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The discursive nature of modern science: philosophical understanding

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ABSTRACT

The article attempts to find out the patterns of adequate discursive interpretation of science in conditions of social turbulence. For this, based on the socio-communicative methodology, the author makes sense of the relationship between science and philosophy, and also characterizes the state of the modern scientific debate about science in domestic and foreign scientific discourse in such fields as understanding the tasks of post-nonclassical science (O. Polishchuk, I. Dobronravova, G. Haken), possibilities of reality transformation by means of technoscience (H. Bashlyar, B. Latour, V. Maryniuk, V. Melnyk), risks of post-academic science development (J. Ziman, O. Kuz, V. Cheshko), modes/types of science (M. Gibbons, H. Novotny, S. Limoges, L. Ryzhko). The main result of the study is the author's definition of the strengths and weaknesses of science in a socially turbulent space. Among its strengths, the author attributes such properties as increased scientific attention to applied problems, a higher degree of scientific self-organization, multitasking at different levels and within different types of relationships, communicativeness. Among the weaknesses are the risks of science losing fundamentality, disciplinary boundaries, which is accompanied by a loss of clarity in the methodology and criteria of scientific success, as well as the risk of replacing scientific truth with non-academic success criteria, such as the economic success of science, political correctness, etc. It is concluded that in the situation of global transformations and uncertainty which humanity is currently experiencing, new characteristics of science are developing, which help to understand the risks and dangers of moving away from traditional academicism.

KEYWORDS

science,
discourse,
technoscience,
social turbulence,
postclassical discourse,
postacademic discourse,
science of the 2nd mode

Introduction

Modern science has a communicative nature, as it is a collective activity in which the exchange of knowledge, mutual review, permanent approvals in discussions between competent experts are an integral prerequisite for the verification, ordering, accumulation and development of scientific knowledge.

The definition of the concept of science acquires special relevance in the modern era of human development, which, according to the Ukrainian researcher O.A. Panchenko, is characterized by a "high degree of instability (turbulence)", when "the balance of the relationship between man and nature, man and society, man and the information environment due to of turbulent phenomena may be disturbed, resulting in chaos and unpredictability of events. Taking into account the phenomenon of turbulence in various aspects of manifestation is important from the point of view of preventing destructive phenomena in society as a whole and concerning the individual in particular" (*Panchenko, 2019: 87*). And accordingly, taking into account the phenomenon of social turbulence should contribute to a comprehensive analysis of the problems of science development in modern society, to the disclosure of its role and significance. Regarding the definition of the concept of social turbulence, we have already made preliminary scientific explanations (*Kubalskyi, 2022*).

The ***purpose of the article*** is to clarify the conditions for an adequate discursive interpretation of science in the conditions of modern social turbulence.

Methods

The research methodology is communicative philosophy, in particular, in its version presented by the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas (*Krüger, 2016*) and the Ukrainian philosopher Anatoly Yermolenko (*2016*). It is referred to not simply comparing different discourses about science, that is, different epistemological approaches to science, and above all, different modern versions of the philosophy of science. Science itself should be considered as a special, rather perfect discourse, namely very close to the ideal (in the sense of K.-O. Apel) embodiment of argumentative discourse, which is the basis for achieving a reasonable and therefore stable consensus regarding social and scientific norms. Previously, we have already carried out a general description of the communicative approach to the study of science (*Kubalskyi, 2022*).

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Results and Discussion

Science as an embodiment of the communicative mind

Modern science is a rather perfect form of embodiment of the communicative mind, about which the famous German philosopher Jürgen Habermas once said: "The content of judgment can be developed only through conclusions, that is, the connection of several judgments. And in order to expand the body of knowledge, we must go through a circle of inductive data collection, abductive search for hypotheses and derivation of explanations – a discourse, not just a search" (*Krüger, 2016: 817*). It is obvious that Habermas here refers to a scientific approach to solving cognitive problems. However, both Habermas and other representatives of communicative philosophy consider it as a general methodology for any human activity. After all, a person does not solve his life tasks on his own, but relying on those experiences, those knowledge and values, on those practices that were already developed by other people earlier and that are supported by people now thanks to their communication with each other. In such communication, people constantly check and confirm these practices, develop them and introduce new ones.

Science, based on philosophy, should play the role of a source of basic methodological guidelines for such practices. Therefore, what is true for science as a communicative practice is often considered, if not as a model, then at least as an instructive example for all other types of human activity. Indeed, science is one of the most reflexively transparent types of human activity – therefore, what is visible in science may well turn out to be hidden in other types of practices, hidden, but no less valid. Philosophy is a model of reflexivity for any activity, including science. Philosophy clarifies what even science cannot clarify due to the lack of empirical data – because philosophy forms a new experience, that is, the experience of something that did not exist before, that a person dared for the first time – for the first time for himself, and perhaps for the first time for humanity. Philosophy seeks to grasp and extrapolate trends in the development of humanity, its thinking and transform them into imperatives of human activity. That is why the communicative turn that took place in philosophy in the middle of the 20th century is of such great importance. As A. Yermolenko notes: "The methodological turn from the philosophy of subjectivity to the philosophy of intersubjectivity is conceptualized and exteriorized by such concepts as "argumentation", "discourse", "consensus", which implies equal relations of people in the society and on this basis – an open discussion by the public of important and relevant social problems" (Yermolenko, 2016: 70). Here, A. Yermolenko speak up as if the turn in philosophical methodology to communicative issues immediately and directly reflects on social practices – namely, on the growth of the social significance of the practices for discussing various social problems. Although in real life this process has a number of mediating links between philosophy and society, the most important of which is science.

Jürgen Habermas looks at the root of the problem: the task of philosophy is to provide the goal of communication, that is, to motivate people to seek understanding: "Of course, if one is looking for a point of support, then the pragmatic concept of the communicative mind forms the core of everything else. The mind is differentiated according to the descriptive, normative and expressive ways of using statements. The unity of this differentiated mind is only operationally established through the intention to reach an understanding, that is, in the process of communication. I speak of the intention to reach an understanding, because the productive power of negation could not do its work without an orientation toward the goal of agreement. The unifying power of discourse proves itself through the negation of negations" (*Krüger, 2016: 825*). Although Habermas writes as if people themselves have to come to philosophy with their inquiry if they want to get the best possible answer to their communicative difficulties. Thus, the illusion arises that philosophy has to wait for some practical demand for its work. However, communication never stands still, just as philosophers never stop the work of their philosophical laboratory, which they always have with them – thinking knows no rest and self-satisfaction. However, J. Habermas finds a radical solution to the aporia in the ratio of theoretical and practical work. Comparing the concept of "communicative rationality" with the concept of "practical rationality", he unequivocally notes that communicative rationality is not only practical, but also theoretical: "...I introduced "communicative rationality" as a broader term from the point of view of language theory... Based on this concept , methods of communication serve as a reference point for clarifying the ontological, socio-ontological and subject-theoretical prerequisites for references, that is, for references to something in the objective, social and subjective world" (*Krüger, 2016: 825*). The difference from previous ideas about the relationship between practical and theoretical rationality is, for Habermas, that in the communicative plane it is more important not to make abstract projections of the theoretical mind onto the field of practice, but first of all, on the contrary, to clarify theoretical difficulties and misunderstandings thanks to an appeal to specific practices that give unequivocal answers to the question of what "will work" or not, that is, what is realistic and what remains only "hare-brained schemes".

Communicability as the basis of modern science conceptualization variability

It is generally accepted today to define science as a multidimensional socio-cultural phenomenon: a component of the spiritual society's culture, a form of human knowledge, a system of concepts about phenomena and laws of reality. At the same time, it is worth considering the complexity and depth of not only the phenomenon, but also the concept of science, its diversity and multifaceted aspects. The expert discourse of science, carried out by epistemologists and philosophers of science, precisely sets the necessary communicative dimension of the modern science's conceptualization.

First of all, it is worth outlining the main approaches and discussions in the definition of the term "science" in modern domestic and world literature. Prominent domestic philosopher S.B. Krymsky notes: science "penetrates into all cells of modern society: from the sphere of production and consumption to the legitimization of theological disciplines. As a result, the boundaries of what can be called science are blurred, and in reference books and encyclopedias we find different interpretations of this phenomenon, the number of which can be only compared with the volume of definitions of human activity. And therefore, the general, unifying thesis of researchers is the statement that science is what professional scientists do. Accordingly, the definition of science as an uncompromising search for truth comes to the fore" (*Krymskyi,*

2003: 7). Subsequently, S. Krymskyi's ideas were developed by other science researchers.

Transformations in the science of a socially turbulent society, which orient scientific knowledge to practical goals and specific orders, have stimulated the emergence of several generalizing conceptual approaches in modern research literature:

- post-nonclassical science (I.S. Dobronravova, V.V. Kyzyma, O.M. Rubanets (*Rubanets, 2007*);
- technoscience (H. Bashlyar, B. Latour, B. Barnes, V. Melnyk, V. Maryniuk (*Melnyk, & Marynyuk, 2013)*);
- post-academic science (J. Ziman (Ziman, 1996), L. Leydesdorff (*Leydesdorff, 2009*), B. Nicolescu (*Nicolescu, 2014*));
- science of Modus / type 2 (M. Gibbons, H. Novotny, S. Limoges).

Below is a brief overview of these main discursive practices, each of which can be considered both as a separate case of the general science discourse, and as a competing position in the common (overlapping) scientific discourse.

Post-non-classical interpretation of modern science's tasks

First of all, we should pay attention to the fact that post-non-classical science claims to justify non-linear methodology as the most adequate explanation of those multidirectional and diverse, rapid and often unexpected changes that characterize modern society. Post-non-classical science explains this by the fact that the world itself is full of surprises and accidents that were simply not taken into account before.

Thus, the Ukrainian Philosopher O. Polishchuk observes the following characteristics of the modern object of scientific and philosophical knowledge: "Paying attention to the instability, chaosogenicity of being also leads to the strengthening of scientific thinking dialectical foundations and the methodology of scientific inquiry: that is why preference is given not to analytical thinking, but to its synthetical character as strategies for information processing of the problem. It is it who permits to identify the "corporate" (H. Haken) principles of organizing the elements of the whole, which are manifested precisely in the unbalanced conditions of these elements' existence. Since in balanced conditions for existence of the world elements (or the existence of all the elements of the whole) has an autonomous character, and in an unstable state their "ensemble" is evident, the interest of scientists in the study of "situational determination" (K. Mannheim) as an integral factor of knowledge is currently fixed" (*Polishchuk, 2010: 5*).

This characteristic receives its worldview and methodological clarification in the program article of I. Dobronravova, one of the most authoritative representatives of post-nonclassical science in Ukraine: "Post-classical science, which is formed in the process of the modern scientific revolution, is largely connected with the introduction of non-linear methods and the creation of non-linear theories, first of all, in the field of natural science... The quantitative solution of nonlinear equations with specific values of parameters by means of computers makes the subject of nonlinear science the concrete existence of complex nonlinear systems capable of self-organizing. Natural science becomes a historical science (I. Prigozhin) in the sense that, in addition to regularities, events of random choice between possible solutions of nonlinear equations must also be taken into account" (*Dobronravova, 2006: 135*).

As we can see, the post-non-classical model of science tends towards transdisciplinarity, the blurring of boundaries not only between individual sciences, but also towards the throwing of methodological bridges between different fields and types of scientific knowledge – between natural sciences and humanities in particular. Moreover, increased attention to accidents, irregularities, non-standard situations draws the attention of researchers to non-scientific forms of knowledge – if not as a methodology, then at any rate as a source of empirical data, and sometimes even a source of ideas. However, the fact of science's tolerant attitude towards extrascientificand non-scientific forms of knowledge does not indicate their scientific legitimacy, that is, in particular, it does not equate them in their methodology with scientific methodology. Scientific knowledge, preserving the original principles and criteria of truth and rationality, takes into account variability of reference systems and points of view of the research activities results in the culture of a socially turbulent society.

"Post-non-classical science represents non-linearity, complexity, a certain orderliness due to chaos, bifurcation, coherence of different approaches to the study of different nature phenomena, which determines the versatility of knowledge about the studied objects" (*Drotyanko, 2000: 137*). At the same time, the foundations of scientific discourse form a theoretical core that contributes to the formation of new methods, the construction of hypotheses, the formation of innovative approaches, thereby ensuring the verification and falsification of new knowledge.

In this new scientific picture of the world, reality loses its previously familiar constancy, and the search for such unchanging, "eternal" characteristics of reality ceases to be a feature of fundamental science. Everything in the object of scientific research is in motion, and therefore science itself can no longer be other than communicative – because it is in communication that one can most quickly, flexibly and sensitively respond to changes in reality.

This is how the Ukrainian philosopher Iryna Dobronravova substantiates the modern scientific picture of the world: "Such a historically composed real necessity includes randomness, which turns out to be fundamental for further self-organization (evolution) in this world, in particular, for determining what exactly options for such evolution (chemical, biological) will be stable" (*Dobronravova, 2006: 135*). The real loses its necessary character and passes into the status of the possible, dependent on many circumstances: "...since in the non-linear domain we are dealing with a real necessity, which includes a real random choice, the theoretical description of the historical process includes information about this choice. The historical approach in physics is carried out so far within the framework of unitary calibration theories, which describe the spontaneous violation of internal symmetries, and in synergistic approaches" (*Dobronravova, 2006: 137*). Moreover, human cognition also turns out to be one of those circumstances that can also change, and quite radically, the scientific picture of the world (although some radical representatives of post-classical science seem to claim that the world itself can change under the influence of cognition): "This historically

formed real necessity includes the randomness of historical choice, which turns out to be fundamental for further self-organization (evolution) in this world, in particular, for determining which particular variants of such evolution, chemical and biological, will be stable" (*Dobronravova, 2006: 139*).

Technoscience as a science of a technologically developed society

One cannot deny the fact that modern society is transforming the environment so profoundly and on a large scale that it is not so much a matter of supplementing nature with the sphere of culture, but of transforming culture, nature, society, and even man himself with modern technologies. All this was reflected in the term "technoscience", which conveys the fusion of science and technology as its main means of transforming reality. At the same time, engineering and technology mean both engineering and material means, as well as social technologies, and psychological and cognitive technologies, and many others. The abbreviation NBIK-technology has become widely used – that is, nano-, bio-, information and cognitive technologies. Some researchers add a fifth to these four letters – "S" – to denote social technologies: NBICS - N. M. Zlenko (Zlenko, 2015), M. K. Roco and V. S. Bainbridge (*Roco & Bainbridge, 2002*).

Ukrainian researchers also use the term "technoscience", despite its somewhat conventionality: "And although the broad meaning of the concept of technoscience is determined by the very appearance of classical science, which has been inseparable from the development of technology from the very beginning, in its proper sense "technoscience" covers the level of "third wave" science (E Toffler), an information society in which engineering/ information technology is an integral part of scientific research" (*Ryzhko, 2001: 215*).

The discourse of technoscience is at the same time the discourse of technology, which, on the one hand, expands the subject field of the discourse of science, and on the other, significantly narrows it in terms of the inclusion of humanitarian issues, which from now on in technoscience are narrowed in many ways to the status of the "human factor" in the functioning of technology, that is, the factor of errors and unjustified risks, a danger that should be reduced as much as possible. From this discourse of technoscience, it seems, the modern discourse of artificial intelligence is growing, which may well replace a person in an increasing number of those roles that a person plays in the functioning and development of technology.

Post-academic science as the loss of some risks due to the increase of others

Some researchers, under the influence of criticism of the classical concept of science, went even further and criticize not a certain type of science, but, it seems, science as such and, in any case, precisely criticize the academic approach as such. In their perception, academicism appears as unjustified breaks with reality as a result of attempts to obtain an objective distance between the researcher and the object of his research.

Such criticism begins with a reasonable proposal to expand participation in scientific research beyond the boundaries of universities – first of all, by involving the work of various laboratories and independent research centers immersed in the practice of constantly fulfilling special orders from the sphere of direct production – economy, politics, culture and all possible types of organized human activity.

Thus, applied science appears as a model, and fundamental science falls under systematic suspicion in unjustified theoretical speculations. On the other hand, post-academic science appeals to the universalization of knowledge – and, it seems, in an even more radical way than transdisciplinarity.

Such a representative of this trend as J. Ziman appeals to changes in the foundations of modern communication, which academic science can no longer master: "Communication was accelerated by electronic means until it became global. Instrumental perfection has made it much easier and much more expensive to do good science. Although this appears to be an ordinary technological development, it leads to radical changes in many traditional practices and attitudes" (*Ziman, 1996: 70*). In particular, Ziman considers university science too bureaucratized, and commercial systems that seek to take control of the exchange of scientific data are just an unnecessary obstacle to the free exchange of knowledge.

Ukrainian researchers O. M. Kuz and V. F. Cheshko consider, in particular, bioethics in its close connection with transhumanism to be the embodiment of post-academic science: "In the binary connection of co-evolving elements of culture, bioethics-transhumanism, bioethics was quickly constituted as a typical example of a new – post-academic organization of scientific research and its product – scientific theory" (*Kuz & Cheshko, 2017: 157-158*). From a simple statement about the transdisciplinarity of bioethics, these researchers move suddenly, but quite naturally, to a statement about excessive ideologization, commercialization, politicization of science, as well as an even more risky bipolarization of science:

"the stratification of the single process of scientific knowledge into two streams autonomous in terms of their social functions – risky (dangerous) science (transformation of the world in accordance with the ideal image of the desired future) and preventive science (identification and calculation of risks generated by scientific and technical development, i.e. risky science)" (*Kuz & Cheshko, 2017: 158*). In many ways, such a diagnosis is premature, but the risks of its possible implementation should not be dismissed – especially if academic science will not defend the efficiency of its own approach in practice.

Science in "Mode 2": appeal to discourse or its imitation?

The understanding of the contract between modern science and the socially turbulent society found a theoretical basis in the concept of Modes / types of science. According to this approach, according to the testimony of the Ukrainian philosopher L.V. Ryzhko: "Academic production of knowledge is moving from the traditional Mode 1 to the new Mode 2. Mode 1 is characterized by the predominance of the development of fundamental research within disciplinary boundaries, which are guided by the interests of researchers, is carried out in stable institutional structures and is evaluated according to criteria accepted by the scientific community.

Such a traditional model is complemented by interdisciplinary and problem-oriented studies of Mode 2, which are funded by customers, are mainly applied in nature and are evaluated according to economic and social utility. The dominance of applied research leads to the fact that the usual linear sequence of the science devel-

opment from fundamental to applied research and further – to development for production – loses its meaning. Instead, new and new needs of practice stimulate the relentless development of scientific research" (*Ryzhko, 2019: 9*). But is such a basis for a contract reliable? On the one hand, there is a clear underestimation by supporters of deep transdisciplinarity of those fundamental differences that are fundamental to different fields and types of sciences. The natural sciences will never become interpretive, just as the humanities will never be able to exhaustively verify their ever-evolving object. On the other hand, Modus 2 is attributed to what has long been characteristic of the technical sciences: if it is still permissible for the natural sciences at the beginning (although here too it will soon lead to the collapse of the fundamental science), then for the humanities following the whims of the customer is fatally dangerous. It is enough to mention the "scientific nature" of commissioned sociological research. It is characteristic that in order to deny this criticism, supporters of the ideas of departure from the principles of fundamental and academic science also try to adapt to the paradigm of communicativeness in science. As L.V. Ryzhko testifies: "...the approach of M. Gibbons, H. Novotny, S. Limoges is now gaining wide popularity, stimulating scientific research based on his conceptual and methodological schemes. A characteristic feature of such studies is the expansion of the conceptual discourse. In particular, it increasingly includes the concepts of the semantics of sports, which denote contestation, competition, attention to time, which has several dimensions (project time, research process time), formulation of problems facing scientists as great challenges" (*Ryzhko, 2019: 10*). They claim that they will make it possible to reveal the role of science in mastering and transforming the surrounding reality.

In fact, we are only talking about the transformation of science into the field of permanent changes in the conjuncture. In addition, in "Mode 2" science is threatened with the loss of its own object of research, because its objective contours are replaced by the desired images of the research customer, who only select a part of this object, and also add to it extraneous characteristics from an academic point of view. As a result, the rigor of the research methodology application will inevitably be lost, which will be constantly adjusted, adapting to the wishes of the customer – to obtain the result which will be paid more, and not the one that is more in line with reality. If such Modus 2 games are still acceptable in the periphery of academic science, then the transition of the entire system of science to Modus 2 threatens with the rapid collapse of science as such. In particular, scientific discourse should be a means of increasing the efficiency of scientific research, and not replace this research.

Strengths and weaknesses of science as a means of communication in a socially turbulent space

If we directly transfer the characteristics of its research object to science, then we will obtain the worst model of science and scientific communication. It seems that this is exactly what the Ukrainian researcher N.V. Vozniuk is doing unwittingly:

"Analyzing the main regularities in the development of the scientific picture of the world, it can be found that the modern scientific picture of the world is the embodiment of the idea of constant changes and multifaceted new projections, in which uncertainty, vagueness and self-organization play a leading role. The presence in it of such features as multidimensionality, lability, inaccuracy indicates profound changes in the methodology of forming the latest model. Therefore, in the modern philosophy and methodology of science, much attention is focused on rethinking the ways of expressing meaningful knowledge" (*Vozniuk, 2013: 55*).

Such a position presents the weaknesses of modern science as inevitable for it and the main perspective: the risks of science losing fundamentality, disciplinary boundaries, which is accompanied by a loss of clarity in the methodology and in criteria of scientific success, as well as the risk of replacing scientific truth with non-academic success criteria. However, such a rethinking of the laws of the modern science development can consist in something completely different – namely, in the reduction of uncertainty, inaccuracy, changeability, vagueness of the studied object due to the organization, clarity and regularity of the scientific discourse about it. The self-organization of science is something fundamentally different from the self-organization of a post-nonclassical object of research.

As a form of spiritual and practical mastering of the world, science attests multidisciplinarity within various types of relationships at the social, cognitive, and psychological levels. The formation of hierarchical chains, networks of direct and reverse relations of connection and isolation testify to the expansion of the space of science, to the informal leadership of the scientific system in the knowledge of reality, and at the same time to its certain dependence on other forms of mastering reality. As V. Melnyk notes, "science, by its nature and immanent-genetic definiteness, cannot be a universal means of knowledge, and therefore – the only universal theoretical basis for understanding and transforming the world, the only basis for human system-creating activity" (*Melnyk, 2011: 12*). Therefore, it is worth defining its specific features that distinguish science from other ways of knowing reality – which appear both as strengths and as weaknesses of science as a way of knowing. Communication, namely scientific discourse, is precisely the way to efficiently use the strengths of science and to neutralize its weaknesses.

The specified approach helps to understand the processes currently taking place in a socially turbulent society. It can be used to determine the specifics of modern science as a special type of discourse and social communication, which are a form of spiritual and practical mastering of the world, since in the modern era even a partial change of ideas about certain processes can change the general principles not only of the appropriate field of scientific knowledge, but also of others related to it. The general impression of familiarity with attempts to detach science from classical standards of academicity is well conveyed by this elaborate position of Habermas on learning from mistakes: "In dealing with nature – and with everything that we can ultimately consider a physical object – we learn from disappointments with our cognitive expectations; in everyday life these are everyday expectations, in science – hypotheses. The need to revise such mistakes can lead to new insights – in an objectifying treatment of nature or society, this then leads to an expansion of existing or organizational knowledge. When dealing with other people, we can learn from their objec-

tions. In science, we combine one (experiments) with another (discussion). In the context of communicative action, we can learn from the failures of our own plans of action, as well as from the objections, protests and resistance of others" (*Krüger, 2016: 819*).

Thus, even rather risky statements in science contribute to the improvement of the general theoretical level of scientific discourse – provided that they are well-argued. This brings to life the important need of academic science for constant self-criticism and constant updating of its own evidence base.

Conclusions

Thus, discussions about the essence of science and its place in a socially turbulent society help to determine the priorities of the scientific development of modern humanity, the key problems of scientific knowledge and the prospects for their solution. In a turbulent society, new characteristics of science are revealed, which, in particular, is manifested in the controversial concepts of post-non-classical scientific rationality, technoscience, post-academic science, Mode 2 science.

These concepts help to understand the risks and dangers of moving away from academicism in science. The situation of social turbulence creates a number of risks for modern science, which can be summarized by one characteristic – it is the risk of science losing itself. After all, by abandoning the strategic fundamentality of theoretical knowledge for the sake of the conjuncture success of applied knowledge, science loses not the external signs of academicism, but its very essence: profitability, political correctness; the focus on communication for the sake of communication increasingly supplants the search for truth in the everyday life of a modern scientist.

However, these distracting extraneous factors that create the effect of turbulence and lead scientists astray from a clear course in search of truth can be overcome thanks to the firm orientation of researchers to strict adherence to scientific methodology and consistent targeting of scientific truth as a mandatory and priority end result of scientific research.

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Дискурсивна природа сучасної науки: філософське осмислення

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У статті зроблено спробу з'ясувати закономірності адекватного дискурсивного витлумачення науки в умовах соціальної турбулентності. Для цього, ґрунтуючись на соціально-комунікативній методології, автор осмислює відносини науки та філософії, а також характеризує стан сучасної наукової дискусії щодо науки у вітчизняному та зарубіжному науковому дискурсі за такими напрямами як розуміння завдань постнекласичної науки (О. Поліщук, І. Добронравова, Г. Хакен), можливості перетворення дійсності засобами технонауки (Г. Башляр, Б. Латур, В. Маринюк, В. Мельник), ризики розвитку постакадемічної науки (Дж. Зіман, О. Кузь, В. Чешко), модуси/типи науки (М. Гіббонс, Х. Новотни, С. Лімож, Л. Рижко). Основним результатом дослідження є авторське визначення сильних та слабких сторін науки в соціально турбулентному просторі. До сильних сторін автор відносить такі її властивості як посилення наукової уваги до прикладної проблематики, вищий ступінь наукової самоорганізації, багатопрофільність на різних рівнях і в межах різних типів відносин, комунікативність. До слабких – ризики втрати наукою фундаментальності, дисциплінарних кордонів, що супроводжується втратою чіткості у методології та критеріях наукової успішності, а також ризиком підміни наукової істини позаакадемічними критеріями успіху, такими як економічна успішність науки, політична коректність тощо. Зроблено висновок, що в ситуації глобальних трансформацій та невизначеності, яку людство переживає зараз, розвиваються нові характеристики науки, які допомагають зрозуміти ризики і небезпеки відходу від традиційної академічності.

Ключові слова: наука, дискурс, технонаука, соціальна турбулентність, постклассичний дискурс, постакадемічний дискурс, наука 2-го модусу.

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