SELF-OTHER DIALECTIC, HEGEL, AND THE CONTEMPORARY THEORY OF 'THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION'

This paper approached the concepts of self-other dialectic and "the politics of recognition" from the aspect of Hegel's self-consciousness chapter in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Various authors attribute Hegel as a source and inspiration for the current theories of identity politics. This article is, therefore, focused on examining the implication of Hegel's idea of 'recognition' and 'self-consciousness' on the contemporary debates of identity politics. Hegel has an enormous contribution to the current debate on identity politics. This article shows that with specific reference to the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel's understanding of 'recognition' in terms of the dialectic of consciousness is vital to see the contemporary theory of the politics of recognition in a broader epistemological and ontological basis. When it comes to the more practical and empirical political situation of these days, his idea of freedom and recognition has many important insights that support constitutional liberal system to handle 'needs' and 'demands' of recognition raised in identity politics. As Hegel has emphasised in many of his works, in the progress of human history, state (including the established institutions) is the Absolute Spirit that actualises the reciprocal freedom and mutual recognition of individuals in a broader political space. Based on these Hegelian insights, the study concluded that education, deliberative democracy, and institutions are substantial to handle competing 'needs' and 'demands' of recognition in identity politics without granting group rights and interests a constitutional recognition.

Key word: Hegel; Identity; Politics of Recognition; Recognition; Self-consciousness.

Introduction

These days, identity politics is becoming the main form of politics in the advanced industrial societies of the West, and other parts of the world (Burns, 2006; Fukuyama, 2018a). Francis Fukuyama took the current government of Hungary, USA following the election of Donald Trump, and the UK concerning Brexit as some of the examples of the shift to identity politics and nationalism (Fukuyama, 2018ab). The rise of leftist political parties in Europe and other parts of the world has also made identity politics a master concept of political struggle and bargaining. Charles Taylor also mentioned Canada in Quebec case as an example of identity politics that comes from the politics of difference and multiculturalism (Taylor, 1994). After cold war and collapse of socialism, the ideological shift from Marxian 'class consciousness' to 'identity consciousness' has also contributed to the development of identity politics especially, in the post-socialist countries in Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa (Malsevic, 2005). Concerning this ideological change, the post-1991 Ethiopia is one of the examples in which the country's constitution has provided recognition for group rights under the title of "the right of nations and nationalities" (FDRE Constitution, 1995). However, apart from conceptual analysis and objections against identity politics, several studies indicated that the growth of identity politics worldwide is not a positive development for democracy, national unity, and global political stability. Fukuyama warns, "unless liberal democracies can work their way back to more universal understandings of human dignity, they will doom themselves and the world to continuing conflict" (Fukuyama, 2018a).

The rise of identity politics is, in fact, a significant encounter to the overwhelming liberal politics of many countries in the West. The majority versus minority relationship, emigrant issues, political representations of emerging cultural groups related to gender and LGBs (lesbian, gay and bisexual movements) are significant challenges against the individualist liberal system or commonly called "conservative liberalism". The rise of populist nationalism and other movements enticed by collective interests and group rights are also becoming significant encounters of "libertarians" of the politics of liberalism in general. Charles Taylor described these kinds of challenges as "the need and the demand" for the politics of recognition (Taylor, 1994); whereas Fukuyama named it as the struggle for "identity politics" (Fukuyama, 2018a). According to Taylor, the "need" for the politics of recognition is a driving force behind nationalism movements in politics. On the other hand, the "demand" comes from the politics of difference or multiculturalism, which is linked with the supposed defining characteristics of human beings as a cultural group and the demand for political representations in the political space upon group or cultural rights and interests (Taylor, 1994).

Charles Taylor associates identity politics with social institutions and the differential social roles and moral duties which individuals with their differential roles and positions constitute those social-political institutions (Taylor, 1994). Burns also describes identity politics in terms of its focus on the nature, allocation, and exercise of a basic form of power in any society or political community (Burns, 2006). In this way, identity politics is conceptualised with two approaches and political practices: con-
serves as a vehicle for Hegel's system of "dialectical mediation" (Douzinas, 2002). The concept of self-consciousness as a fundamental category in the philosophy of Hegel (Hegel, 2007) and the notion of recognition in the "self-consciousness" chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit (Hegel, 1807) form the basis for an analysis of the relationship between identity and recognition. In the dialectical process of recognition, the self encounters objects and other selves, and the process of self-recognition is seen as a necessary condition for self-development. The concept of recognition is central to Hegel's philosophy, and it is through recognition that the self achieves its identity and self-consciousness.

**Analysis, Result and Discussions**

**Self-Other Dialectic, Self-Consciousness, and the Notion of Recognition**. In Hegel's idea, the "dialectical mediation" has an implication for the theory of identity and difference as well as for the theory of recognition (Grier, 2007). Hegelian dialectic has two dimensions. The first is related to the dialectic and development of the identity of a person. This dimension is closely connected to Hegel's conception of consciousness and self-consciousness and the struggle for recognition. The second dimension is manifested in the general historical trajectory of people, society, institutions, morals, religions and all aspect of social existence and the historical contradictions and developments (Douzinas, 2002). In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel has presented the dialectical mediation in terms of the levels of consciousness. These levels include the awareness of objects in the environment with the force of primitive 'Desire'; the immediate awareness of 'I' myself as 'I'; and to the final stage of self-consciousness with the encounter of other self-conscious subjects (Hegel, 1777). On the other hand, in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, the dialectical mediation involves the development in the construction of difference and identity which includes logical progressions from the Logic of Being, to the Logic of Essence, and the Logic of Concept (Hegel, 2007). As William argues, for Hegel, "difference" is a negative matter, and it is an inherent contradiction in every step of dialectical development that propels the struggle for recognition and moves self to its unity and universality (Williams, 2007).

Hegel's dialectical development represents the contradiction and synthesis inherent in the formation of identity and difference. Dialectic is a rule governing the development of consciousness and self-consciousness within the negotiation and unity of Self-Other. Here, recognition is central in the dialectic to resolve negations within consciousness. As Williams argues, for Hegel the process of recognition is driven by the existential necessity or the need to overcome this contradiction which the self finds itself in the process of consciousness and self-consciousness in (i.e., relation with others). Hegel's dialectic is intended to serve as an illustrative example of what Hegel has in mind about the development of self-consciousness (Burns, 2006). In connection with this, the article scrutinised self-consciousness and the struggle for recognition in the lordship and bondsman relationship. The subsequent section explored the implication of Hegel's idea of recognition on the contemporary debates of identity politics. The final part of the paper took insights from Hegel's idea of freedom and recognition and reflected on solutions for today's political crisis related to recognition and the struggle for identity politics.
parallelism that the conceptual logic governs the development of the object-Notion and the subject-Notion, and world-historical forces (Stewart, 1994). In the Phenomenology of Spirit, these levels of cognition represent consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason, each provided in a separate chapter. In the self-consciousness chapter, Hegel provided the conceptual logic governing the Subject-Notion. As Ikäheimi claims, the self-consciousness-chapter can be best captured into three sections: Desire, "recognitive" self-consciousness, and general self-consciousness. These parts of analysis represent the levels of consciousness and self-consciousness in man's life, which have the "I" identity in the form of unity and self-certainty (Ikäheimo, 2013). At the beginning of the chapter, Hegel claims that we cannot reach to the unified conception of the object through consciousness alone, which the consciousness that moves from immediate self-certainty to perception, and the "Force" and "Understanding". He claims, "what the object immediately was in itself-mere being in sense-certitude self the concrete thing of perception, and for the Understanding, a Force - proves to be true, not this at all; instead, this in-itself turns out to be a mode in which the object is only for another" (Hegel, 1977: §166). Instead, for Hegel, any account of knowledge must include an analysis of self-consciousness since, as he claims, we can only account for consciousness through self-consciousness. In self-consciousness, the knowing self the subject moves from the knowing objects to the knowing self itself.

For Hegel, the first level of consciousness of the subject is consciousness through the object of desire. As a conscious being, the subject makes relations with Other objects in the environment through desire. At this level of consciousness, the Other and the conscious subject is the negative objects of desire. For Hegel, "self-consciousness is a desire in general" (Hegel, 1977: §167), and the movement of self-consciousness consists in satisfying desire by overcoming the difference between what is and what it desires in a unity between the subject and the object. Human being's consciousness of the object will then be reflected on the human desire to certain the concrete thing of perception, and for the Understanding, a Force - proves to be true, not this at all; instead, this in-itself turns out to be a mode in which the object is only for another" (Hegel, 1977: §166). Instead, for Hegel, any account of knowledge must include an analysis of self-consciousness since, as he claims, we can only account for consciousness through self-consciousness. In self-consciousness, the knowing self the subject moves from the knowing objects to the knowing self itself.

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tion. In the trial by death, each seeks the other's death at the cost of his own life. Although there is a chance for each person to recognise each other through the consciousness of the other mutually, in this primitive stage, death comes in the natural negation of consciousness (Hegel, 1977: §186). Everyone does not have an equal power, and at this stage, it is impossible to establish lasting recognition through each as being a potential killer over others. As Hegel claims, death is a natural negation of consciousness. However, an attempt to affirm one's recognition through death is a negation without permanence. It does not last long and makes a person free and independent at the cost of the death of the other. Thus, the only way both subjects survive at this stage is when one submits to the will of the other. In the relationship, the one unyielding will be a master, and then the other yielding will be the slave. Both parties avoid death when the master is recognised as the acquiescent slave, but the slave is not recognised by the master and is dependent on the master. This relationship depicts Hegel's second stage of "recognitive" consciousness.

In the second stage of the struggle for recognition, one member- the lordship is self-sufficient, living only for himself, and the other- the bondsman is dependent, living entirely for another. Hegel analysed this relationship in terms of the existence of two opposed shapes of consciousness. The one is the independent consciousness whose essential nature is to live or to be for another. The former is lord, and the other is bondsman (Hegel, 1977: §189). The lord depicts the consciousness that exists for itself which is mediated with itself through another consciousness, i.e. through a consciousness whose nature it is to be bound up with an independent consciousness of the death of the other. Thus, the dependent consciousness whose essential nature is to live or to be for another. Here the lord is independent vis-à-vis the slave, but the consciousness the master has at this stage is like the consciousness of thinghood. Though the master is conscious of himself as independent, he is not self-conscious based on the recognition of the slave as an 'equal' conscious being. Hegel explains the relation of the master and the bondsman as follows:

The lord relates himself mediately to the bondsman through a being [a thing] that is independent, for it is just this thing which has the bondsman in bondage; it is his chain from which he could not break free in the struggle, thus proving himself to be independent, to possess his independence in thinghood. But the lord is the power over this thing, for he proved in the struggle that it is something merely negative; since he is the power over this thing and this again is the power over the other [the bondsman], it follows that he holds the other in subjection (Hegel, 1977: §190).

At the second stage of recognition, the relationship of the master and the slave lacks a recognition proper. In other words, it lacks the mutual recognition of the two as one sees others in the way he/she sees himself. Hegel argues, "the moment is lacking that what the lord does to the other he also does to himself, and what the bondsman does to himself he should also do to the other. The outcome is a recognition that is one-sided and unequal" (Hegel, 1977: §191). As Burns claims, in Hegel's idea, there are two prerequisites for self-consciousness. Firstly, the individual is conscious of himself as a concrete self which possesses a fixed social position- individual selves see themselves as others see them or the society see them as possessing a determinate social identity. However, in the second prerequisite individuals must also possess universal characteristics of rationality and freedom, which is necessarily shared by all human beings (Burns, 2006).

For Hegel, to be conscious of oneself in one's particularity or as possessing of a determinate social identity is a necessary condition for seeing oneself as universal and vice versa. Thus, for Hegel, being oneself from the label in society is to have a determinate social identity in a society. However, this relationship and labelling of one's identity as a slave and master in a social position is not based on self-consciousness and the consciousness of others as free and equal beings. As a result, this relationship between the master and slave is subject to dialectic and negation. Of course, identification of oneself in a social position as a slave and master is a precondition for the development of self-consciousness- a consciousness of oneself as a free being whose freedom is acknowledged by others with a significant encounter of the self with others. Thus, for Hegel, the dialectic and negation of consciousness move to the final level of self-consciousness. This stage, as Ikäheimo argues, is the level of "concrete freedom", the subject realises his/her real freedom by knowing him/herself within an independent Other. All subjects are conscious of themselves in the Other in the sense of being affirmed by Other's recognition. Ikäheimo claims that in this stage, neither is trying to subsume the other under one's egocentric perspective (the first negation or moment of difference); yet, somehow neither of them "dissolves" the other (the second negation or moment of unity). The unity with oneself is formed with a new form orientation of subjectivity as intersubjectivity (Ikäheimo, 2013). In the self-consciousness chapter and the reason chapter, Hegel envisioned this kind of relations, a relation of full equality based on mutual recognition as a necessary condition of authentic self-consciousness. As Ikäheimo argues, the subject realises his/her real freedom by knowing him/herself within an independent Other. All subjects are conscious of themselves in the Other in the sense of being affirmed by Other's recognition. Ikäheimo claims that in this stage, neither is trying to subsume the other under one's egocentric perspective (the first negation or moment of difference); yet, somehow neither of them "dissolves" the other (the second negation or moment of unity). The unity with oneself is formed with a new form orientation of subjectivity as intersubjectivity (Ikäheimo, 2013).

If we take this goal- and this is the Notion which for us has already appeared on the scene- in its reality, viz. the self-consciousness that is recognised and acknowledged, and which has its own self-certainty in the other free self-consciousness and possesses its truth precisely in that 'other; in other words, if we look on this still inner Spirit as a substance that has already advanced to the stage of having an outer existence, then in this Notion there is disclosed the realm of ethical life. For this is nothing else than the absolute spiritual unity of essence of individuals in their independent actual existence, it is an intrinsically universal self-consciousness that takes itself to be actual in another self-consciousness, in such wise that this has complete independence, or is looked on as a Thing, and it is precisely therein that the universal self-consciousness is aware of its unity with it, and only in this unity with this objective being is it self-consciousness (Hegel, 1977: §349).

For Hegel, consciousness has three levels: consciousness through the object of desire; consciousness of itself in itself; and self-consciousness within the recognition of Others. In the contemporary philosophical and anthropological theories identity, these levels of consciousness represent three kinds of interpretations of the formations of identity. The first signifies the formation of identity in its identity as a practical matter of achieving of the different Others. Here, the identity of individual and community's sameness is conceived as dialectical development of Self over Others' difference. The alterity of self from others is considered to be the identity of self. The second conception is the understanding of the identity of self to itself without any logical connection with Others. In a more metaphysical sense, this discourse on identity can be connected to the "cartesian model of the rational subject". "I think; therefore, I am." The third conception, however, goes beyond the two discourses and observes identity essentially as a developing form, the mutual
recognition of sameness and difference through relation to Other (Grier, 2007). Hegel's conception of authentic identity rests on the third interpretation of identity. However, for Hegel, identity is constructed as a developing form that passes through various stages of consciousness and self-consciousness. Thus, for Hegel, the first and second interpretations of identity do not describe the formation of genuine identity; instead, they are levels of consciousness in the development of authentic identity. Recognition for Hegel has an ontological/anthropological, and political contents. While the ontological/anthropological content of recognition signifies the formation of identity, its political content rests on recognition of self by others and by legal and social institutions. The more political sense of the connection between self-consciousness and struggle for recognition is vividly seen in Hegel's analysis recognition at institutional societal levels.

In his other works, Hegel translated the idealist movement of self-consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit into the history of state and society, and he analyzed self-consciousness at familial, institutional and societal levels. While at the family level, the underlying force of recognition is love, at the institutional and state level, recognition is institutionally and socially mediated and actualised in the forms of customs, laws, and rights. As Douzinas in light of Hegel's Philosophy of Rights argues, rights (legal, human, or political rights) are the result of the continued struggle for recognition of a non-recognition (Douzinas, 2002). Jon Stewart, in his latest publication, also looks human rights in terms of philosophical anthropology and the existence of the concept with some historical circumstances. With both aspects of the origin of human rights, Stewart believes that Hegel's theories of philosophical anthropology and philosophy of history are essential to ground human rights in a fundamental philosophical and historical foundation. The author argues that the modern idea of human rights could only come about at a specific point in time when the anthropological conception allowed for it. Stewart further claims that human rights emerged when humans came to be regarded as having an inward sphere of subjectivity and being capable of exercising their freedom. In this case, Hegel's idea of the philosophical anthropology and philosophy of history is essential to ground human rights under the broader philosophical anthropology (Stewart, 2019).

Thus, Hegel's idea on "recognition" conscious and philosophical anthropologies in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of Rights is vital to broadly comprehend human rights and the contemporary debates on the politics of recognition.

The politics of recognition or identity politics is a struggle for rights. It goes beyond the usual struggle for respect as an individual. It instead aims at realising collective or group needs and demands for being acknowledged by some other people or groups. So, the struggle for recognition arises amidst of the society or community as a background where recognised, and non-recognised groups do no longer co-exist as one dependent on the other or as one is free, but the other is not. In fact, from the aspect of history, human rights movements of the 1950s and 1960s, and political struggles and nationalisms movements during and after socialism are all popular struggles against non-recognition. The underlying demand and need behind the movements were what Hegel has presented in the form relationship of non-recognition between the lord and bondsman. Likewise, contemporary political movements such as minority rights, the rights of women, rights associated with emigrants, LGBs and other collective interests enticed by cultural rights are all extensions of the struggle for recognition of human and political rights to the 'excluded groups'. In this regard, it is right to claim that today's ideas and theories concerning the politics of recognition are philosophically grounded in what Hegel has presented in the form of the dialectic of consciousness.

The Contemporary Theory of the Politics of Recognition and Hegel. The politics of recognition or identity politics as an alternative political theory is motivated epistemically and ontologically with the critique of liberalisms of Hobbes, Locke, and Kant (among others). Liberalism is rooted in the "cartesian" model of the rational subject as central to the political philosophy. However, as Toddington based on Hegel's critique of the then liberalism claims, this conservative liberalism has a dialectical deficiency rooted in the atomistic view of self. Toddington took the idea of Hegel, and he argues that the "atomistic" perspective in liberalism appears to be an obstacle to mediate liberty and equality and entertain mutual recognition between subjects (Toddington, 2015). The politics of recognition stands from this grand Hegelian critique of individualism and individualist conception of justice the political philosophy of liberalism. Thus, the politics of recognition has ontological and anthropological foundation going back to the idea of Hegel. As Procyshyn & Wenning presented, the normative social context is the social ontology of the struggle for recognition (Procyshyn & Wenning, 2019). In a more philosophical-theoretical sense, the ontological basis of the politics of recognition lies within every man's search for his/her being, and autonomy in one's cultural community in the broader societal space. The politics of recognition also has a practical-political interest centring at the advocacy for justice. In the first 'liberal individualism' is critiqued as it lacks with its prime focus on the individual self and associated goods or rights.

The ontological demand for recognition is more of an existential demand for psychological self-affirmation. However, this demand is followed by practical-political interests. Observing the past historical and actual struggle for the politics of identity, this practical political interest is manifested in the 'demand' and the 'need' for group or communal representations of individuals in the constitution and the political space upon group rights or cultural rights and interests. In his recent interview on The Economist, Fukuyama has identified the ground of the recent shift to identity politics, which from his explanation, the foundation has an ontological basis. This suggests the shift with the re-thinking of modern identity, which is built around self-esteem, and the increasing association of the cause of low self-esteem of some groups with marginalisation by some other people. For Fukuyama, the struggle for the politics of recognition is like a 'therapeutic turn'. It is a struggle of people who feel they are marginalised by others and want to regain their self-esteem. As Fukuyama claims, this turn has coincided with great social movements of the 1960s (Fukuyama, 2018b). So, the underlying factor for the recent shift in identity politics lies in the re-orientation of politics and political-social positions in light of self-other dichotomy and the demand for communal representations in the political space.

Robinson described the politics of recognition as the urgency to move towards cultural liberalism, a politics that advocates for justice to cultural, national, ethnic, or societal groups than individuals. He argues, "justice to be properly understood, requires liberal-democratic conceptions of justice that equates equal treatment with identical treatment to be modified, or even transformed, to facilitate the accommodation of cultural groups" (Robinson, 2007).
When we look at the history idea of the theory of recognition, most of the authors on the politics of recognition agree on the centrality of social/cultural justice. Nevertheless, there is a difference among authors concerning political solutions to the demand and needs for recognition in identity politics. For instance, V. Dymel argues that the individual-based liberal principles could respect for cultural communities through the entitlement of 'special' rights. These rights are interests and goods, a specific group or cultural society enjoys on the ground of their 'differences' and 'special advantages'. Thus, as he claims, without changing the general liberal principles, the rights of specific cultural groups can be accommodated by granting them exclusive constitutional rights (Kymlicka, 1995). Different from Kyamlika, J. Habermas (1994) argues in defence of the applicability of constitutional liberalism. However, for liberal constitutionalism to function well and to accommodate the needs and demands associated with the politics of recognition, Habermas appeals to a 'self-organised public sphere' (Habermas, 1994). On the contrary, Taylor argues that proper respect for cultural differences and acceptance requires a move away from liberal principles of individualism to cultural liberalism (Taylor, 1994).

The philosophical background of the idea of politics of recognition is connected within re-thinking of identity and 'autonomy' of humans given in the form of pure Cartesian cogito, or a psychological individual essence of human subjectivity in the enlightenment. Instead, it observes identity and 'dignity' humans in the community and the broader political space. For instance, unlike the individual liberalists, cultural liberalists (e.g. Taylor and Kyamlika) justify the need and the demand for recognition based on the significant role the community plays on self-identity and communal interest as well. However, one of the more compelling arguments one can bring against this approach failed to see is that both individual liberalists and cultural liberalists did not explicitly differentiate the multiple normative contexts or social spaces a person in his/her everydayness is situated as a member of a particular cultural community and the state politics. Individual liberalists conceive self-identity in terms of legal and moral personalities alone. In light of this conception, when it comes to the handling of cultural differences and related identity questions and rights in the political space, they put a promise on capitalism and stick to the principle of difference - blindness as the cornerstone of justice. However, this may be against the dignity, interest, and rights of individuals by the reason that cultural community may demand the recognition of individuals in a broader political space. Based on these Hegelian insights, education, deliberative democracy, and institutions are substantial to handle competing demands of recognition of group rights and interests without granting constitutional recognition for group rights. In this case, unlike the cultural liberalist interpretations of Hegel (such as Charles Taylor and Will Kyamlika), a particular reading of Hegel suitably modified by Jurgen Habermas and John Dewey offers promising normative accounts of social and political institutions that could help to handle the current political crisis related to identity politics. Both Hegel and Habermas propose an intersubjective recognition account of freedom. However, when it comes to more practical politics, Habermas appeals to the open public sphere and deliberative democracy instead of Hegel's most abstract sense of universality through reason (Habermas, 1985). Dewey was also influenced by Hegel, especially in his early works. Like Habermas, Dewey emphasises the role of deliberative democracy and open public space to address political and public policy issues. However, in a more pragmatic way, Dewey emphasises the role of education to build democracy, and democratic institutions, and to bring the overall growth of the society.

Dewey contends that education emancipates individuals from social dependence. Education enhances individual and collective efficacy through liberation and the
use of the diversity of individuals’ capacity, initiative, planning foresight, vigour, and endurance. Education develops the moral consciousness and personality of individuals, and in turn, it fixes democracy. As Dewey asserts, moral development and education are connected with democracy (Dewey, 1920/2004). Democracy for Dewey is more than the instruments of the government. It is our life where we adapt ourselves to a social environment where to make relations and build institutions. As an ideal of social life, democracy invokes traditional ideals of fraternity, liberty, and equality; however, for Dewey, it also has a moral meaning and connotation. He argues, “democracy has many meanings, but if it has a moral meaning, it is found in resolving that the supreme test of all political institution and industrial arrangements shall be the contribution they make to the all-around growth of every member of the society” (Dewey, 1920/2004). Dewey’s approach to democracy is connected with building democratic institutions. It is true that Dewey stresses on deliberative democracy. Nevertheless, the institutional building is also a primary thing to build a healthy democratic society. Institutions make democracy practical and realise the all-round growth of the society. In a system where institutions are built, deliberative democracy as a process and practical functioning of institutions use to actualise the collective ends of the society and individuals. Likewise, Dewey argues, “organisation as a means to an end would reinforce individuality and enable it to be securely itself by ending with resources beyond its unaided-reach” (Dewey, 1954). Thus, to conclude, education, deliberative democracy, and establishing democratic institutions are substantial to manage the issues of recognition, group rights and interests by addressing individual rights under the big picture of societal growth. Such systems in turn would in several ways handle competing ‘needs’ and ‘demands’ of recognition in identity politics without granting group rights and interests a constitutional recognition.

REFERENCES


онтологічних і гносеологічних засад сучасної політики визнання. Обґрунтовується думка, що гегелівська ідея свободи і визнання підтримує існуючу конституційну ліберальну систему для задоволення "потреб" та "вимог" визнання, на яких будується теорія ідентичності. Як підкреслював Гегель у багатьох своїх працях, у ході історії людства, Держава (включаючи створені інститути) - це Абсолютний Дух, який актуалізує взаємну свободу та взаємне визнання людей у більш широкому політичному просторі. Відштовхуючись від цих гегелівських тез, автор статті дійшов висновку, що освіта, дорадча демократія, інститути громадянського суспільства є інструментами для вирішення конкуруючих "потреб" та "вимог" визнання в політиці ідентичності, які не торкаються конституційного визнання соціальних прав та інтересів.

Ключові слова: Гегель; ідентичність; політика визнання; визнання; самопізнання.

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