AT THE INTERSECTION OF PSYCHOLOGY, PHENOMENOLOGY, LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS: PHILOSOPHICAL WORK OF ALEXIUS MEINONG

The paper focuses on the philosophic evolution of Alexius Meinong. Analyzing the ways of genesis of the Austrian philosopher, the author comes to conclusion about an inter-boundary character of Meinong's philosophical conception that finds its place at the intersection of psychology, phenomenology, logic and metaphysics, however managing to keep its autonomy. Such an inter-boundary position and a certain distance from the mainstreams of knowledge enable him to actualize new philosophical questions and discover new ways to investigate the objects that previously, due to different reasons, were believed to be unknowable.

Key words: Alexius Meinong; Gegenstandstheorie; hermeneutics; history of philosophy; noneism; Sosein; theory of objects.

Introduction

Despite Alexius Meinong was native Lviv citizen, his philosophical work has still been poorly known in modern Ukraine and his literature heritage is largely unexplored in Ukrainian scientific space.

Nevertheless, a figure of Meinong seems to be rather significant according to the historical and philosophical perspective. He was at the roots of ideas that later formed the basis of such philosophical trends as phenomenology and hermeneutics and influenced on the development of British and American analytical philosophy to some extent. However, his role in establishing of the philosophical areas has still been substantially ambiguous.

A philosophical concept of Alexius Meinong used to be a subject of scientific studies of the foreign authors in previous years. For instance, Gustav Bergmann focused his attention on a metaphysical dimension of Meinong's concept, having highlighted its realism, wherein he considered realism to be a logical result of an perfection conception, whereas some possible deviations into idealism were a result of ontological negligence (Bergmann, 1967). Arkadiusz Chрудzimski analyses Meinong's theory of objects considering the issue of internationality. He states that object theory is ontologically neutral and aims at newfound metaphysical system's creation, which is unlike any other system; moreover, he believes in its indisputable promise (Chрудzimski, 2007). John Findlay stated the crucial significance of Meinong's philosophical conception in the context of anti-idealistic mainstream of the first two decades of the 20th century in his classical work, having highlighted its quasi-empirical character (Findlay, 1963). Reinhard Grossmann (1974) considered in his study that the central element of Meinong's conception was distinction between objective and factual matters, however, Meinong himself could not accept that an ontological status of objective by no means demonstrated factual presence of objects. Dale Jacquette (Jacquette, 2015), builds his study via focusing on non-being and intentional semantics of object theory, ontology and extra-ontology as the central elements of Meinong's philosophical conception. Karel Lambert (1983) devoted his study to consideration of Meinong's conception in the light of independence of so-being (Sosein) and being (Sein). Terence Parsons (1980) focused on Meinong's "non-existent objects", according to analytical consideration and without any completed results, it could be assumed as an expression of subjective author's view. The studies of Kenneth Perszyk (1993) are also devoted to "non-existent objects"; nevertheless, in contrast to Parsons, a comparative analysis of the range of analytical works has been done, furthermore, the author has provided some critical results and generalizations. One more generalization of all Meinong's system and its connection with the concepts of other philosophers was performed by Richard Routley (1980) in his extended and voluminous work that could be considered the most fundamental study of an Austrian philosopher. Two papers of Marie-Louise Schubert Kalsi concentrated on Meinong's study of "objects of higher order" and their connection with Husserl's phenomenology (Schubert, Kalsi, 1978) and Meinong's theory of knowledge (Schubert, Kalsi, 1987). The works of Janet Farrell Smith (1985) and Caroline Swanson (2011) devoted to the discussion between Alexius Meinong and Bertrand Russell.

The analysis depicts the broad development of interpretations of Meinong's conception that provides a necessity of the further development with the aim of present position coordination regarding a concept of the Austrian philosopher or its exception (whether its invalidation will be identified).

Consequently, we can state that the philosophical work of Alexius Meinong has remained debatable till nowadays, and requires further scientific research.

Methods

The paper offers a new vision of historical and philosophical perspective of Meinong's philosophical conception and its philosophical potential in the context of modern philosophical studies.
The article aims at fundamental basis consideration of Alexius Meinong's philosophical work which combines the elements of psychology, phenomenology, logic and metaphysics. The following objectives are set to achieve the aim, namely:
- The genesis of Alexius Meinong's philosophical work and its periodization should be depicted and presented;
- The main intellectual tendencies and connections impacted on the genesis of Meinong's conception at every stage should be identified and characterized;
- The central positions of Alexius Meinong's philosophical work and the perspectives of its usage in modern philosophical studies should be determined.

Results and Discussion
The last quarter of the 19th - beginning of the 20th century was significant in modern history of European philosophy. This period generally associated with the in-depth philosophical and psychological studies, the initiator of which was ingenious Franz Brentano, one of the main merits of whom was Aristotle's returning into the issues of philosophical discussions. It balanced idealistic breakthrough of the German idealists as well as irrationalism and voluntarism of their direct opponents, and positivistic simplified understanding of human knowledge offered an opportunity of "striking a balance", hence it provided some chances to find an objective method as a way for philosophical and scientific truth.

Due to that fact, Alexius Meinong (1853-1920) deserves some special attention among all students of Franz Brentano. According to Arkadiusz Chru zdzimski, "he was the first philosopher who systematically designed a quasi-ontological subject that was much more general in comparison with a subject traditionally named as metaphysics or ontology. Metaphysics considers actual objects as actual and owing to Meinong, actual objects create only a small part that can be studied within the theory of objects. The objects themselves ("true" objects) are "beyond existence", due to Meinong, it means that they should be neutral to personal existence or non-existence" (Chrudzinski, 2007).

Historical genesis of Alexius Meinong's philosophical conception. There was no clearly defined periodization in the work of Alexius Meinong, nevertheless, emergence of his philosophical conception had several stages determined the important milestones of his studies. The periodization of Meinong's life and work differs in the works of various authors, particularly according to the objectives a paper is aimed at. Due to the context of our study, Meinong's career can be divided into three big periods: (1) philosophical and psychological period (till the end of 1880-s); (2) descriptive or phenomenological period (1890-s); (3) logical and semantics period (1900-1920-s).

The first philosophical and psychological period was under the impact of Franz Brentano. "Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint" ("Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt"; 1874) was a crucial work of the Austrian philosopher that introduced psychological division into "descriptive" (remote from physiology) and "genetic" (with the elements of physiology), it was key Brentano's work that influenced on Meinong. He took a concept of intentional thought from Brentano. Commenting that fact, Dale Jacquette writes: "Meinong begins with a critically analyzed assumption that a thought, in contrast to the physical world, is necessarily intentional. A thought is always a thought aimed at an intentional object. Brentano distinguished between psychological and pure physical, non-psychological phenomena based on intuition as psychological phenomena were always aimed at some object of intentions compared to non-psychological, pure physical objects that were not consistent with the rule. To respect means that you respect for something, some position is true, to love - means that you love something as it should be an existing or non-existing object of love intentions, to which love emotion is directed, whatever the mental state and corporal conditions are finally considered. Similarly to other mental states, whatever the intentional objects are things in the common sense, whether they are physical or abstract, condition or intentional results of contemplative actions or decisions to act, or it is non-existent state, on understanding which, an action is directed" (Jacquette, 2015: xxii). Meinong adopted the threefold phenomenological analysis of mental states that includes a mental act, its content and object of intention (see: Jacquette, 2015: xxii).

Arkadiusz Chruzdzimer but also agreed that young Meinong was within the frames of Brentano's scheme of intentional relations; however, he mentioned that he had borrowed rather the theory of logical judgement (die Theorie der Logik-Vorlesung) from Brentano than psychological theory. The core of the theory is in contradiction of transcendental and non-transcendental objects of knowledge, nevertheless the positions of objects are not described (value of propositional objects was recognized by Meinong only in 1902). However, the fact of abovementioned contraction demonstrates realistic approach and perception in the context of (refined) classical correspondence theory of truth (see: Chruzdzimer, 2007: 54).

The first research works of Alexius Meinong were the critical studies of David Hume, namely his theory of abstraction (Meinong, 1877) and theory of relations (Meinong, 1890) that formed the general characteristics of the period. The central problem that he was endeavoring to solve in Hume Studien I (1877) aimed at Hume's theory of abstraction, was a problem of nominalism. Content's connection (Inhalt) with its volume (Umfang) creates a range of abstractions: a result of combination between individual (partikulär) and particular (konkret) is a concept of personal thing or individual (Begriff eines konkreten Individuums); a result of combination between individual and abstract is a concept of attribute of personal thing (Begriff eines Attributs von einem konkreten Individuum); a result of combination between general and abstract is an abstract (abstrakt) object or attribute (Begriff eines Attributs "für sich betrachtet") that can be considered alone (Meinong, 1877).

The central issue of Hume Studien II (1882) became Hume's theory of relations that Meinong considered via subjectivism approach, the relations between subjective, general categories and internal (objective) reality were presented here. He claimed that "relations cannot exist without factual basis" (Meinong, 1882: 43), and made an endeavor to clarify the fundamental basis of actual relations. The relations were determined according to ideal or a priori, empirical or a posteriori, direct or indirect, etc. The detailed classification of relations was a result of his studies. Generally, Meinong divided the relations into empirical (or external) and ideal (internal - explicit or implicit) (Meinong, 1882).

The possibility of overcoming nominalism (that is a main feature of all modern philosophy) and objective and idealistic restrictions via the recognition of mechanism of human consciousness and the real world abstraction was
The result of Hume’s studies. We could state that maintaining a realistic position developed in the period of study under the guidance of Franz Brentano, Meinong had formed a solid basis for object theory that did not need a lot of refinements and became his main issue and work in the following period.

**Descriptive or phenomenological period.** Alexius Meinong concentrated his scientific attention on content (Inhalt) and object (Gegenstand) refinement in 1890-s. The previous studies provided an opportunity of overcoming subjectivism and awareness of objective knowledge the basis of which consisted of subjective knowledge interpretation. Nevertheless, in his first period Meinong theoretically relied on conception of Franz Brentano regarding two objects - non-transcendental and transcendental, the first of which was internal, while the second was external in relation to a subject of cognition.

The main issue regarding the general knowledge was expressed at level of language and word. According to Brentano and Höfler (Höfler, 1890; Chrudzimski, 2007: 116) a word (language) denotes external object of knowledge, however an object of its intentions is internal and immanent in relation to an object of learning that it implies. Such approach led to confusion about knowledge and became a reason of discrepancy between the internal knowledge of an object and general knowledge that was reflected in language. In 1894 Kazimierz Twardowski published his work “On the Content and Object of Presentations” (“Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen”, 1894). Twardowski offered to substitute Brentano's theory of two objects that used to be a variant of unified theory by a theory of mediation. An immanent object was substituted by "content" with the preservation of whole scheme of intentional relations. That work initiated devastating criticism of Brentano's concept regarding internal and external objects of knowledge, moreover, it dramatically influenced on the further development of Alexius Meinong's philosophical conceptions. Meinong copied Twardowskis’s scheme of intentional relationship with some modifications in his work "On the Objects of High Order and their Relationship to Internal Perception" ("Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältnis zur inneren Wahrnehmung", 1899). Primarily, modification refers to word’s relation to internal object. Only one object of knowledge is accepted, which is internal regarding object in the context of intentional relationship. A place of Brentano’s immanent object occupies content. According to Meinong, a word does not only name an external object, it denotes (bedeutet) it, having internal content as an object of intention. Simultaneously, word’s content impacts on act of knowledge as well as on the general perception of content.

The same theory of mediation was developed by Edmund Husserl, nevertheless, his theory did not need any immanent object or goal-setting, it completely focused on psychological content and intentional experience of object that almost entirely eliminated object of knowledge, having left it behind brackets (e.g. see: Husserl, 1901: 386; Chrudzimski, 2007: 118). The result of the changes in Meinong’s philosophy was close scientific attention and endeavors to explain the issues of abstraction and general imagination, study development about undetermined objects (Gegenstände), objects of higher order (Gegenstände höherer Ordnung) and in-depth analysis of common and distinguished features between ideal and real objects.

The third period of Alexius Meinong’s philosophical conceptions - so called "mature Meinong"; we denote as logical and semantic. The eventual establishment of famous object theory that was a result of logical and semantic considerations regarding objective nature of knowledge and methodology of any theory building, happened in that period. Object theory of Alexius Meinong is considered to be his most significant philosophical work and we share this view.

Meinong’s doctrine about objectives that differ from the transcendental objects that relate to objects as well as some words (objects of language) and sentences (language objectives) are interrelated in language can be regarded as a direct approach to object theory.

Objectives are the correlators of ontological structures, the main logical correlation - logical sequence (logische Folge) is nothing else than correlation between the relevant objectives (see: Meinong, 1902: 174-175). Nevertheless, due to Chrudzimski’s statement: "the theory of objects cannot be simplified to the internal complexity of nominal object as well as to bare existential position (or existential objection, respectively)" (Chrudzimski, 2007: 150).

The doctrine was expressed in the paper "On Assumptions" ("Über Annahmen", 1902), where he clearly admitted a propositional attitude to the objects of knowledge and began developing of his theory of objects based on his semantic theory.

The name of the work refers to threefold nature of psychological act that, according to Meinong, includes presentations (Vorstellen), assumptions (Annahmen) and judgements (Urteilen), where assumptions are between presentations as the first form of knowledge and judgements that are their perfect completion.

The paper "On Assumptions" (1902) with the previous work "On Objects of High Order and their Relationship to Internal Perception" (1899) established basis on which Meinong's program work "The theory of Objects" ("Gegenstandstheorie", 1904) was created. He constantly referred to two previous works in his well-known essay. "Object theory" became a crown and final result of Alexius Meinong's philosophical heritage. An issue that he tries to solve in the work he denotes as "an issue according to the appropriate place of scientific study of object (Gegenstand) which is taken pure and general - we are eager to know whether there is any scientific tradition among the sciences within which we will be able to perform theoretical consideration of an object itself or from the position of which we can pose a question at least" (Meinong, 1904: 496).

"The theory of objects" structurally consists of twelve chapters that include:

1. Introduction;
2. Biases in the favor of reality; 3. Sosein (so-being - V.D.) ta Nichtsein (non-being - V.D.);

Meinong endeavours to violate the limits of traditional metaphysics in the work. Everything that deals with real belongs to a posteriori science, therefore from its competence does not encompass all objects that do not have real and plausible existence, however, due to Meinong, the object quantity considerably excels the present objects.
as well as the objects with direct connection with being; and it is wrongly to exclude all objects from knowledge and denotes them undetermined.

The main terminological introduction in the work (in conjunction with the term objective introduced in 1902) is the term so-being (Sosein).

Sosein (so-being) differs from being (Sein) as it is theoretical data and not a physical or mental fact (Tatsache). It is data regarding an object in the light of objective that ignores real being or non-being. Thus, an object should not subsist to be an object of knowledge. Explaining the difference between distinctive functions of knowledge - judgements regarding being (factual function) and assumptions regarding so-being (synthetic function), Meinong introduces distinguishing mark between objective of being (Seinsobjektiv) and objective of so-being (Soenseisobjektiv). Consequently, Meinong offers his consideration at the level of the highest abstraction and from a priori perspectives of pure objects that do not have any empirical characteristics within the context of personal objective theory (see: Meinong 1904: 494).

In addition to description of principal methodology in object study in the context of object theory, the work of 1904 represents the theory of objects as a separate science, hence, it tries to insert into the circle of existing sciences and inherit all cross-disciplinary connections - initially, with psychology, logic, general theory of scientific knowledge (epistemology), philosophy. Eventually, Meinong suggested an idea about necessity of object theory existence in the light of a separate science, having posited it according to the level of abstraction near metaphysics, nevertheless, having stressed the principal difference from metaphysics due to its a priori nature (see: Meinong 1904: 517).

We can partially agree with Hilbert Railey that "The figure of Meinong (...) is crucial according to three reasons. Firstly, he was responsible for excluding mental nature in logic to a considerable extent. Secondly, he had arisen and constantly arose logical and metaphysical questions regarding nature and status of relations, numbers, facts, universal, contradictions, presentations, assumptions, necessity. Furthermore, he forced philosophers to study value problems contained such categories as "real", "being", "object nature", etc. Thirdly, the most important, he used traditional doctrine of logical terms and via problem synthesis and without any doubts designed conclusions based on a system that had been rotten. If the Orthodox terminological theories had been true then all fantastic hierarchy of Meinong's nonentities should have been accepted" (quotation according to Findlay, 1963: xiv).

Finally, the main task of all scientific studies of Alexius Meinong seemed to reach and keep balance between object, logic and semantics in the interest of truth. Therefore, we can completely agree with Dale Jacquette that "Meinong's logic and semantics provide possibility to treat ontologically neutral with the objects, consider their existence or non-existence within semantic frames that facilitate naming and description through predication (categorical definition - V.D.), considering, presenting in quantity and etc. despite ontological status. (...) Nevertheless, we should remember that the subject of our discussion is eventually rather true than wrong or contradictory in any case. (...) Due to the same reason we cannot deepen into logic or semantic philosophy, endeavoring to highlight truth prior to meaning that meaning prior to truth" (Jacquette, 2015: xxxi).

Conclusions

Having summarized abovementioned, we came to the following conclusions:

The genesis of Alexius Meinong’s philosophical work passed through several stages connected with the general context of his philosophy and personal development. The process can be divided into three periods: (1) philosophical and psychological period (till the end of 1880-s); (2) descriptive or phenomenological period (1890-s); (3) logical and semantics period (1900-1920-s).

The evolution of Meinong's philosophical positions was under the influence of other philosophical works where he analyzed, criticized, agreed or disagreed. The main intellectual impacts shaped his further philosophical studies in the first and second periods were: the influence of Franz Brentano and whole British empiricism (primarily Hume) and the impact of Kazimierz Twardowski and Edmund Husserl respectively. The third period was denoted by independence of Meinong’s position and design of his own detailed philosophical conception with the center in well-known philosophy of objects.

The philosophical evolution of Meinong's conception characterized by its gradual emancipation from the psychological conception of Franz Brentano and other views to achieving originality and completeness - from critics of nominalism and subjectivism via definition of the terms "content" and "object" to a complete integral system that pretended to be a separate science. The main concept of Meinong's philosophical work was distinction between the terms "objective" and "factual", "metaphysical" and "realistic" that had formed a new sphere included all approaches in the intersection of psychology, phenomenology, logic and metaphysics, however, it was not internally identical with them. An outcome of Meinong’s philosophy was that he endeavored to avoid extremes natural for the Continental tradition in the theory of objects, namely overstatement of logic (in a broad sense) and psychology, exaggerated attention to language semantics typical for British analytical philosophy with the relative philosophical and scientific truth presentation.

The subject of Meinong's philosophical search was tool identification of objective knowledge considered to be able to overcome contradictions between object, psychology, logic and language semantics. It has become one of the central philosophical tasks in the 20th-21st centuries. The principal Meinong's contribution into the heritage of European philosophy was the theory of objects that permitted to overcome limitations of scientific (mainly positivistic) and philosophical (idealistic-nominalist) discourse via the usage of interdisciplinary tools based on psychological, logic, philosophic, mathematic, language and semantic methods of analysis. Despite the range of existing studies, the conclusion has not been complete; therefore, it needs the further in-depth study.

REFERENCES


Статтю присвячено аналізу філософської еволюції Алексіуса Майнонґа, австрійського філософа і психолога, автора "теорії предметів" (Gegenstandstheorie) та теорії цінності. На підставі аналізу сучасних філософських досліджень, присвячених його творчості, авторка пропонує нове бачення тієї історико-філософської перспективи, у якій постає філософська концепція Майнонґа. Описано генезу філософського доробку Алексіуса Майнонґа та подано його періодизацію; встановлено та охарактеризовано головні інтелектуальні тенденції та зв'язки, що обумовили генезу концепції Майнонґа на кожному з її етапів; окреслено центральні положення філософського доробку Алексіуса Майнонґа та перспективи використання його потенціалу у сучасних філософських дослідженнях. Показано, що предметом філософських пошуків Алексіуса Майнонґа був пошук засобів об'єктивного пізнання, що мислився у подоланні суперечностей між суб'єктом, психологією, логікою та мовною семантикою, що зрештою стало одним з центральних завдань багатьох мислителів ХХ та ХХІ століть. Головним же внеском Алексіуса Майнонґа у скарбницю європейської філософії стала теорія предметів, що уможливлювала подолання обмеженості як наукового (здебільшого позитивістського) так і філософського (ідеалістично-номіналістичного) дискурсів через використання міждисциплінарного інструментарію, в основі якого лежало поєднання методів психології, логіки, філософського, математичного та мовно-семантичного аналізів. Основним результатом дослідження є ідея про межовий характер філософської концепції Майнонґа, що знаходить своє місце на перетині психології, феноменології, логіки та метафізики, але зберігає при цьому автономію. Таке межове положення й певна дистанція від магістральних шляхів пізнання дозволяють актуалізувати нові філософські питання й відкривають шляхи дослідження того, що з різних причин раніше вважалося непізнаваним.

**Ключові слова:** Алексіус Майнонґ; герменевтика; історія філософії; нонеїзм; теорія предметів; так-буття; теорія об'єктів; Sosein.