentic (Orthodox) dimension of the phenomenon of Sobornist demonstrates that it offers a complex conceptual framework – unity in diversity. Theoretically, this ideal was to be realized by the conciliar Orthodox Church, which was expected to create a conciliar Orthodox community. In practice, however, a series of ideological factors rendered this task unachievable.

From a historical perspective, the most significant influence on the variations in the realization of this social ideal came from the cultural-civilizational complex of Byzantism. Through a series of “social sins,” such as caesaropapist subordination of the Church to state power, statist exaggeration of the historical role of certain countries and peoples, and the devaluation of human individuality, Byzantinism prioritized unity through pressure on diversity.

Despite the pervasive influence of Byzantism across all Orthodox countries, it is crucial to consider the role of each nation’s sociocultural and political factors in shaping this phenomenon on a national level. In the case of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, this pertains to “Kyivan Christianity,” which exhibited several distinctive traits, setting it apart from Byzantine or Russian Christianity. More specifically, the Kyivan-Rus’ model emphasized church-state interaction, trends of conciliar governance not only within ecclesiastical matters, but also in the broader community, thereby enhancing the value of the individual. As a result, Ukrainian Orthodoxy laid the groundwork for legitimizing both unity and diversity, somewhat mitigating the distortion of the conciliar ideal in the life of the Church and the community.

Russian Byzantism hyperbolized the etatist component of this ideology. With the support of Russian Orthodoxy and Russian religious philosophy, the so-called “mission” of the Russian people and state to serve as protectors of “Orthodox values” was proclaimed. Under the banners of “defending co-religionists” and “gathering lands,” Russia has for already ten years tortured and killed Ukrainians, destroying the culture and economy of our country. This brutal violence flagrantly undermines all principles of conciliar teaching, exposing the profound value differences between the mentalities of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples.

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## Феномен соборності в контексті цивілізаційних дискурсів українського православ'я

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Стаття досліджує автентичний (православний) вимір феномену соборності. Обґрунтовано, що соборна парадигма пропонує складну ідеологічну конструкцію єдності в різноманітності. Теоретично, це ідеал гармонії всередині Православної Церкви і православної спільноти. Практично, через низку ідеологічних спотворень, він не може бути реалізований ні в церковному, ні в соціальному житті. Обґрунтовано, що в історичній ретроспективі в православних країнах джерелом цих спотворень був культурно-цивілізаційний комплекс візантизму. Низка "соціальних гріхів" візантизму, а саме цезаропапистське підпорядкування Церкви державі, державницька гіперболізація історичної ролі окремих країн та народів, девальвація людської особистості абсолютизували принцип єдності через тиск на різноманітність. Доведено важливість врахування ролі соціокультурних і політичних факторів різних націй та країн у самовиявленні візантизму на національному ґрунті. У випадку українського православ'я мова йде про традицію "Київського християнства", яке мало кілька специфічних рис, що заклало основу для легітимації як єдності, так і різноманітності, частково мінімізуючи візантійські спотворення соборного ідеалу в житті Церкви й громади. Навпаки, російське православ'я та російська релігійна філософія, культивуючи державницький компонент візантизму, легітимізували російський імперіалізм. Його сучасна форма – ідеологія "російського світу" з акцентом на насильницьке "збирання земель" – втілює антисоборну соціальну парадигму.

**Ключові слова:** Соборність, конциліярність, єдність у різноманітності, цивілізаційні цінності, візантизм, візантинізм, Київське християнство, етатизм.

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Received (Надійшла до редакції): 29.09.2024,

Accepted (Прийнята до друку): 01.12.2024

Available online (Опубліковано онлайн) 30.12.2024