The article shows the implementation of the policy of subjection of the peasants of the border Olevsk district in Polissya by the Soviet authorities through the use of terror-famine. Based on the materials of the State Archives of Zhytomyr Region, which were first introduced into scientific circulation, and the involvement of the available source and historiographical array, it has been proved that the Holodomor was used as genocide in the villages of the district, as well as throughout Ukraine, and exterminated the population only in 1933. The concept of “famine” or “terror-famine” should be applied to mass deaths in 1932, a well-planned action by the authorities to exterminate the number of peasants who resisted the government’s policies and thus force everyone else to work on the collective farms with “full efficiency”. Having studied in detail the content of the materials of the Olevsk Party Committee and the reports of the 19th Olevsk Border Department, the author reconstructs the course of collective farm construction in the “Olevsk border area”, emphasizing that the resistance of the peasants was fierce. This provoked the authorities to use artificial famine against the dissatisfied in order to build ideal farms, demonstrative for foreign neighbors, on the border.

**Key word:** collectivization, grain procurement, in-kind fines, terror-famine, Holodomor, peasants, Olevsk district.

**Introduction**

Immediately after coming to power, the Bolsheviks tried to change the usual way of life, but managed to implement it rapidly only through terror and intimidation. The 1930s can undoubtedly be considered the most tragic period in Ukrainian history, as the policies implemented over a decade had resulted in the deaths of millions of innocent victims throughout Ukraine. Introducing new methods of management unknown to the population at that time, the party leaders encountered mass peasant riots, which became evident of the rejection of pro-government policies. A key place in the politics of that time was given to collectivization, which became the alpha and the omega of peasant policy and led to the mass extermination of the rural population through terror-famine planned by the authorities.

Party leaders, building an artificial socio-economic system, used terror-famine to subdue the Ukrainian people three times in peace time – in 1921, 1932 and 1933 (Kulchytsky, 2018: 125)

Since contemporary Ukrainian researchers and their foreign colleagues have long been discussing the recognition of the Great Famine, or the Holodomor of 1932-1933 as genocide of the Ukrainian people, it is worth examining in more detail the meaning of these concepts.

The term “terror-famine” was first used and introduced into scientific circulation by British researcher R. Conquest in “The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine”. The author explains it as a famine artificially created by the authorities, aimed at peasants gathered into collective farms, organized by collecting overtaxes on crops, confiscating food from the population, and banning any support for the starving from outside and even from the other parts of the USSR. The authorities immediately declared the persistence and cussedness of the peasants, who resisted collecting grain which was almost absent, a manifestation of their "Ukrainian nationalism", in line with Stalin’s idea that the national question was essentially a peasant question (Conquest, 2007: 10-11)

The term “genocide” (extermination of the people) first appeared in 1944 in the book by Polish Lawyer R. Lemkin “Axis rule in occupied Europe”. The author used this term to refer to both the extermination of Jews and Roma in Nazi-controlled territory and broader programs of racially motivated extermination (for example, the Generalplan Ost). The UN General Assembly, in a resolution adopted on December 11, 1946, stated: “genocide is a crime under international law which the civilized world condemns, and for the commission of which principals and accomplices ... are punishable”. On December 9, 1948, it adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which stated in Article I that: “The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish” (Konventsiia ..., 1948, URL...). Article II defines genocide as: “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethничal, racial or religious group” (Konventsiia ..., 1948, URL...). The word “destroy” here meant: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (Kulchytsky, 2018: 99).

Thus, having studied in detail the available documentary base and historiographical developments, we claim that the creation in Ukraine for the local population through excessive grain procurement, seizure of all food products, in-kind fines for non-compliance with grain procurement plans, listing villages that resisted in the so-called “black boards”, conditions that led to the physical extermination of the population can be regarded as genocide.

Analyzing the state of domestic historical heritage, it is worth noting the study of S.V. Kulchytsky (Kulchytsky, 2007: 424, Kulchytsky, 2018: 98-127), V.I. Marochko (2014: 64), N.M. Bokiy (2003: 56-63), N. Bem (2003: 227-243). In particular, N. Bokiy, in his monograph on the basis of many documents and evidences establishes that the Holodomor was the result of a punitive action disguised as grain procurement to seize from the peasants all their food. The book proves that Stalin used this terrorist act in a situation of acute crisis and famine in many regions of the USSR. The work also helps to realize that terror-famine combined with repressions against non-partisan Ukrainian intelligentsia and members of the CP(b)U were aimed at preventing a social and political explosion in the largest national republic, the Ukrainian SSR (Kulchytsky, 2007: 424). In an article published in 2018, he confirms his position on recognizing the Holodomor as genocide of the Ukrainian nation based on the concepts of foreign researchers R. Conquest (2007), R. Lemkin (1944) and A. Nove (1986). On the basis of analysis of historical sources, the author concludes that the “Stalin’s blow” was actually directed against Ukrainians, among whom there were many peasants, and not against peasants, among whom there were many Ukrainians (Kulchytsky, 2018: 98-127). In his article, N. Bem clearly demonstrates the negative sentiments that prevailed during that period among the owners of individual farms, and their resistance to joining collective farms, for which they later paid the price by deportations to concentration camps and deportations abroad (Bem, 2003: 227-243). N. Bokiy presents the process of collectivization in Right-bank Ukraine, explaining its regional features (Bokiy, 2003: 56-63).

Regional ethnographers also paid attention to collectivization in the district. In particular, V. Chepik in his article in one of the local newspapers provides information about the first wave of collectivization (spring 1930), which failed completely and did not justify the hopes of the Bolshevik leadership. The residents of Olevsk district as one of the clearly planned ways to build an “obedient” society, tolerant of power.

Materials and methods

The source base of our study was the materials of the P-132 Fond "Olevsk District Committee of the CP(b)U" of the State Archives of Zhytomyr Region, in which we found information about the progress of collective farm construction in the villages of the district, the level of local resistance to government policy, as well as works “The Harvest of Sorrow of 1932-1933 in the memories of the residents of Olevsk district” (Zhnyva skorboty... Olevskoho raionu, 2010: 90) and “National Book of Memory of Victims of the Holodomor 1932-1933 in Ukraine, Zhytomyr Region” (Natsionalna knyha pamiati..., 2008: 1116), which, based on archival data and published sources and testimonies of the residents of Zhytomyr and Olevs region who witnessed these terrible events, recorded this tragic page in the history of the district. The “National Book of Memory of Victims of the Holodomor...” contains statistics and gives the number of people in the region who starved to death during these terrible years. However, historiography, in fact, lacks research related to the Olevsk district in the context of the outlined issues (Natsionalna knyha pamiati...., 2008: 1116).

The theoretical basis of the study is the concepts of domestic scholars regarding the Holodomor as a genocide of the Ukrainian people. The author shares the views of S. Kulchytsky and V. Marochko, who, based on the concept of foreign researchers R. Conquest R. Lemkin and A. Nove, prove that the terror-famine used by the authorities in the early 1920s was introduced with new vigor in the 1930s in order to subdue the Ukrainian peasants dissatisfied with the government’s political measures. In order to achieve this purpose, comparative-historical, problem-chronological methods were used, as well as the methods of generalization, systematization and archival heuristics. It was with their help that we were able to thoroughly cover the topic by using a set of available historiographical works and archival documents, different in origin and type.

Since there are two dates of the Holodomor, which is quite natural, it should be understood that the grain procurement of 1931 which ended in famine, and the Stalinist terror-famine which began in the last two months of 1932, are different phenomena. Both famines should be separated in time to establish what evidence we have to classify the Holodomor as genocide (Kulchytsky, 2018: 115).

Results and discussion

After coming to power in Ukraine, the Bolsheviks faced the fact that the population of the border Olevs region, as well as the whole of Ukraine, especially the peasantry, was extremely negative about the introduction and implementation of their policy. Since autumn 1918, the harvesters had begun to impose obligatory tasks on the peasants, based on the existing needs, and then had distributed them among the counties, parishes and villages. When peasants became convinced that the state was taking away what they intended to sell on the market, they lost interest in labor. The cultivated areas were sharply reduced, and the land obtained after the division of the landed estates remained uncultivated (Kulchytsky, 2007: 33).
Opposition sentiments led to an increase in both passive and active forms of resistance to the Sovietization of Ukraine. The geographical location and natural conditions (the presence of significant forest areas) of the territory of the contemporary Zhytomyr region contributed to the deployment of a powerful insurrectional movement in this area. According to official documents, in 1918-1923, Ukrainian insurgents Sokolovsky, Mordalevych, Lysytsky, Haras, Mastolyarchuk, and many others operated in Volyn (Natsionalna knyha pamiatyi…, 2008: 9). The bulletin of the secret information department of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR №24/261 of May 26, 1922 “Review of banditry in Ukraine” contains information that “in Olevsk district, there are 6 or 7 gangs, 9 people each, mostly criminal in nature. Here we can also note the remnants of the Solominsky gang, of Petliurian nature, which maintains contacts with foreign countries and serves as an intermediate link with gangs located deeper in Ukraine” (Makhorin, 2017: 155).

In the conditions of an active anti-Soviet insurrectional movement, which was strongly supported by the population, the Bolsheviks for the first time resorted to terror-famine, first in the eastern regions of Ukraine with the aim of undermining its social base. Thus, the terror-famine of 1921-1922 became a means of calming the insurgents more effectively than punitive expeditions, and a kind of rehearsal for the terrible Holodomor of 1932-1933. From August 1921, the American Relief Administration (ARA) rescued the starving people of the Volga region, but it was not allowed in the no less drought-stricken regions of southern Ukraine until the beginning of 1922 – anti-Soviet uprisings spread throughout those areas. The famine eliminated the insurrectional potential of the village (Kulchytsky, 2018:103).

During the grain procurement campaigns and the acceleration of violent collectivization, protests and threats against members of the CSE, active bread collectors, and civil servants repeatedly arose.

V. Lenin and his associates used the ideas of the “Manifesto of the Communist Party” by K. Marx and F. Engels to extraplicate society and concentrate the possession, use, and disposal of the means of production in the state they controlled. Socio-economic transformations in Soviet Russia and its enslaved nation-states took place under the communist slogan of “eliminating the private ownership of the means of production”. In fact, during the socio-economic transformations of the 1920s and 1930s, not private property as such but the previous owners were destroyed. Possession, use and disposal of the means of production were concentrated at the top of the Communist Party Soviet pyramid of power (Kulchytsky, 2018: 111-112).

Continuous collectivization, which Stalin called a “revolution from above”, began in 1929. As the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) in November 1929 declared the pace of collectivization of the peasant economy outlined by the XV Congress insufficient, on January 5, 1930, a new resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) “On the pace of collectivization and state assistance to collective-farm construction” was adopted. It obliged to complete collectivization in the USSR in the autumn of 1931, or, at worst, in the spring of 1932 (Bern, 2003: 230).

However, mostly poor and mercenary groups united their farms voluntarily, and only the implementation of a terrorist policy was possible to force the peasant-owner to join the collective farm. That is why dekulakization was chosen as a method of terror. On November 7, 1929, the newspaper “Pravda” published an article by J. Stalin entitled “A Year of Great Change (On the Occasion of the Twelfth Anniversary of the October Revolution)" the main conclusion of which was: “The peasants are joining the collective farms; they are joining by whole villages, volosts, districts”. Its purpose was to mobilize the Communist-Soviet nomenklatura, because local leaders always had the impression of lagging behind their neighbors, as if they had a small percentage of collectivization, while in other areas middle peasants went to the collective farms (Kulchytsky, 2007: 118).

However, peasant uprisings in 1930 showed the obvious unpopularity of collective farms among the population. Peasants massively left the collective farms. The continuous collectivization of the village then stopped for six months, but from the autumn of 1930 it resumed – already in artel form. Collective farmers were given the right to homestead property (with cows, small cattle and poultry), which existed under the guise of personal property, although in fact it was private property. The artel became a kind of “Two-faced Janus”. With one of its “faces”, it turned to the planned-directive economy, and with the other, it looked at the market, i.e. live production, which functioned due to the natural interest of the producer. The artel form of the collective farm presupposed the existence of commodity-money relations not only in the limited sphere of agricultural production, but also in the whole economy.

However, Stalin considered this concession to the peasantry as temporary. The resolution of the XVI Congress of the CPSU(b), held in June 1930, emphasized that at this stage, the main form of the collective farm was the artel, but it was assumed that “the collective farm movement could be strengthened to a higher form – the commune” (Kulchytsky, 2018: 113).

From the materials of the State Archives of Zhytomyr Region, we have learnt about the course of collectivization in the area. In the special report on the state of the socialist sector as of 16.10.1930 it was said that the situation in the collective farms of Olevsk district was unfavorable, there was no clarity in the work, no interest of collective farmers, the organization of labor was not established, there was lack of food discipline, there also were some cases of poor people leaving collective farms 1. Thus, in one of cases it was noted that the collective farm in Zhurzhievychi village was on the verge of collapse, there were exits from the collective farm. Non-fulfillment of sowing campaigns was also observed in collective farms in Andriyivka, Kishin, Khochn and Zolnya villages 2. In the summary on the Maidan village it is said that in the course of collectivization, things were still going badly, at the meeting of the village council, the majority had been against it; only 2 people joined the collective farm as a result of meeting of the Committee of Poor Peasants 3. In a political report on the Golish village, it was said that the peasants were against collectivization, in the countryside every day the class struggle was intensifying, the kulaks were actively working 4. In Serdyuky village, 29 members

1 State Archives of Zhytomyr Region (further SAZR), fund p-132, list 1, file 43, p.56.
2 SAZR, fund p-132, list 1, file 55, p. 1.
3 SAZR, fund p-132, list 1, file 43, p. 6-7.
4 SAZR, fund p-132, list 1, file 43, p.9.
were enrolled, but due to the “agitation of the kulaks” they left, so only 7 remained. The chairman of the Sushcha village office resigned from the collective, some peasants wrote applications for resignation from the collective in the Andriyivsky center. Cases of refusal of mercenaries to join the collective farm were also observed in Budki-Sobichino village.

Due to the difficult situation in the collective farms and the strict policy of the authorities, grain procurement from the harvest in 1931 was carried out until the spring of 1932. Almost all food, including seeds, was taken from the peasants. As a result of grain procurement from the 1931 harvest, in the first half of 1932, a famine began with numerous deaths, which stopped only in the summer, with a new harvest. However, since the harvesters confiscated only bread in the second half of 1931 and in the first half of 1932, the owners of weak farms died of hunger, and in well-established estates people survived on other food, which they stocked until the new harvest. If non-grain food was confiscated in form of in-kind fines, all the peasants died, not just the poor. Cooperative shops served only those who fulfilled the grain procurement plan. In the city, shops in general became distributors that served only food stamp holders (Kulchytsky, 2004: 61).

J. Stalin used grain procurement from the 1930s and 1932 harvests to punish Ukrainian peasants for resisting collectivization, the intensity of which was many times greater than anything he encountered in other regions. Thus, Stalin’s terror was directed not against the peasants as such, but against the Ukrainian peasants (Kulchytsky, 2018: 115). Residents of the Ukrainian SSR, including the Olevsk district, were aware of this – we have enough documentary evidence of this fact.

In the special report “On the political state of Olevsk district” dated 4.03.1932 it was said that anti-Soviet activities had intensified recently, and a number of cases of provocative rumors of famine had been recorded. In a number of villages, there were some families who had no bread at all, they had even eaten acorns and were starving. District organizations did not register the starving, did not provide any assistance. Relatives of the families drafted into the Red Banner Army appealed to their sons: “Everything was taken away, even the last cow and sheep, bread, potatoes. We are starving, help us”.

On May 22, 1932, a message was addressed to the Secretary of the RPC in Olevsk that in in Zhubrovychi village, there were 9 starving families who were not helped at all by the Soviet authorities, but this number was not final, as other families were also starving. In addition, the reports stated that due to the fact that some collective farmers were experiencing difficulties due to lack of food, there was a number of cases of collective farmers’ absence from work in Maiidan village, Golyshi village, Zolnya village, Kishin village, who explain their actions as follows: “We are not allowed to eat, we can’t work hungry, we will go to work where we are fed”, “Finished, no bread, no linen, and we were promised a fortune. We let ourselves be fooled as donkeys going to the collective farm. Live and admire life.”

In addition, on August 7, 1932, the CEC and CPC of the USSR adopted a resolution “On the protection of property of state enterprises, collective farms and cooperatives and the strengthening of public (socialist) property”, according to which theft of collective farm property was severely punished by execution, and under “exterminating circumstances” – by imprisonment for at least 10 years. It was popularly called the “Law of Three Spikelets” (Kulchytsky, 2007: 250).

In the autumn of 1932, the hungry and exhausted peasantry was no longer able to conduct a sowing campaign promptly and effectively, so an emergency commission headed by V. Molotov was sent to Ukraine to improve the situation. An important element of this commission’s activity was the already tested way of expropriating farms. To this end, the CPC of the Ukrainian SSR adopted a resolution on takings away the movable property, as well as crops, homesteads and buildings of individuals who did not fulfill grain production obligations. Soon, this idea of dekulakization, which was popularly called “squandering”, was deepened with “recommendations” to apply it to collective farmers and deport the expropriated to settlements in remote areas of the country or to concentration camps (Kulchytsky, 2007: 268).

The central part of Stalin’s “smashing blow” was the seizure of all food in the already starving Ukrainian countryside. Documents show that cases of such confiscation also occurred during grain procurement from the 1930s and 1931 harvests. However, it is documented that the Kremlin decided to limit the seizure of 1932 harvest to the introduction of legislation on the seizure of meat (salo) and potatoes in the form of in-kind fining “debtors”, “counter-revolutionaries”, “saboteurs”. Such legislation was based on the norm introduced in the Constitution of the RSFSR in 1918 and the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR in 1919, where in Art. 28, the last thesis was: “The Ukrainian SSR recognizes work as a duty of all citizens of the Republic and proclaims the slogan ‘He who does not work, neither shall he eat’” (Kulchytsky, 2018: 123).

On November 18, 1932, a resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b), and on November 20, 1932, a resolution of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, with the same names “On Measures to Strengthen Bread Procurement” were adopted. According to them, the local authorities had to organize the seizure of bread “stolen” from collective farms during mowing and threshing, which was detected by searches, from individuals and workers of state farms. If bread was not found during the search, the debtors were fined in-kind. The resolutions referred only to natural fines of meat, salo and potatoes, but in numerous memoirs published over the past 15 years, witnesses to the famine said that during the searches they were seized everything – cereals, beets, cabbages, beans, onions, fruit-drying, etc. Searches first were episodic, and after Stalin’s New Year’s telegram to the leaders of the USSR they became systematic and covered the entire territory of the republic (Kulchytsky, 2004: 60-61).

Thus, the events in the Ukrainian countryside should be viewed in terms of genocide. However, it is important to note the point in the relationship between the Stalinist state and the peasants when state terror-famine became a sign of genocide. The famine of the first half of 1932, which was the result of repressive grain procurement from the 1931 harvest, had no such signs. The Soviet government did not yet intend to demonstratively exter-
miniate several million Ukrainian peasants in order to force everyone else to stop resistance to the government in active and passive forms. However, when, after the active work of harvesters in the autumn-winter of 1932 – at the beginning of 1933, almost all available food was confiscated by continuous yard searches, it was clear that the real Holodomor was waiting for the population (Kulchytsky C., 2018: 116–121).

Left adrift without any food, the peasants were doomed to death by the party-state apparatus. The famine began in the fall of 1932, and in the fall of 1933 it became widespread. The Stalinist leadership, trying to silence the fact of famine, created barricading detachments to isolate the most starving areas, used the principle of “black boards” in the villages, checked all passengers’ luggage on the railways and confiscated all available food.

Propagandists presented the famine caused by the authorities as a difficult food situation caused by the reluctance of peasants to earn “trudodi” by working on collective farms. Local leaders were blamed for the excesses committed during collectivization, and the Soviet authorities shifted the responsibility for miscalculations in the policy towards the peasantry and the slow progress of collectivization to the so-called kulaks (Kulchytsky, 2007: 327).

An example of this is the criminal case of December 22, 1933 against the following residents of the Andrijivka village, Olevsk district, who were accused of distorting the party line: Fishman K.P., Dobrovolsky U.I., Hrynshpon Yevisiy Lvovych and Hrysovysh Yevsiy Lvovych. The resolution stated that while holding the position of the chairman of the village council, deputy chairman of the village council, secretary of the village council and secretary of the party center respectively, in the summer of 1933, Fishman K.P., Dobrovolsky U.I., Hrynshpon Ye.L. and Svitelman H.M. were engaged in the illegal seizure of bread, potatoes, agricultural products and other property from persons deported from the village during certification, appropriated this property and engaged in bribery. According to the District Police and the 19th Border Department of the SPD: “The village council widely applied the penalty policy, fines in most cases were imposed without any grounds, illegally, to 60% of the total population was fined up. The village council treated the peasants rudely, terrorizing them with illegal actions and intimidating them with dekulakization and deportation. There were no mass information campaigns, as a result of which all economic political companies were implemented with great difficulty, under administrative pressure from the village council. As a result of the gross distortion of the party line, the population was hostile to the Soviet authorities and fled the village under the guise of relocation to other areas.”

However, the true meaning of this campaign is indicated by two words: “education by murder”, because the level of resistance of the peasantry during the Holodomor was almost zero. Government assistance to starving peasants was provided primarily to “party and non-party activists”. The vast majority of peasants, whose bread and, then, all their food were taken away in the middle of winter, were left without help, and the number of victims of the famine skillfully directed by the Stalinist team was growing from month to month until July 1933. The famine relief was to be considered the most convincing argument for the authorities’ lack of intention to use weapons of hunger to physically destroy their own populations (Kulchytsky, 2018: 124).

Cases of famine in the villages of the district continued in 1934, but on a smaller scale. In particular, as of January 20, 1934 in Yurove village, 31 families were starving and in need of help10. 5 families in Tepernitsi village were swollen with hunger due to the fact that the individual sector did not receive assistance12. 16 collective farmers suffered from partial malnutrition in Golyshy village13. 75 farms had nothing to eat at all, 2 people died and several were swollen with hunger in Stovpinka village14. The appeals to the central government about the catastrophic state of food did not yield results. Talk of famine was considered a provocation.

Therefore, since for a long time, the communist leaders’ accusations of the genocide of the Ukrainian people have been based mainly on the quantitative parameters of the Holodomor, at the present stage, due to long-term research of the previously silenced tragedy, it is finally possible to analyze Stalin’s terror-famine step by step to convince the world that this crime of leaders against the local population was genocide.

Conclusions

Thus, with the proclaimation of a course for collectivization, which should have improved the economic situation of the village, the Bolshevist leadership actually began to launch a terrible and relentless repressive machine, which destroyed lives of millions of innocent victims throughout the Ukrainian SSR. The Holodomor of 1932-1933 was a purposeful and systematic action of the Soviet leadership primarily against the Ukrainian peasantry, as the entire power vertical was actively involved in this process. Realizing that it would not be possible to gain the support of the population at a rapid pace, the party leadership took decisive action. Using the experience of suppression of the peasants of Eastern Ukraine in 1921-22, in the 1930s, party leaders resorted to the practice of terror-famine throughout Ukraine, including the Olevsk border zone. As local party leaders repeatedly emphasized in their reports that the situation in the district’s collective farms was unfavorable, there was no interest from collective farmers, and peasants were massively leaving, the central government needed to stabilize the situation as soon as possible. This was done through searches to seize grain and food. Cases of famine resulted from such requisitions did not become isolated, but became widespread, as evidenced by the reports of the heads of collective farms addressed to the Olevsk Party Committee. Starting from 1933, the peasants exhausted by the Holodomor stopped resisting the authorities and no longer posed a threat to the Soviet system. Instead, the state gladly “helped” those peasants who expressed a desire to work conscientiously in the collective farm.

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13 SAZR, fund p-132, list 1, file 92, p. 208.
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СХІД Том 2 (І) березень-квітень 2021 р.
У статті показано здійснення радянською владою політики упокорення селян прикордонного Олевського району, що на Поліссі, через застосування терору голодом. На основі матеріалів Державного архіву Житомирської області, які вперше введено до наукового обігу, та залучення наявного джерельного та історіографічного масиву доведено, що Голодомор як геноцид застосовувався в селах району, як і по всій території України та масово знищував населення лише у 1933 р. Що ж до масової смертності в 1932 р. варто застосовувати поняття “голод” або “терор голодом” – чітко сплановану владою акцію з метою знищити ту кількість селян, які чинили опір владній політиці, і тим самим змусити всіх інших працювати в колгоспах з “повною відданістю”. Детально вивчено зміст матеріалів Олевського прикордонного відділу, автор реконструює хід колгоспного будівництва в “Олевській області”, які вперше введено до наукового обігу, та залучення наявного джерельного та історіографічного масиву.

Ключові слова: колективізація; хлібозаготівлі; натуральні штрафи; терор голодом; Голодомор; селяни; Олевський район.