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HUMAN RIGHTS DIMENSION IN HELSINKI 1975: CANADIAN CONCERN THE SITUATION IN THE SOVIET UNION

During the 1960s and 1970s, Western countries, including Canada, became increasingly aware of and responded to human rights abuses abroad. The ideological, military and economic Cold War with the Soviet Union has intensified Ottawa's focus on human rights abuses in the country. For many Canadian observers, the communist system inherently repressed a number of human rights, including the freedoms of religion, movement, and property ownership. This concern was manifested during the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). The Final Act of the CSCE was signed at Helsinki on August 1, 1975 by the heads of government of the states of Europe and of Canada and the United States. Helsinki Final Act contained far-reaching agreements on political borders, trade, and human rights norms, has often been described as the "high point of détente". It is intended to establish the basis for the development of future relations between their countries and peoples. Among other the participants promised to respect fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief. Also pledges were given to make it easier for families to unite across borders and visit one another. However, Canadian Government made less likely to press human rights concerns than might have been expected. Ottawa often felt that more could be gained in its relationship with the Soviet Union by overlooking human rights violations. Such an approach was not uniformly supported in Parliament or in nongovernmental circles, which led to ongoing negotiations about the proper place of human rights concerns in Soviet-Canadian relations throughout this period. Despite uneven attention by Canadian Government, the growing prominence of human rights issues helped to ensure their enduring salience in the years that followed.

Keywords: *Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe; Canada; Soviet Union; Ukrainian Canadians; human rights violations.*

Introduction

The subject of discussions for over 20 years, a European Security Conference was first proposed by the Soviet Union in 1954, but Western and neutral states were largely unfavorably treated to the initiative. The feeling in the West was that Moscow's primary objective was to produce a document which would legitimize the Eastern European boundaries established at the end of World War II. The West was skeptical, but eventually agreed that there could be benefits in such a meeting, where pressure could be brought to bear on the Soviet bloc in relation to human rights issues (Brett, 1996: 669). But, with increasing bilateral moves toward *détente*, in 1969 the parties agreed on the idea of holding such security conference (Fascell, 1979: 71). Although it was announced as a European Conference, the Western Group insisted that all NATO countries be involved because of the nature of the European security system. Thus, Canada and the United States have participated throughout, along with all countries of Europe. Thus it came about that all the states of Europe except Albania plus the United States, and Canada, gathered for nearly three years of negotiations, starting on 22 November 1972 with preparatory talks in Helsinki, which ran until 8 June 1973. This opened the way to the Helsinki summit, where the Final Act was signed on 1 August by leaders of 35 nations.

The document set out the principles of relations between States in areas such as: Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty (I); Refraining from the threat or use of force (II); Inviolability of frontiers (III); Territorial integrity of States (IV); Peaceful settlement of disputes (V); Non-intervention in internal affairs (VI); Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief (VII); Equal rights and self-determination of peoples (VIII); Co-operation among States (IX); Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law (X)¹.

Motivated by the political will in the interest of the peoples to improve and enhance their relations and to promote peace, security, justice and cooperation in Europe, the conference participants, and later the signatories of the Final Act, became two North American countries - the United States and Canada. White House's main criterion in tailoring the CSCE policy was the relationship with the Kremlin (Romano, 2009: 706). Simultaneously, under the influence of the large Ukrainian community in Canada, its government began to pay increased attention to the situation in the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian SSR in particular.

¹ Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act (1975), Retrieved from: <https://www.osce.org/helsinki-final-act?download=true> (Accessed March 16, 2019).

In Canadian political and public discourse, the issue of reunification families on both sides of the ocean and the right to self-determination of the Soviet republics (notably Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine) were added to the issue of human rights violations in the Soviet Union.

There are a number of studies that reveal the history of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in Helsinki (Nolan, 1985), (Davy, 2009), (Snyder, 2010), and the place of human rights in OSCE activity (Brett, 1996), (Romano, 2009). Canada's domestic and foreign human rights policies are also covered in separate publications (Matthews and Pratt, 1985), (Mahoney, 1992), (Clément, 2012), (Thompson, 2018). These articles explore how international human rights standards are interpreted and applied at the national level, and how this affects states' participation in international politics. The focus is on Canada, which has been deeply influenced by international human rights standards and has, in turn, helped transform international politics. Almost no one specifically addresses Canada's human rights policy in the Soviet area, except for memoirs (Icaïs, 2016).

The purpose of the research: scientific analysis of the Canada's position on human rights abuses in the Soviet Union in the context of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in Helsinki and to prepare a Final Act. To achieve this purpose the following **research tasks** are set: 1) to identify the place of human rights in Canada's foreign policy; 2) to track the attitude of Canadian politicians to their country's participation in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in Helsinki 1975; 3) to find out the role of the Ukrainian community of Canada in drawing attention to the situation of human rights violations in the Soviet Union, in particular in the Ukrainian SSR; 4) to determinate Canada's human rights policy in the USSR.

Methods

During the analysis of the information base, a wide range of research methods was used. In particular, the historical-comparative method, which provides for the use of analogy, made it possible to compare interpretation of historical events and political processes by different sources on the basis of concrete facts. This method was very useful for exploring the approaches of different political groups to the treatment of human rights in Canada's foreign policy during the discharge period. The systematic approach made it possible to study both general governmental approaches to this issue and the public response to them (primarily Canadian Ukrainians). In turn, the system-structural method based on structural analysis has led to the implementation of a multi-level approach to the elements of the system of information influence as such (public organizations, parliament, government).

Results and Discussion

Canadian foreign policy on human rights has a strong domestic political foundation and is based on historical and legal tradition after World War II. At least one can mention the contribution to support the concept of human rights at the international level by John Peters Humphrey, a Canadian jurist and the first head of the United Nations (UN) Secretariat's Human Rights Division, known as the author of the first draft of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 (Thomson, 2018: 301). Canada routinely demonstrated its commitment to promoting hu-

man rights with interventions in sessions of the Commission on Human Rights and other international forums (Clément, 2012: 770) (Canadian representatives often discussed with Soviet representatives on various aspects of human rights). Canada was actively involved in helping draft international human rights treaties, participating in various United Nations human rights organs, and adhering to every major human rights treaty.

Human rights in Canadian political and legal traditions have been regarded as natural, inalienable and universal. The Canadian model of public liberties was characterized by the fact that the social system was based on the values of pluralistic democracy, the traditions of liberal political culture, and the individualist understanding of freedom. Canada's policy on human rights included the notion that democracy, which is the best guarantee of human rights, prosperity, and stability, must make systems more prosperous and stable (Matthews and Pratt, 1985: 160). The primary focus of Canada's foreign policy on human rights during this period was on standard setting within the international community through the development and articulation of basic human rights principles and norms. This was done with the intention of creating pressure on governments to respect the human rights of their own nationals and to balance the claims of "cultural relativism" as a reason to alter human rights norms for economic, social, and political reasons (Mahoney, 1992: 558). Canada's actions depended largely on the realities of the Cold War, economic feasibility, "constructive relations" with the Soviet Union, to some extent coordinated with the United States and the United Kingdom, but overall Ottawa's human rights policies were entirely independent.

In the 1970s, according to Dominic Clément, Canada was increasingly appealing to human rights as a cornerstone of international politics (Clément, 2012: 776). It has to do with P. Trudeau's policies and his concept of a "just society", which underpins the values of freedom and human rights. He emphasized that "freedom is of paramount importance... without it one cannot hope that human rights can be respected" (Trudeau, 1990: 357). However, there is evidence of this understanding on the international stage have been selective and laced with self-interest. Moreover, international relations expert Jeremy Kinsman called P. Trudeau's foreign policy not entirely consistent. The Prime Minister condemned the human rights abuses in Rhodesia but ignored the violations of these rights in the communist countries of Eastern Europe; he supported the policy of *détente*, knowing that Soviet dissidents were being imprisoned. In particular, the expectations of part of the Canadian politicians that P. Trudeau would raise the issue of human rights during his visit to the Soviet Union in May 1971 were not justified. In addition, Prime Minister's comparison Canadian and Soviet federal systems have sparked intense debate in Canada's public sphere (Сіромський, 2015: 135). This made P. Trudeau in the future to be much more cautious in his statements and to take account of domestic political sentiment.

In the early 1970s, the discussion of human rights abuses in the Soviet Union among the Canadian parliaments was usually centered around of "the rights of peoples to self-determination" (Cathal, 1985: 387). The first evidence of an improved understanding of the issues and sophistication of approach came in 1973, with the participation of an all-party delegation in an Inter-Par-

liamentary Union Conference prior to the CSCE meetings in Helsinki. Discussions of violations in the Soviet bloc began to take on the special language and interests, as parliamentarians began to introduce draft resolutions in the House on principles and mechanisms to promote human contacts, the free movement of people and ideas, religious freedom, and the reunification of families². Member of the Canadian Senate, Hon. Stanley Haidasz stressed: "Canada has invested a great deal in the CSCE. Though separated from Europe by the Atlantic Ocean, Canadians are deeply conscious that the fortunes of this continent have moulded our fate through history. Many events in Europe influence Canada and its people who seek peace and justice for all nations. For this reasons, Canadians want the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to be success"³.

However, there were other views on Canada's involvement in the OSCE. Human rights activist Christina Isajiw recalled: "Many of us who have dealt with human rights issues in Eastern Europe and the USSR have seen the potential of this document (the Helsinki Act). However, there was much confusion and opposition to this document among representatives of ethnic European organizations in Northern America. Some opposed it because it was legally non-binding, while others actively opposed it because they saw it as a betrayal by the West in order to consolidate Europe's political split and thereby condemn all dissenters" (*Icaïe*, 2016: 27). In fact, some representatives of the Baltic and Ukrainian ethnic groups in Canada considered the Helsinki Act a definitive rejection of countries that were violently subjugated by the Soviet Union during World War II. Some leaders of the Eastern European interest groups compared the CSCE in Helsinki 1975 with the post-war meeting in Yalta, which initiated Soviet domination of Eastern Europe (*Snyder*, 2010: 70).

The Canadian Committee of Captive European Nations, composed of representatives of peoples that were subjugated by Soviet Union, urged the Canadian government not to sign the agreement, and gave evidence that the Helsinki "pact" was a self-out of the peoples behind the Iron Curtain. Many outstanding authorities were highly critical of the CSCE, warning that most of the advantages were on the side of the Soviet bloc. Canadian historian James Eayress, former Prime Minister of Canada John G. Diefenbaker, Soviet expert Mark Gayn and many others prominent authorities spoke out against sanctifying Soviet tyranny⁴.

During the parliamentary debate on July 24, 1975, a week before the signing of the Final Act in Helsinki, J. Diefenbaker asked the Prime Minister, P. Trudeau: "What stand will Canada take before signing a treaty with regard to the right of self-determination being assured, as provided for in the United Nations charter, for Ukrainian people, those of the Baltic states and others who are kept in captive nations behind the Iron Curtain?". Trudeau's answer did not quite satisfy Diefenbaker: "I can tell the right honorable member that it is not the intention of the conference in

Helsinki to change the frontiers of any countries which are now members of the United Nations"⁵.

Several requests were addressed to Prime Minister P. E. Trudeau, and Minister for External Affairs, Allan MacEachen (1974-1976) for the intervention of the Canadian Government with the Soviet authorities on behalf of Valentyn Moroz and other Ukrainian prisoners. In a telegram sent July 22, 1975 the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) requested that, before any treaty is signed, the Canadian delegation to the Helsinki conference take steps to assure full reciprocity in the movement of people and the exchange of cultural activity and information, as well as to guarantee full respect to human rights in Ukraine under Soviet regime. The telegram also expressed respect to the appointment of the International Committee of the Helsinki Accords, with particular reference to human and national rights by the Soviet Union and demarcation between nations of Eastern Europe under the principle of self-determination⁶.

Despite the fears of some politicians (and not just Canadian), the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was signed in Helsinki (Finland), on August 1, 1975. Although the Final Act did not have the force of law, it did impose certain moral obligations on the signatories and had the advantage of integrating humanitarian concerns with other foreign policy issues. This turned out to be a political commitment with profound consequences for all countries. The OSCE Final Act contained three major "baskets" related to political and security issues; economic, scientific and technological cooperation; and cooperation in strengthening human contacts, information sharing, cultural and educational relationships. It also provided for periodic review meetings to assess compliance and enforcement (the first such meeting was scheduled in Belgrade in 1977) (*Brett*, 1996: 670). The Canadian Government believed the follow-up of the CSCE effective, which should have been important and, ultimately, a measure of its success or failure.

Apart from the signing ceremony, the sessions heard 35, mostly mechanically-read, speeches. Leonid Brezhnev, the Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union did not even refer to the Final Act, stating the conference was "a necessary summing-up of the political outcome of the World War II". Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau warned that state activity alone could not produce security and cooperation. He stated: "Without the promise of family reunification, without the interchange of ideas and opinions, the new era of harmony we seek will be not found"⁷. The statement of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honorable Allan MacEachen, was rather terse. He was of the opinion that the Final Act of the CSCE "is intended to establish the basis for the development of future relations between their countries and peoples... it does not look back to the past"⁸.

The Final Act of the CSCE 1975 included human rights

² House of Commons Debates. Official Report. 30th Parliament, 1st Session. Vol. VII. Ottawa, 1975, p. 6853.

³ House of Commons Debates. Official Report. 30th Parliament, 1st session. Vol. IX. Ottawa, 1975, p. 9749.

⁴ Debates of the Senate. Official Report (Hansard). 30th Parliament, 1st session. Vol. III. Ottawa, 1976, p. 1760.

⁵ House of Commons Debates. Official Report. 30th Parliament, 1st session. Vol. VIII. Ottawa, 1975, p. 7896.

⁶ *Світовий конгрес вільних українців*. Центральний державний архів зарубіжної україніки (далі - ЦДАЗУ. [World Congress of Free Ukrainians. Central State Archives of Foreign Archival Ucraina - TsDAZU - further] Ф. 36. Оп. 1. Спр. 25. Апр. 142-143.

⁷ Debates of the Senate. Official Report (Hansard). 30th Parliament, 1st session. Vol. III. Ottawa, 1976, p. 1758.

⁸ Debates of the Senate. Official Report (Hansard). 30th Parliament, 1st session. Vol. III. Ottawa, 1976, p. 1758.

issue in the East-West relations policy. The Western countries were convinced that differences in the approach of the East and the West to human rights problems should not be an obstacle to greater security on the continent. However, in addition to promoting the free movement of people, ideas and information, the West has aimed to invalidate the Brezhnev doctrine (*Romano, 2009: 712*) (Soviet foreign policy, calling on the Soviet Union to intervene in countries where socialist rule was under threat).

Basket III was the subject of long and intensely difficult negotiations. Soviet officials had originally wanted a brief mention of economic and cultural cooperation in one section. At a later stage they tried to get Basket III separated entirely from the Final Act so that it could be downgraded. By the end they agreed, with extreme reluctance, to include a long section on "cooperation in humanitarian and other fields" (*Davy, 2009: 12*).

The Soviet Union has for a long time refused to discuss honouring the Basket III principles on the grounds that it contravenes non-interference in their internal affairs. However, the conduct of a state towards its own citizens is its private business only insofar as the norms of such conduct are not subject to international agreements. The other signatories should not hesitate to press for corrective action once those norms have been breached⁹. Sensitive to public opinion in their own countries, Western negotiators (most notably the US and Canada) carefully insured the inclusion in Basket I of the Final Act of Principle VII which commands participating states to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience and religion (*Fascell, 1979: 71*). In principle VII of the Final Act 1975, the participating states reaffirmed their obligation in connection with "human rights and fundamental freedoms" to "act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights"¹⁰. The latter clause and the subsequent reference to International Covenants on Human Rights, "by which they may be bound", were important because these instruments of the international human rights law are more specific than Principle VII of the Final Act¹¹.

In view of this, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Canada A. MacEachen noted: "Canada entered the negotiations with a specific set of concerns. We wanted to play a part in the conference commensurate with our interests in Europe. In this we succeeded. We wanted to see incorporated in the Final Act measures to assist the freer movement of people and ideas. This goal has been achieved. Worthy of special note in this regard is the strong text on the reunification of families, sponsored by Canada"¹². However, there were other interpretations. Canadian Senator Eugene Forsey made critical comments in his analysis of the text of the Helsinki Declaration. His "warning, doubts, hesitations and fears" concerned the motivations of the Soviet leader and the leaders of democratic states, and the implementation of this agreement. At the same time, Senator Paul Yuzyk, of Ukrainian origin,

emphasized: "Canada must remember that the Soviet Union is a communist totalitarian police state governed by ruthless dictatorship having complete control over the lives of hundreds of millions of people of various origins in the largest empire in the world. It is a mistake to assume that communists keep their agreements; they have always followed Lenin's dictum: "Promises are like pie crusts, made to be broken"... Therefore, it should not be surprising that the Soviet Union has violated more than 100 treaties and agreements"¹³.

Despite the signing of the Helsinki Accords with all the commitments to respect and safeguard human and national rights in all the signatory countries, Ukraine and other Soviet republics continued to suffer from the evils that accompany totalitarian rule¹⁴. Not only is the Soviet view regarding implementation of human rights quite differed, at least overtly, from that of much of the international community, but there was also little evidence to suggest that the existing official governmental view was different from Soviet practice either prior or subsequent to the formal signing of a document at Helsinki (*Paust, 1982: 58*). In fact, this practice was to further violate human rights.

The luncheon-meeting with the Executive of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC) hosted by Prime Minister P. E. Trudeau, was held in Winnipeg, September 12, 1975. The meeting was also attended by the Minister of National Defense, James Richardson, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister, Ron Robert and Manitoba Liberal Party leader, Charles Huband. The UCC asked to secure full reciprocity in cultural, tourist and information exchanges with the Soviet Union according to the Helsinki treaty. At the same time the Prime Minister was asked to intercede again with the Soviet authorities on behalf of Valentyn Moroz, Leonid Plyushch and other political prisoners¹⁵. The UCC requested strongly objecting to granting visitor's visas to Soviet psychiatrists, members of the Serbsky Institute, where dissident intellectuals are being incarcerated, without justifiable medical grounds¹⁶.

Shortly after signing the Final Act in Helsinki, 86 Members of the Senate and the House of Commons prepared a petition to Leonid Brezhnev, Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and sent it to the Soviet Embassy. In petition said: "We, the undersigned Canadian Members of Parliament, urgently appeal to the Soviet Government, in the spirit of the Helsinki Agreement, to permit the distinguished scientist Andrei Sakharov to go to Oslo to receive the deserved Nobel Peace Prize". A reply was received on December 8, 1975 from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa addressed to Mr. Alistair Fraser, Clerk of the House of Commons, returning the petition "in connection with an unjustified request on behalf of A. Sakharov"¹⁷. A reply was sent to the Soviet Embassy by Senator E. Forsey. He remarked: "In any event, how can our petition be described as "interference" in the affairs of the Soviet Union? ... Surely any citizens, of any state, can address to the Government of any citizen, a request, or plea, or petition, asking that Government to take, or not to take, a certain

⁹ ЦДАЗУ. [TsDAZU] Ф. 36. Оп. 1. Спр. 48. Арк. 52.

¹⁰ Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act (1975), Retrieved from: <https://www.osce.org/helsinki-final-act?download=true> (Accessed March 16, 2019).

¹¹ ЦДАЗУ. [TsDAZU] Ф. 36. Оп. 1. Спр. 48. Арк. 94.

¹² House of Commons Debates. Official Report. 30th Parliament, 1st session. Vol. IX. Ottawa, 1975, p. 9634.

¹³ Debates of the Senate. Official Report (Hansard). 30th Parliament, 1st session. Vol. III. Ottawa, 1976, p. 1758.

¹⁴ ЦДАЗУ. [TsDAZU] Ф. 36. Оп. 1. Спр. 48. Арк. 116.

¹⁵ ЦДАЗУ. [TsDAZU] Ф. 36. Оп. 1. Спр. 25. Арк. 140.

¹⁶ ЦДАЗУ. [TsDAZU] Ф. 36. Оп. 1. Спр. 25. Арк. 143.

¹⁷ Debates of the Senate. Official Report (Hansard). 30th Parliament, 1st session. Vol. III. Ottawa, 1976, p. 1760.

action? In the Helsinki Declaration is to be interpreted in the fashion you appear to suggest in your letter, then the passages in it dealing with human rights and freedoms are just waste paper"¹⁸. Finally, A. Sakharov was still awarded the Nobel Prize in absentia - "for struggle for human rights, for disarmament, and for cooperation between all nations"¹⁹.

So, when the Final Act in Helsinki was signed, initial public evaluations in the East and West were that the multilateral accord was primarily a Soviet diplomatic victory. But first impressions were wrong. The movement to support the implementation of the provisions of the Helsinki Act began in the Soviet Union. In May 1976, about ten activists announced the formation of the first citizens' Moscow Helsinki Watch Group. The Moscow chapter was quickly followed by the formation of Public Groups to Promote the Observance of the Helsinki Accords in Ukraine, Lithuania, Georgia, and Armenia. Soviet dissenters of varying backgrounds used the Final Act as a shelter against repression. They began to cite the clauses of Principle VII (on human rights) and the humanitarian provisions in Basket III of the Helsinki accord as the basis for demanding internal change in the Soviet Union (*Fascell, 1979: 72*). Within a short time, most members of the Helsinki groups were persecuted by the Soviet authorities and thrown into prison.

Canadian Foreign Minister A. MacEachen has publicly stated that human rights violations in the Soviet Union are a domestic affair. It soon became clear that Canada was implementing "quiet diplomacy", bringing to the Soviet leadership its concern over the fate of many convicted Ukrainian dissidents. MacEachen explained his position: "by trying to help one group or another, we will cross the boundaries of international behavior and thus impair our ability to discuss human rights issues with the Soviet government and will not be heard with any degree of understanding" (*Icaie, 2016: 44*).

In order to appease public opinion within the country, the Canadian government has carried out several publicly traded actions. The Canadian Prime Minister issued the enclosed statement expressing his deep disappointment at the sentencing of Anatoly Shcharansky, Alexander Ginzburg and Viktoras Petkus and his concern that this acts by the Soviet Union increased the risk that the authority of the Helsinki Final Act will be undermined²⁰. It is a fact that among them the mentioned dissidents were not Ukrainian, forced to activate the Ukrainian diaspora. Human Rights Commission of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians sent letter to Prime Minister P. E. Trudeau appealed to intervene with the Government of the USSR in order to secure the release of Levko Lukianenko, a founding member of the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Helsinki Accords²¹. A later response by the Prime Minister said: "The Canadian Government and, I know, Canadians in General share your concern about violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the USSR. It takes

every appropriate opportunity to remind Soviet authorities of the undertaking they have given, as signatories of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the Helsinki Accords), to facilitate the freer movement of peoples. Canada will continue to press for the full implementation of the Helsinki Accord and for acceptance of the human rights principles that are at issue, including the freedom to emigrate and the right of individual to monitor his government's implementation of the Helsinki Final Act"²².

Government concerns were also shared by public human rights organizations. The Chair of the Executive of Amnesty International in Canada sent to Alexander Yakovlev, ambassador of the USSR, petition for release from prison Yuri Orlov, Oleksiy Tykhyi, Mykola Rudenko, Myroslav Marynovych, Zviad Gamsakhurdia and others. Chairperson of Executive Committee N. F. W. Gates pointed out in that letter that there appeared to be no indication that any of these persons had done anything other than to comment openly on the observance in their own country of the Act of Helsinki, and that in so doing, they would appear to have exercised rights which are guaranteed Soviet constitution and which are formally recognized in the Act of Helsinki itself²³. Yakovlev ignored this appeal, which prompted the Canadian Amnesty International Division to return again with a letter saying: "Members of Amnesty, as Your Excellency is well aware, are not committed to the aims of this or that political bloc. They are committed to the upholding of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the International Covenant, to which your country is a signatory... In view of the dissatisfaction which we must express regarding the proceedings against all these persons, we ask you to transmit to your Government our urgent request that all of them be immediately released. In view of the past silence of your Embassy regarding these and other cases, which we have brought to your attention, I am circulating this letter for public distribution"²⁴.

In June 29, 1978, both Houses of the Canadian Parliament unanimously nominated Helsinki groups operating in the USSR (Ukrainian, Moscow, Georgian, Armenian, and Lithuanian) for the Nobel Peace Prize. The resolution stated that "at the risk of their own liberty and being severely persecuted, imprisoned and exiled, they sought to fulfill the Soviet Union's human rights obligations voluntarily undertaken by the Union under the 1975 Helsinki Act" (*Лук'яненко, 2012: 283*). The document emphasized: "As a signatory to the Helsinki Accords, Canada is proud to have initiated and promoted the humanitarian articles of the document and regarded the agreements as a major step in establishing a climate of greater trust and understanding between signatory states" (*Лук'яненко, 2012: 285*). Earlier, so did a group of US parliamentarians when have nominated all of the Public Groups to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords in the USSR. In their letters to the Nobel Institute in Oslo, Norway, the US lawmakers cited the Helsinki watchers (of the 15 people, 5 of list were Ukrainians: Mykola Rudenko, Oleksiy Tykhyi, Myroslav Marynovych, Mykola Matusevych and Levko Lukianenko), as "man and woman of great moral courage"²⁵.

¹⁸ Debates of the Senate. Official Report (Hansard). 30th Parliament, 1st session. Vol. III. Ottawa, 1976, p. 1761.

¹⁹ Presentation Speech by Mrs. Aase Lionaes, Chairman of the Nobel Committee of the Norwegian Storting (1975), Retrieved from: <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1975/ceremony-speech/> (Accessed 22 March 2020).

²⁰ ЦДАЗУ. [TsDAZU] Ф. 36. Оп. 1. Спр. 43. Арк. 105.

²¹ ЦДАЗУ. [TsDAZU] Ф. 36. Оп. 1. Спр. 43. Арк. 57.

²² ЦДАЗУ. [TsDAZU] Ф. 36. Оп. 1. Спр. 43. Арк. 104.

²³ ЦДАЗУ. [TsDAZU] Ф. 36. Оп. 1. Спр. 43. Арк. 53.

²⁴ ЦДАЗУ. [TsDAZU] Ф. 36. Оп. 1. Спр. 43. Арк. 54-55.

²⁵ The Ukrainian Weekly (February 19, 1978), U.S. Legislators Nominate Helsinki Groups for 1978 Nobel Peace Prize, p. 1.

The Soviet Union launched a campaign to thwart Canada's diplomatic initiative. After all, the Helsinki groups never received the Nobel Prize.

Conclusion

In signing the Helsinki Final Act, the political leaders of the 35 participating States undertook to enhance respect for human rights and recognize the role of the individual in pursuing this goal. For the Soviets, the inclusion of human rights principles in the Helsinki Act was but a token price they had to pay to the supreme values of western civilization to obtain other rewards. Canada together with other western countries reaffirmed the importance of exciting mechanisms dealing with human rights issues. At the same time Canada started playing a role in promoting human rights abroad. The Canadian Government insisted that the Helsinki Final Act cannot be applied selectively; it must be observed in all its aspects. Canada tried to impress on the Soviet Union the difficulties that lack of progress in human rights can have on other aspects of Final Act, and on *détente* generally. Howsoever, Canada's policy on human rights violations in the USSR was within the scope of "quiet diplomacy" and the accomplishments of such a policy were not what the Canadian Ukrainians would like to see.

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ВИМІР ПРАВ ЛЮДИНИ В ГЕЛЬСІНКІ 1975 РОКУ: КАНАДСЬКА СТУРБОВАНІСТЬ СИТУАЦІЄЮ В РАДЯНСЬКОМУ СОЮЗІ

У статті висвітлено реакцію канадського політикуму та окремих громадських організацій на порушення прав людини в Радянському Союзі в контексті Гельсінського процесу, започаткованого Заключною Народою з безпеки і співробітництва у Європі 1975 р. Впродовж 1960-1970-х років країни Заходу, зокрема Канада, усе більшу увагу приділяли ситуаціям з порушеннями прав людини за кордоном. "Холодна війна" сприяла загостреному сприйняттю порушень прав людини, перетворивши це питання на дражливий чинник у міждержавних відносинах. Саме в той час права людини виразно увійшли у зовнішню політику Канади, зумовивши особливу увагу до ситуації в Радянському Союзі. Причиною такої уваги стала з-поміж іншого діяльність чисельної української громади в цій країні, організації і представники якої домагалися від канадського уряду реакції на системні порушення прав людини за "залізною завісою". За океан потрапляла інформація про нехтування в Радянському Союзі такими фундаментальними правами людини, як свобода релігії, висловлювань та пересування. Ця стурбованість виявилася під час Наради з безпеки та співробітництва в Європі (НБСЕ). Заключний акт НБСЕ, підписаний в Гельсінкі 1 серпня 1975 року главами урядів держав Європи, Канади та США (Гельсінський акт), містив домовленості щодо кордонів, торгівлі та прав людини й часто сприймався за "найвищу точку розрядки міжнародної напруженості". Після тривалих дебатів учасники НБСЕ задекларували повагу до основних прав і свобод людини, включаючи свободу думки, совісті, віросповідання. Канадський уряд у той час домагався від радянської сторони полегшення процедури "з'єднання родин", розділених війною. Однак всередині країни такі зусилля вважали недостатніми, спричинивши дискусії в публічному просторі Канади навколо дієвості такої стриманої політики, як зрештою і "тихої дипломатії". Переслідування й арешти у наступні роки членів громадських груп сприяння виконанню Гельсінських угод у Радянському Союзі змусили канадський політикум зайняти різкішу позицію щодо порушень прав людини і взятих Москвою на себе зобов'язань.

Ключові слова: Нарада з питань безпеки та співробітництва в Європі; Канада; Радянський Союз; українські канадці; порушення прав людини.

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